States reporting of Annex II exports (AP) and the significance for - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

States’ reporting of Annex II exports (AP) and the significance for safeguards evaluation

Filippo Sevini1, Renaud Chatelus1, Malin Ardhammar2, Jacqueline Idinger2, Peter Heine3

1 European Commission Joint Research Centre, ITU Ispra, Italy 2 International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria 3 US DOE Argonne National Laboratory, USA

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Summary

• 1. The Additional Protocol
• 2. Export reporting and the Additional Protocol
• 3. Use of AP export declarations in State evaluation
• 4. AP Annex II and the evolution of its source –

INFCIRC/254/Part 1 (NSG Trigger list)

• 5. Discussion

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• The Model Additional Protocol of 1997 has enabled the

IAEA to gain access to a wider range of locations in a State and State-declared information.

• The State evaluation process is supported by information

derived from:

• obligatory State declarations and other reports,
• Agency’s own verification activities (e.g. Short-Notice,

Unannounced Inspections, Complementary Access)

• other safeguards-relevant information sources
• Early detection of undeclared/clandestine activities is

supported by satellite imagery, environmental sampling, forensics and information analysis

• Important indicators:
• trade patterns, procurement attempts
• R&D activities

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• 1. The Additional Protocol

• 2. Export / Import Reporting Requirements

Article 2.a.(ix)

• …shall

provide the Agency with a declaration containing the following information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II: –For each export: the identity, quantity, location of intended use in the receiving State and date … of export; –Upon specific request, confirmation as importing State of information provided by another State concerning the export of such equipment and material

In addition: Article 2.a.(iv) …shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing a description

• f the scale of operations for each location engaged in the activities

specified in Annex I to this Protocol

Additional Protocol Export / Imports Reporting Requirements

Annex II – List of equipment and non-nuclear material (based on IAEA INFCIRC/254/Part1 Trigger List)

• 1. I. Reactors and major equipment
• 2. II. Non-nuclear material for reactors
• 1. deuterium, heavy water, and nuclear-grade graphite
• 3. III. Reprocessing plants and especially designed or

4. prepared (EDP) equipment

• 5. IV. Fuel Fabrication plants
• 6. V. Enrichment plants and EDP equipment
• 1. centrifuge, diffusion, aerodynamic, CHEMEX, laser,

plasma, electromagnetic

• 7. VI. Heavy water production plants and EDP equipment
• 8. VII. Uranium conversion plants and EDP equipment

The manufacture… i.

• f centrifuge rotor tubes or

the assembly of gas centrifuges ii.

• f diffusion barriers
• iii. or assembly of laser-based

systems

• iv. or assembly of

electromagnetic isotope separators v.

• r assembly of columns or

extraction equipment

• vi. of aerodynamic separation

nozzles or vortex tubes.

• vii. or assembly of uranium

plasma generation systems.

• viii. of zirconium tubes
• ix. or upgrading of heavy

water or deuterium x.

• f nuclear grade graphite
• xi. of flasks for irradiated fuel
• xii. of reactor control rods
• xiii. of criticality safe tanks

and vessels

• xiv. of irradiated fuel element

chopping machines

• xv. The construction of hot cells

Additional Protocol Annex I - Nuclear fuel cycle related activities

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Processes Supporting Safeguards Implementation as Applied to all States

Evaluation and implementation cycle

Simplified model of evaluation cycle

State declarations SG-relevant information from open and other sources (incl. nuclear trade-related data) Analyse & evaluate (State evaluation) Plan verification activities Safeguards conclusions Conduct verification activities Results of verification activities

Consistency analysis process

Based on:

• State declarations,
• information from verification activities and
• safeguards-relevant information from all other available

sources

• E.g. technical cooperation, open source information
• Applied both to declared nuclear fuel cycle activities and

to other possible safeguards-relevant activities

Evaluating the Declaring State

• Do Annex II exports correspond to

declared Annex I activities?

• Is the scale of Annex I activities

consistent with indigenous need for the NFC* + declared Annex II exports?

• If Annex I activities are not for the

indigenous NFC*, are they reflected as Annex II exports?

Evaluating the Recipient State

• Are the Annex II imports consistent

with indigenous NFC* needs?

• Are there corresponding Annex I

activities for the Annex II imports? (if relevant)

• Are needs for the declared NFC*

reflected as Annex II imports, or as indigenous capabilities?

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Evaluating both States: Are known nuclear cooperation or trade agreements reflected as Annex II exports/imports, and vice versa?

* NFC = nuclear fuel cycle

• 3. Use of AP export declarations in State evaluation

State A has a declared centrifuge enrichment plant under

• expansion. Is the data consistent? Would further data be

needed…?

Annex I declaration for State A Scale of

• peration

Manufacture of rotor tubes Approximately 10000 last year Assembly of gas centrifuges Approximately 3000 last year Annex II declaration for State A Quantity etc. 2.a.(ix) (a) Export of rotor tubes to State B 1000 items

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Fictitious example:

Example, cont.

State A has reported the export of 1000 rotor tubes to State B.

• Is State B known to engage in centrifuge rotor assembly*? Are

there exports from State B of rotor tubes or centrifuge rotor assemblies?

• Does State B have a declared gas centrifuge enrichment plant?

If so, is there consistency between imports, assembly activities and installment needs in the declared plant?

• Are there other import activities of possible relevance to the

issue (other 2.a.(ix) exports to State B, trade statistics, etc.)? >>Possible follow-ups/clarifications to be sought?

*If an AP is in force, is the assembly a declared AP Annex I activity? If so, what scale?

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Main sources of trade-related data for ‘State’

• AP 2.a.(ix) exports from other States. [As relevant,

‘State’ confirmation of imports, subsequent clarifications and, if required, complementary access.]

• Statistical trade data (sums of transactions per

commodity and counterpart States)

• Transactional trade data (detailed records of export/

import transactions)

• TC (and other) procurement for ‘State’
• Procurement attempts for nuclear-relevant goods
• riginating in ‘State’

(cf. Session 23-10 " Analysis of Nuclear Relevant Information on International

Procurement and Industrial Activities for Safeguards Purposes")

Added value of 2.a.(ix) export information

A variety of uses strengthening safeguards State Evaluation, e.g.:

• External source of information relevant to nuclear fuel cycle activities

in the recipient State (whether the State has CSA/AP/66/VOA)

• Contributes to consistency analysis of activities in reporting State

(Annex I as well as nuclear fuel cycle activities)

• A gauge of nuclear-related industrial capabilities

(All of the above in conjunction with other information sources)

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Background – AP Annex II

Model Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected): Annex II is a list reflecting INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 1 (NSG TL, October 1995)

• Mechanism for updating AP Annexes provided in AP Article 16
• INFCIRC/254/Part 1 now in its 12th revision
• Substantial changes of INFCIRC/254/Part 1, particularly

following the NSG fundamental list review undertaken 2010- 2013

• 4. AP Annex II and the NSG ‘Trigger List’

NSG Fundamental Review 2010-2013

Natural Uranium Mining and Milling Uranium Conversion Uranium Enrichment Highly Enriched Uranium Pit Fabrication Reactor Fuel Fabrication

High Explosive and Non-nuclear Components

Plutonium Pit Fabrication Weaponization Industrial equipment Reactor Reprocessing

Graphite or Heavy Water

 50 Trigger list changes and 40 nuclear dual-use changes

TL: Complete nuclear reactors

• New

introductory note explaining the main categories of reactors

• Deletion of ‘zero power’ reactors exemption
• Implicit inclusion of thorium reactors (by removal
• f a Pu production limit)
• More specific reference to heavy water reactors
• Explicit decontrol of fusion reactors

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Main differences Part 1 1995-2013

Main differences Part 1 1995-2013 /2

• 1.8 Reactor internals (partially covered under 1.2 before),
• 1.9 Heat exchangers,
• 1.10 Neutron detectors,
• 1.11 External thermal shields
• 3.5 Neutron measurement systems for process control
• 5. Equipment for isotope separation of “other elements”
• 5.1.2.(a) 2. Active magnetic bearings
• 6.8. Heavy water upgrade systems
• 6.9. Ammonia synthesis converters or synthesis units
• 7.2. Plants for the conversion of plutonium
• + numerous changes to control parameters, explanatory

notes etc.

Other important differences

1.6 Nuclear fuel cladding: zirconium metal tubes or zirconium, threshold down to 10 kg (was 500 kg) 2.2. Nuclear grade graphite: threshold down to 1 kg (was 30 tons in 12 months) Technology and software not included in AP Annex II

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Procedure for updating AP Annexes

• AP Annexes may be amended by the Board of Governors

upon the advice by an open-ended working group (AP Article 16)

• Last raised by Committee 25 in 2006 (Recommendation 4
• f 2006/Note 45)
• Discussed 26-27 Sept. 2006 but no agreement reached –

wide range of objections

• Opportune moment in the future?
• 5. Discussion

Possibility to voluntarily report exports beyond AP Annex II

• The current reporting form requires an AP Annex II

number

• The future AP input system will provide for expandable

look-up lists

• However, it is already possible to select the Annex II

Section heading and enter the detailed information in the subsequent fields

• 6. Summary
• Reports on AP 2.a.(ix) exports have multiple uses in

safeguards evaluation (of both exporting and recipient States)

• Analysis of trade-related data contributes to analysis of

completeness of State declarations and strengthens safeguards conclusions

• The model used for AP Annex II – INFCIRC/254/Part 1 – has

been revised 10 times, while AP Annex II remains static

• Member States could consider ways to help improve the use
• f AP declarations by
• improving their own AP reporting
• voluntary measures
• updating AP Annex(es)?

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