structural imperfections in japanese automotive keiretsu
play

Structural Imperfections in Japanese Automotive Keiretsu Business - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Structural Imperfections in Japanese Automotive Keiretsu Business Groups: How Business Group Structure Failed the Business A Case Study of Nissan Motors College of Management Honors Seminar Spring 2008 David Killeffer Overview of Thesis:


  1. Structural Imperfections in Japanese Automotive Keiretsu Business Groups: How Business Group Structure Failed the Business A Case Study of Nissan Motors College of Management Honors Seminar Spring 2008 David Killeffer

  2. Overview of Thesis: Hypotheses • Basic hypotheses: – structural inefficiencies within Japanese automotive keiretsu business groups have caused demonstrable performance problems (vis-à-vis Nissan) and contributed to the macroeconomic recession in Japan since 1990 – Global competition has increased, and many keiretsu organizational attributes (acceptance of lower profitability, closed trading network, etc.) are ill- equipped to address this increasing competition (cross shareholdings, preferential inter-network trading, etc.) 2

  3. Research Methodology • Primary methodology: case study & historical analysis • Historical analysis established the framework for what keiretsu are, how they have evolved, and what their primary goals/attributes are • Case study format offers a clear application of hypothesis principles to Nissan, clear correlation • Primarily qualitative in nature, partially due to difficulty in obtaining accurate and translatable accounting data (very difficult to obtain desired datasets without insider access, different accounting standards) 3

  4. Japan: Number 3 Economy Worldwide • Despite India’s allure, Japan remains #3 economic power (after US & China) • 2nd most technologically powerful country (after US) • GDP at official exchange rate: $5.103 trillion • As of 2007: – 0% inflation rate – Only 4% unemployment – 3rd highest life expectancy overall, 1st among advanced economic nations – Six major keiretsu business groups - ~10% of economy 4

  5. Japanese Economy post 1990: Painful Recession • Slowing macroeconomic growth • Declining average economic growth rate each decade: – 1960s: 10% GDP growth – 1970s: 5% GDP growth – 1980s: 4% GDP growth – 1990s: 1.7% GDP growth – 2000s: ~2% GDP growth • Rising unemployment rates • Late 1980s, 1990: extremely high land prices, stock market crash 5

  6. Causes for Recession • Decreased domestic consumer spending • Domestic economy over-dependent on exports • Speculative asset bubble - over-inflated stock and land prices • Inefficiencies in keiretsu business groups – Primary driver of Japanese economy – Represent over 10% of entire economy – Largest employers are keiretsu companies – Accept lower relative levels of profitability in exchange for diversified risk profiles 6

  7. What are Keiretsu? • Keiretsu is an organizational structure that is comprised of several aspects: – Financial - cross shareholdings – Managerial - exchanging of management expertise, advice, training – Trade - preferential treatment given to partner firms – Exclusion - keeps foreign competition out of domestic economy – Political - tightly interwoven relationships with government – Social - “old boys network” of presidents and senior executives • Six main keiretsu business groups in Japan today, though many non-KBG companies form structural relationships modeled after keiretsu 7

  8. Brief History of Keiretsu • Predecessors: Zaibatsu business cartels: 1865-1945 (Meiji-era to WWII) – Family owned conglomerates – Family owns central holding company – Firms in several areas, complementary businesses – Tight integration with government, exclusive contracts to rapidly industrialize nation • Broken up by Allied Occupation after WWII, re-emerge as keiretsu (minus family ownership) 8

  9. 9

  10. Nissan Motors - Selected Case • Major international automotive giant • Number 2 in Japan for several years • Reputation for engineering excellence • Well-known brand, critically acclaimed car lines: Altima, Maxima, Z, Pathfinder, etc. • Economic weight greater than 1% Japanese GDP • Ideal example of member firm in keiretsu business group 10

  11. Nissan: Then and Now • As of 1999: – Massive debt: US $22 Billion, verge of bankruptcy – Lost domestic market share 27 years straight – Flagship vehicle, Z sports car, discontinued • As of 2006: – 10 new models introduced – Return to profitability – All key financial indicators up significantly over 1999 levels 11

  12. Nissan: The 1990s • Posted losses in 7 out of 8 years in from 1990-1998 • Lost 50% market share to Toyota domestically, lost domestic market share for 27 years straight overall • Keiretsu supplier network consisted of over 1400 different suppliers (all with cross-shareholdings) - unmanageable – 1 factory making 200,000 vehicles annually had six tire suppliers • Overpaying by 20-30% for auto parts • Factories and plants operating at 50% capacity • By 1999: US $22 Billion in debt (nearly 40% of total annual revenues) 12

  13. Nissan Motors, Inc.: Financial History Performance background - pre & post Renault merger, NRP, Nissan 180º Plan Fiscal 1999 Fiscal 2006 ⇓ US $0 (completely eliminated) Debt (automotive) Approx. US $22 Billion ⇑ US $88.7 Billion (+11% Net Sales US $56.4 Billion increase over 2005) ⇑ US $3.9 Billion Net Income loss of US $6.5 Billion ⇑ US $6.6 Billion Operating Income US $779 Million ⇑ 3,483,000 Vehicles Sold 2,404,650 ⇑ 186,336 Total Employees 141,526 13

  14. Nissan: Internal Problems • Complacent management team • Lack of exciting, innovative car designs • Lack of cross-communication between departments/divisions within the company • Non-productive workers remained on payroll, under-utilized plant & factories • Dropped production of premier sports car: Z 14

  15. Nissan - Renault Merger • Japanese government would not bail out Nissan, and keiretsu bank would not either • Nissan courted numerous buyers/merger targets: – Chrysler, Mercedes-Benz, Ford, Renault • Merger announced March 27, 1999 - Renault would give Nissan $5 Billion cash, take 36.8% ownership stake in Nissan • Renault sent core management team of 8 executives to Nissan, including Carlos Ghosn 15

  16. Carlos Ghosn: Le Cost Killer • Ghosn named new COO, announced “NRP: Nissan Revival Plan” on 10/18/99 • Goals of NRP: 1. Return to financial stability within one year 2. Within 3 years, reduce debt by 50% 3. Within 3 years, operating margin rise to 4.5% of sales 16

  17. NRP & Nissan 180º Plan • NRP: Oct. 1999 - 2003 – Reached 2 out of 3 goals within 1 year – All goals reached within 2 years • Nissan 180º Plan: 2003-2006 – Successor to NRP, more ambitious – Goals: 1. Produce and sell 1 million additional vehicle sales by 2006 as compared to 2003 2. Achieve an 8% operating profit margin 3. Reduce total net automotive debt to zero 17

  18. Changes to Nissan’s Keiretsu • Reduced number of auto parts suppliers from > 1400 to six , sold off ownership in nearly all suppliers • Major supplier cost reductions, 20-30% • Better economies of scale for remaining suppliers • Simpler to manage smaller number of suppliers 18

  19. Changes to Nissan’s Keiretsu • Establishment of highly-productive cross-functional teams, enhanced communication and blurred lines of responsibility/increased autonomy • Foreign leadership team and ownership (now Renault owns ~44% of Nissan) • Much less reliant on main keiretsu bank for loans and new venture financing 19

  20. Results of Changing Keiretsu Structure and Ownership • Significant debt reduction • Improved operating margins • Drastically improved communications between divisions • More agile - better able to respond to customer wants/needs • Several new product offerings (new Z , etc.) • Gained significant new partner in Europe - Renault 20

  21. Macro Trends in Japanese Business Today • Central keiretsu banks less likely to bail out ailing member firms • Many keiretsu firms loosening ties with other members • Foreign leadership, ownership stakes, and partnerships more common • “Lifetime employment” as a social contract diminishing 21

  22. Keiretsu Business Groups - Looking to the Future • Old goals and ideals of keiretsu no longer compatible with a globalizing market • Japan already industrialized - no need to exclude FDI or partnerships • “Lifetime employment” no longer feasible in light of global “hyper-competition” • Rethink keiretsu structure to raise relative profitability • Formulate strategic partnerships on mutually beneficial aims, not static keiretsu relationship 22

  23. Questions ??? 23

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend