Spectroscopy of Private DNS Update Sources Vocal and lyrics: Andre - - PDF document

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Spectroscopy of Private DNS Update Sources Vocal and lyrics: Andre - - PDF document

Spectroscopy of Private DNS Update Sources Vocal and lyrics: Andre Broido, Evi Nemeth, kc claffy & elves (broido, evi, kc) @ caida.org CAIDA/SDSC/UCSD WIAPP San Jose 22 jun 03 www.caida.org/presentations/ Acknowedgements Paul Vixie


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Spectroscopy of Private DNS Update Sources

Vocal and lyrics: Andre Broido, Evi Nemeth, kc claffy & elves (broido, evi, kc) @ caida.org CAIDA/SDSC/UCSD WIAPP San Jose 22 jun 03 www.caida.org/presentations/

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SLIDE 2

Acknowedgements

Paul Vixie Peter Losher Nevil Brownlee Betty Tso Yuen Young Hyun Brad Huffaker Margaret Murray Marina Fomenkov

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Part I Introduction

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DHCP

Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Configures IP addresses, gateways, nameservers automat- ically Has a server part and client part Server leases addresses etc. Client requests them and accepts them Client also requests renewals when lease gets short

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DNS

Distributed Database of Names and IP Address Mappings Since 1996 can do dynamic updates DHCP gives an IP address DHCP tells DNS DNS updates zone’s A and PTR records Life is good

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RFC1918 Private Address Space

Addresses in 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16 For use inside an organization Dont need permission from anyone Should never leak outside local site Can use DHCP and dynamic DNS Life should be very good

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Root Servers

DNS servers for the top of the tree Know about .com, .net, .org, .de, .uk, etc. Dont know about your private address space domains Don’t care either Getting zillions of updates for private address space The growth started in 2000 Life is not good

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AS112 Project

Root servers overwhelmed by update load Always refuse all updates Delegated the private address zones to other servers prisoner.iana.org: 192.175.48.1 blackhole-1.iana.org: 192.175.48.6 blackhole-2.iana.org: 192.175.48.42 These are anycast servers Several machines have these IP addresses Addresses identify a service not a network interface Routing system finds closest server to bogus updater Any ISP can run one, see www.as112.net Life is getting better, but

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29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5

time, day in May-June, 2002, PDT. Sat=Jun.01

5000 10000 15000 20000

#updates per minute

amer asia euro

Updates per minute by Internet Registry, D1

Figure 1: 9

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A week of update counts

Can see weird spikes at midnight, local time 4 in the US, 3 in Asia, 2 in Europe Can see weekday, weekend patterns Can see that Asians work on the weekend Can see that Europeans and Asians get to work on time Largest observed: 1200 updates/sec (Nov.2002)

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  • 0.3
  • 0.2
  • 0.1

0.1 0.2 0.3

time, hours EDT

100 200 300 400 500

updates per second

Surge at midnight EDT. Mon 2002-07-29

Figure 2: 11

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A spike in detail

Midnight US Eastern time Four-fold increase over about 2 minutes Spread is over about 6 minutes Clock skew, home users don’t run NTP We are very lucky they don’t

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100 200 300 400 500 600

Duration, hours

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

Updates cdf

Duration of source activity, D2

Figure 3:

60% of updates are from permanently active sources

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Who is trying to update the roots?

16 32 48 64 80 96 112 128 144 160 176 192 208 224

First byte of IP address

1 10 100 1000 10000 1e+05 1e+06 1e+07

#updates

updates per /16 updates per /8 cable, DSL

IP addresses of update sources, D1

Figure 4:

Hosts are behind DSL and Cable modem ISPs mostly Academy and medium-sized businesses (class B) are low

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Top 20 AS sources of RFC1918 updates

AS Updates Percent Cumul. 4134 7329178 7.51 7.51 CHINALINK, China 3352 6166266 6.32 13.84 Ibernet (TDE), Spain 7132 4559748 4.67 18.51 SW Bell, US 5673 3271669 3.35 21.86 Pac Bell, US 5676 2936073 3.01 24.87 Pac Bell, US 4813 2765227 2.83 27.71 China Telecom Guandong 4812 2644362 2.71 30.42 China Telecom Shanghai 852 2176242 2.23 32.65 Telus, Canada 6128 2083593 2.14 34.79 Cablevision, US 2828 1855065 1.90 36.69 XO, US 11427 1753091 1.80 38.49 Road Runner, US 7843 1504131 1.54 40.03 Adelphia, US 4760 1413921 1.45 41.48 Netvigator, Hong Kong 2914 1393102 1.43 42.90 Verio, US 1221 1378306 1.41 44.32 Telstra, AU 11509 1226816 1.26 45.58 Pajo, US

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4436 1142608 1.17 46.75 SantaCruz Community, US 11426 1135058 1.16 47.91 Road Runner, US 10994 1129898 1.16 49.07 Time Warner, US 2548 1091393 1.12 50.19 Business Internet, US

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Update properties

1 10 100 1000 10000 1e+05 1e+06

Updates in a week (bins at 2^k)

0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3

Fraction of sources or updates

%sources %updates 1/2 sources, 3-4 upd 1/2 updates, 784 upd

Source contribution sizes, D1

Figure 5:

Mules, not mice or elephants send the bulk of updates

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1 10 100 1000 10000 1e+05 1e+06

#updates in a week (bins at 2^k)

1e-6 1e-5 1e-4 1e-3 0.01 0.1 1

fraction of sources or updates ccdf P(X>=x) 2^k bin contrib. x^(-0.45) 300/x^1.5

Scaling of updates’ ccdf, D1

Figure 6:

Mules’ prevalence causes two scalings in ccdf

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0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

Interarrival time, sec

1e-09 1e-08 1e-07 1e-06 1e-05 1e-04 0.001 0.01 0.1 1

update fraction or ccdf upd.fraction ccdf P(>=X) exp(-x/8.5e-3)

Interarrival times, D2

Figure 7:

Exponential interarrival times in the total stream

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0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000

Average rate, updates/hour

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

%Updates or sources

% updates % IPs

Update rate distribution, D2

Figure 8:

Surprisingly, many sources are periodic

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10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Period, min

0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4

Fraction of sources or updates

sources updates

Update periods, D1

Figure 9:

Periods are 60 minutes or 75 minutes

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Can we blame Microsoft?

Maybe Updates are periodic 75 minute one is 5+10+60 Try an update, get refused back Wait 5 minutes Try an update, get refused back Wait 10 minutes Try an update, get refused back Wait 60 minutes Repeat forever and ever Windows 2000 Server does that Observed in test lab: 16 packets sent to server per update 13 packets received At 1200 updates/sec, about 30 Kpps at one server

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More Microsoft Evidence

Lots of hosts use ports in 1024-5000 range Win2k does that 44.3% of all updates are from that range 17 times more updates from port 5000 than 5001

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Need more info to determine who dunnit

NOPE, it’s MICROSOFT Need to determine default behavior of DHCP server/client Does it renew/expire leases at midnight? YES, NETLOGON Does it default to dynamic updates? YES Does it update periodically with either 60 or 75 minute periods YES

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“By default, DNS records are re-registered dynamically and periodically every 24 hours by Windows 2000 Professional and every 1 hour by Windows 2000 Server and Windows 2000 Advanced Server.”

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“A statically configured client does not communicate with the DHCP server and dynamically updates A and PTR RRs every time it boots up, changes its IP address or per-adapter domain name”

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The update sequence consists of the following steps:

  • 1. A client, using an SOA query, locates the primary

DNS server and zone authoritative for the record to be registered.

  • 2. The client sends to the located DNS server an as-

sertion or prerequisite-only update to verify an ex- isting registration. If the registration does not exist, the client will send the appropriate dynamic update package to register the record.

  • 3. If the update fails the client will attempt to reg-

ister the record with another primary DNS server if the authoritative zone is multimaster. If all pri- mary DNS servers failed to process the dynamic update it will be repeated after 5 minutes and, if fails again, after another 10 minutes. If registration still failed, the described pattern of the registration attempts will be repeated after 50 minutes after the last retry.1

1This is probably a typo: our laboratory measurements revealed a delay of 60 minutes, not 50 minutes.

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Who else could it be?

MacOS is not guilty, doesnt do dynamic updates at all UNIX maybe, but DHCP is off by default UNIX might be the small bump at 30 minute period Win2K by default does dynamic DNS updates to the clos- est enclosing domain If you are using 192.168/16 addresses Tries 168.192.in-addr.arpa, but If not configured, tries 192.in-addr.arpa, and If not configured, tries in-addr.arpa, and even arpa, but in-addr.arpa is served by the roots Now, referred to prisoner.iana.org anycast servers 6% root traffic are update SOA queries

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Conclusions

The updates are sent by Microsoft This was almost like a DDoS attack on root servers Took a lot of community effort to organize defence: AS 112 dedicated blackhole servers reserved addresses Update-related traffic still reaches root servers Software vendors should keep infrastructure stable

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