Secure Tera-scale Data Crunching with a Small TCB Bruno Vavala Nuno - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Secure Tera-scale Data Crunching with a Small TCB Bruno Vavala Nuno Neves Peter Steenkiste UL / CMU UL CMU 47th IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN17) Goal delivering security guarantees for
Bruno Vavala Nuno Neves Peter Steenkiste
UL / CMU UL CMU
47th IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN’17)
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0.3TB per genome
S V P
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large state
S V P
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request
S V P
large state
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request
command
S V P
large state
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request
authenticated reply
S V P
large state
command
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interface
VHD
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narrow interface
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small TCB Large State Interface calls App Specific Trusted Computing arch. Haven
(OSDI’14)
VC3
(S&P’15)
MapReduce workloads
XMHF- TrustVisor
(S&P’13,’10)
(but Minibox has tens)
LaStGT
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Scenario: two execution environments
app’s execution flow
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the service code is running
access data in block bi is bi in memory?
app’s execution flow
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the service code accesses data in memory
access data in block bi is bi in memory?
app’s execution flow keep going
yes
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when data is available, there are no interruptions
access data in block bi is bi in memory?
app’s execution flow
handle page fault load data
keep going
yes no
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data memory pages are loaded
access data in block bi is bi in memory?
app’s execution flow
handle page fault load data validate data
keep going
yes no
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data is validated inside trusted environment, independently from service execution
access data in block bi is bi in memory?
app’s execution flow
handle page fault load data validate data
keep going
yes no resume
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service is resumed and
trusted untrusted
Untrusted address space
Hardware SGX/TPM
untrusted services
Trusted address space
state handler service code SMM
(State map manager)
OS
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untrusted untrusted
Untrusted address space
Hardware SGX/TPM
untrusted services
Trusted address space
state handler service code SMM
(State map manager)
OS
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0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Hierarchical
data is created Made for:
as data is loaded
unsuitable
210 220 230 240 220 225 230 235 240
Tree size (bytes) State size (bytes)
bytes/block 210 215 220 225 230
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
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chunk chunk
masterchunk
directory
state root
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state root directory masterchunk chunk chunk masterchunk chunk chunk
loaded separately
not loaded in memory
allows state validation
Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
SMM
(State map manager)
OS
state handler service code
When the trusted execution environment is created, only the code is available inside
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Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
SMM
(State map manager)
OS
state handler service code
grab root from disk
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Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
SMM
(State map manager)
OS
state handler service code
grab root from disk register state
the first execution
installs root
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Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
SMM
(State map manager)
OS
state handler service code state root
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before service code runs
pages NOT available pages available
OS
Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
SMM
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state handler service code state root data
page hit on access
OS
Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
SMM
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state handler service code state root data
page miss on access
OS
Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
SMM
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state handler service code state root data
seamlessly waiting to continue
OS
Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
SMM
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state handler service code state root data
Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
SMM OS
page fault!
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state handler service code state root data
Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
OS
page fault!
page address grab state component from disk
SMM
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state handler service code state root data
Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
OS
page fault!
SMM data
validate data
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state handler service code state root data
Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
OS
page fault!
SMM data
data is valid
invalid data => no resume (e.g.: TrustVisor)
invalid data => no accept, so no access (e.g.: SGX)
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state handler service code state root data
Untrusted address space
Trusted address space
OS
SMM data
page hit on access resume
fault solved, data accessible on resume, continue…
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state handler service code state root data
including input request, state root,
and intended identities/hashes
VC3 Haven LaStGT
hypervisor library SQLite (example)
KSLoC
(lines of code x 1000)
9.2 O(103) 17 7.7 92.6 library is small compared to real service SGX-based TPM/TXT based
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load&hash data upfront LaStGT entry/exit & block validation
2 4 6 8 10 12
MB 128 MB 256 MB 384 MB 512 MB
seconds TrustVisor LaSt-GT
LaStGT is Incremental, Faster & Scalable
LaStGT chunk loading
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0.0 0.2 0.4 128 MB 256 MB 512 MB 1 GB 2 GB ... 0.25 TB 3.2 3.4 3.6 seconds
5 10 15 20 1 MB 2 MB 4 MB 8 MB 16 MB 32 MB 64 MB 128 MB 256 MB 512 MB 1 GB 2 GB ... 0.25 TB seconds
experiment on hypervisor
through state hierarchy
to improve substantially
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Secure Tera-scale Data Crunching with a Small TCB
Bruno Vavala1,2, Nuno Neves1, Peter Steenkiste2
1LaSIGE, Faculdade de Ciˆ
encias, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal
2CSD, Carnegie Mellon University, U.S.
Abstract—Outsourcing services to third-party providers comes with a high security cost—to fully trust the providers. Us- ing trusted hardware can help, but current trusted execution environments do not adequately support services that process very large scale datasets. We present LASTGT, a system that bridges this gap by supporting the execution of self-contained services over a large state, with a small and generic trusted computing base (TCB). LASTGT uses widely deployed trusted hardware to guarantee integrity and verifiability of the execution
service through simple techniques based on virtual memory. As a result, LASTGT is general and applicable to many scenarios such as computational genomics and databases, as we show in our experimental evaluation based on an implementation of LASTGT on a secure hypervisor. We also describe a possible implementation on Intel SGX.
support the execution of either small pieces of code and data [10], or large code bases [11], or specific software like database engines [12] or MapReduce applications [13]. Recent work [14] has shown how to support unmodified services. However, since ”the interface between modern applications and operating systems is so complex” [30], it relies on a considerable TCB that includes a library OS. In addition, the above systems are specific for TPMs [10], [15], secure coprocessors [12], or Intel SGX [13]. Hence, porting them to alternative architectures (e.g., the upcoming AMD Secure Memory Encryption and Secure Encrypted Virtualization [36], [37]) requires significant
relying on idiosyncratic features of the hardware” [16]. We present LASTGT, a system that can handle a LArge STate on a Generic Trusted component with a small TCB.
IEEE/IFIP DSN’17 Bruno Vavala, UL / CMU, bvavala@cs.cmu.edu
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Steve Wozniak
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(excerpt from)
Intel’s Legal Desclaimer
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