Safety Study: Integrity Management of Gas Transmission Pipelines in - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Safety Study: Integrity Management of Gas Transmission Pipelines in - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

May 18, 2023 106 likes •421 views

Safety Study: Integrity Management of Gas Transmission Pipelines in High Consequence Areas Ivan Cheung 2015 Pipeline Safety Trust Annual Conference November 19, 2015 1 NTSB Background Independent federal agency No regulatory authority

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SLIDE 1

Safety Study: Integrity Management

  • f Gas Transmission Pipelines in

High Consequence Areas

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Ivan Cheung 2015 Pipeline Safety Trust Annual Conference November 19, 2015

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SLIDE 2

NTSB Background

  • Independent federal agency
  • No regulatory authority
  • Responsible for investigating accidents in

aviation, railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline transportation modes

  • “Board” made up of 5 members appointed by

President

  • Supported by about 400 staff in DC and 4 regional
  • ffices
  • Four modal offices and one technical support
  • ffice

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SLIDE 3

NTSB Research Mandate

  • NTSB authorization calls for

accident investigation as well as safety research

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“Conduct special studies on matters pertaining to safety in transportation and the prevention of accidents.”

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SLIDE 4

Safety Study vs. Accident Investigation

  • Differences
  • Proactive vs. reactive
  • Breadth vs. depth
  • “Parties” to investigation
  • Similarities
  • Written report
  • Findings and safety

recommendations

  • Public board meeting

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SLIDE 5

Safety Study Process

  • Internal assessment of topic suitability
  • Board approval of research proposal
  • Field work and analysis
  • Internal and external technical review
  • Board meeting
  • Safety advocacy
  • Tracking of safety recommendations

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SLIDE 6

Recent Safety Studies

  • Safety of Experimental

Amateur-Built Aircraft

  • Curbside Motorcoach

Safety

  • Crashes Involving

Single-Unit Trucks

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SLIDE 7

Objective of This Study

  • Evaluate the need for safety

improvements to gas transmission integrity management programs

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SLIDE 8

Motivation

  • Palm City, FL

May 4, 2009

  • San Bruno, CA

September 9, 2010

  • Sissonville, WV

December 11, 2012

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SLIDE 9

16 Integrity Management Program Elements

  • Identification of all high consequence

areas

  • Baseline Assessment Plan
  • Identification of threats to each covered

segment, including by the use of data integration and risk assessment

  • A direct assessment plan, if applicable
  • Provisions for remediating conditions

found during integrity assessments

  • A process for continual evaluation and

assessment

  • A confirmatory direct assessment plan,

if applicable

  • A process to identify and implement

additional preventive and mitigative measures

  • A performance plan including the use
  • f specific performance measures
  • Recordkeeping provisions
  • Management of Change process
  • Quality Assurance process
  • Communication Plan
  • Procedures for providing to regulatory

agencies copies of the risk analysis or integrity management program

  • Procedures to ensure that integrity

assessments are conducted to minimize environmental and safety risks

  • A process to identify and assess newly

identified high consequence areas

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SLIDE 10

Focus on Select Elements

  • Identification of all high consequence

areas

  • Baseline Assessment Plan
  • Identification of threats to each covered

segment, including by the use of data integration and risk assessment

  • A direct assessment plan, if applicable
  • Provisions for remediating conditions

found during integrity assessments

  • A process for continual evaluation and

assessment

  • A confirmatory direct assessment plan,

if applicable

  • A process to identify and implement

additional preventive and mitigative measures

  • A performance plan including the use
  • f specific performance measures
  • Recordkeeping provisions
  • Management of Change process
  • Quality Assurance process
  • Communication Plan
  • Procedures for providing to regulatory

agencies copies of the risk analysis or integrity management program

  • Procedures to ensure that integrity

assessments are conducted to minimize environmental and safety risks

  • A process to identify and assess newly

identified high consequence areas

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SLIDE 11

Focus Areas

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HCA ¡ Identification Threat ¡ Identification Integrity Assessment Preventive & ¡Mitigative ¡ Measures Remediation Data Integration Risk Assessment

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SLIDE 12

Quantitative & Qualitative Research

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Incidents Annual Reports NPMS Progress Reports Enforcement Accident Reports Literature Operators Industry Associations Researchers Inspectors Relevant Firms NTSB Investigators Review Data Analyses Interviews & Discussions Technical Review Operators Inspectors

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SLIDE 13

Operators’ Perspectives

  • 7 companies
  • IM plans and relevant documents
  • Semi-structured discussion with focus

topics

  • Multiple staff with various responsibilities
  • Demonstration
  • Historical, current, and future
  • Follow-up questions
  • Participated in external technical review

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SLIDE 14

Inspectors’ Perspectives

  • Federal inspectors and regulator
  • Teleconference with regional

directors and inspectors

  • Close coordination
  • State inspectors
  • 5 states
  • NAPSR

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SLIDE 15

Safety Recommendations

  • 28 new recommendations
  • 22 to PHMSA
  • 2 to AGA
  • 2 to INGAA
  • 1 to NAPSR
  • 1 to Federal Geospatial Data Committee
  • 1 reiterated recommendation to DOT

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SLIDE 16

HCA Identification

  • Dependent on GIS and

geospatial data

  • Need of buffering
  • Identified sites

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SLIDE 17

HCA Identification

  • Publish standards for geospatial data

used by pipeline operators (PHMSA, FGDC)

  • Develop a national repository of

geospatial data resources for HCA identification (PHMSA)

  • Assess limitations of current HCA

identification processes (PHMSA)

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SLIDE 18

Threat Identification & Risk Assessment

  • Eliminating a threat from consideration
  • Interactive threat
  • Dynamic segmentation
  • Complex risk assessment
  • Relative risk approach versus others
  • Use of “weights”
  • Consequence of failure
  • Desire for probabilistic model

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SLIDE 19

Threat Identification

  • Establish minimum criteria for

eliminating threats; documentation guidance (PHMSA)

  • Update guidance for evaluating

interactive threats (PHMSA)

  • List of threat interactions to evaluate
  • Acceptable evaluation methods

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SLIDE 20

Risk Assessment

  • Develop risk assessment training for inspectors

(PHMSA)

  • Evaluate safety benefits of 4 approaches (PHMSA)
  • Update risk modeling guidance (PHMSA)
  • Weighting factors
  • Consequence of Failure calculations
  • Risk metrics and aggregation of risk
  • Collect and share data to support probabilistic models

(AGA, INGAA)

  • Require all IM personnel to meet minimum professional

qualification criteria (PHMSA)

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SLIDE 21

Integrity Assessment

  • In-line inspection (ILI) vs direct

assessment (DA)

  • Usage difference of ILI between

interstate and intrastate pipelines

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Integrity Assessment

  • Implement plan for eliminating the sole use
  • f DA for integrity assessment (PHMSA)
  • Develop methods to eliminate operational

complications that prevent use of ILI (PHMSA)

  • Implement strategy for increasing use of

ILI, especially for intrastate (AGA, INGAA)

  • Require all transmission pipelines to be

piggable (PHMSA)

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Data Integration

  • Vaguely defined, hard to evaluation
  • Emergence of GIS
  • Authoritative data source within the
  • rganization
  • Empowering stakeholders at all

levels within the organization

  • Very different levels of adoption

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SLIDE 24

Data Integration

  • Implement plan for all segments
  • f pipeline industry to improve

data integration through GIS (PHMSA)

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Federal and State Oversight

  • State-to-state and federal-to-state

difference

  • Lack of coordination
  • State inspectors need additional

guidance, supports, and resources

  • National Pipeline Mapping System

(NPMS) needs improvement

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SLIDE 26

Federal and State Oversight

  • Assess and improve protocol guidance,

mentorship program, and availability of PHMSA SMEs for consultation (PHMSA)

  • Modify state program to include federal-

state coordination in inspections (PHMSA)

  • Formalize program to increase state-

state coordination (PHMSA, NAPSR)

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SLIDE 27

Data Collection & Analysis

  • Add HCA method, risk assessment method, and

piggable pipe mileage to annual report form (PHMSA)

  • Add previously identified threats and results of

previous assessments to incident report form, and allow multiple root causes (PHMSA)

  • Analyze relationship between incident
  • ccurrences and these threat ID and risk ID

factors (PHMSA)

  • In NPMS, add HCAs and increase positional

accuracy of data (PHMSA)

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SLIDE 28

Current Status

  • Held Board meeting on

January 27

  • Published report and

sent recommendations

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  • Government agencies have 90 days to respond
  • Meeting with organizations that received

recommendations

  • Performing safety advocacy
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SLIDE 29

Recommendation update

  • PHMSA has provided initial

responses; majority of them are considered open-acceptable

  • No response from other

recipients at this point

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SLIDE 30

For More Information

  • ivan.cheung@ntsb.gov
  • nathan.doble@ntsb.gov
  • www.ntsb.gov
  • Click on “News & Events” to see presentations

from the 1/27/2015 board meeting

  • Click on “Publications” then “Safety Studies” to

read the report

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