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s rsrt Case study: information sharing - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

s rsrt Case study: information sharing in incident response Tyler Moore Phishing attacks Challenges of information sharing To combat phishing attacks, defenders take down the


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❊❝♦♥♦♠✐❝s ♦❢ ❈②❜❡rs❡❝✉r✐t②

Case study: information sharing in incident response

Tyler Moore

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Phishing attacks

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Challenges of information sharing

◮ To combat phishing attacks, defenders “take down” the

hacked website hosting the impersonating content

◮ Interested parties must find the offending content and

request its removal

◮ Sharing timely incident information is often hard to do well

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Lack of coordination among defenders

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Non-cooperation in the fight against phishing

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Mule-recruitment websites

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Mule-recruitment websites

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Mule-recruitment websites

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Misaligned incentives in combating cybercrime

◮ Incentive on the party requesting content removal matters

most

◮ Banks are highly motivated to remove phishing websites ◮ Banks’ incentives remain imperfect: they only remove

websites directly impersonating their brand, while

  • verlooking mule-recruitment websites

◮ Scams without a clear champion often operate with impunity

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Identifying intervention points

◮ For many forms of intervention, from self-regulation to

intermediary liability, finding a suitable intervention point is key

◮ Look for (1) concentrations of badness passing through and

(2) an ability to intervene

◮ Lots of natural intervention points in fight against

cybercrime, such as ISPs, web hosting providers

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Benchmarking to correct information asymmetries

◮ ISP abuse teams help remediate infected customers ensnared

in botnets

◮ Some do a better job at dealing with abuse reports than

  • thers

◮ Without knowledge of comparative performance, there can

be little incentive to improve

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Benchmarking to correct information asymmetries

◮ Van Eeten et al. independently tracked infection rates at all

major Dutch ISPs

◮ Dutch government requested they not make the results

public, but share them only with the group of ISPs, and hide company information

◮ Two ISPs trailed the rest by a wide margin ◮ Equipped with this information, the security teams got

management to invest more and they quickly improved

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