TARDIS
Implementing Secure Protocols on Embedded Devices without Clocks
Amir Rahmati, Mastooreh Salajegheh, Dan Holcomb1, Jacob Sorber2, Wayne Burleson, Kevin Fu
1 UC Berkeley 2 Dartmouth Collage
TARDIS Implementing Secure Protocols on Embedded Devices without - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
TARDIS Implementing Secure Protocols on Embedded Devices without Clocks Amir Rahmati , Mastooreh Salajegheh, Dan Holcomb 1 , Jacob Sorber 2 , Wayne Burleson, Kevin Fu 1 UC Berkeley 2 Dartmouth Collage The Problem Slow Brute Force attacks on
Implementing Secure Protocols on Embedded Devices without Clocks
Amir Rahmati, Mastooreh Salajegheh, Dan Holcomb1, Jacob Sorber2, Wayne Burleson, Kevin Fu
1 UC Berkeley 2 Dartmouth Collage
Slow Brute Force attacks on batteryless devices
Garcia et al., Oakland’09 Kasper et al., ISSE’11
E-Passports Smartcards
Amir Rahmati - TARDIS
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
No Notion of Time No knowledge about the query rate
1 Second? 1 Year?
Amir Rahmati - TARDIS
1 1 1 1 1 x x x x x 1 1 1
Use decay in SRAM to derive a notion of time
Halderman et al., Cold boot attacks, USENIX Sec’08 Gutmann, Secure deletion, USENIX Sec’96
Amir Rahmati - TARDIS
Stage 3 Stage 1 Stage 2 % Memory Decay Time Without Power 50 t1 t2 TARDIS gives 1 bit of info TARDIS gives 1 bit of info TARDIS estimates time Query Refused Query Accepted
Three Stages of Decay
Factors affecting stage lengths:
Stages can range from seconds to hours What about a thermal attacks?
Amir Rahmati - TARDIS
Materializing in USENIX Security 2012 https://spqr.cs.umass.edu/tardis/
time
Holcomb RFID Sec’07, IEEE Trans’09