Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences Game Theory Course: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Oct 16, 2023 389 likes •448 views

Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences . . Single-Peaked Preferences Sometimes

SLIDE 1

Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences .

SLIDE 2

Single-Peaked Preferences

Sometimes voters’ preferences have nicer properties
Prominent case: candidates can be ordered from left to right
Voters: have a most-preferred candidate and then candidates

who are more extreme are less-preferred

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences .

SLIDE 3

Single-Peaked Preferences

b a c d e

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences .

SLIDE 4

Median Voting: A Condorcet Winner Always Exists with an Odd Number of Voters

b a c d e

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences .