Revisiting the Fetishism Objection Sebastian stlund - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Revisiting the Fetishism Objection

Sebastian Östlund (kontakt@sebastianostlund.se) KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Division of Philosophy

Overview

1. Instrumental Values and Commodities 2. Capabilities and Functionings as Ambiguously Valuable 3. The Normative Force of the Fetishism Objection 4. Formulating the Finalism Charge 5. A Note on How to Resolve the Tension 6. Conclusion

2

Overview

1. Instrumental Values and Commodities 2. Capabilities and Functionings as Ambiguously Valuable 3. The Normative Force of the Fetishism Objection 4. Formulating the Finalism Charge 5. A Note on How to Resolve the Tension 6. Conclusion Why is this important? We strive toward justice and well-being. We operationalise, measure, and aim to improve various states and freedoms. They require sufficient normative justification. Thus…

3

• 1. Instrumental Values and Commodities

Rawls (1971) argues that primary goods are ”things that every rational man is presumed to want”, and that ”[t]hese goods normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life”. Primary goods are proposed to be a currency of distributive justice. Sen (1980) replies that they are not a good metric of personal

• advantage. They do not take into account what goods do.

We should purportedly distribute the resources’ effects (evenly), not simply the resources as such. But why?

4

• 1. Instrumental Values and Commodities

We should purportedly distribute the resources’ effects (evenly), not simply the resources as such. But why? The idea is that Rawls’s primary goods are merely instrumentally valuable, but Sen’s proposal of capabilities and functionings are valuable in a more morally relevant way. What way? Functionings and capabilities are often called ‘intrinsically good’. But this is ambiguous between two

• readings. Korsgaard (1983) reminds us that we have the

(1) intrinsic—extrinsic distinction, and the (2) means—ends or instrumental—final distinction.

5

• 1. Instrumental Values and Commodities

Distinction 1 (Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Values): Intrinsic goods are those things that are good due to their inherent properties. Extrinsic goods are things that have value due to properties outside themselves (e.g. attitudes). Distinction 2 (Instrumental versus Final Values): Instrumental values serve to realise some other important value-object. Money is a means to get food, which in turn is a means to achieve well-being. A final value, in turn, could be well-being, or agency, or some other candidate. Positive final values are desirable, and are, ceteris paribus, worth realising.

6

• 1. Instrumental Values and Commodities

The objection Sen launches against Rawls’s project (and simultaneously against other commodity based accounts of justice) is that focusing on instrumental values is fetishist. This normative term has its origin in Marx’s (1887) expression ‘commodity fetishism’ for when we “regard goods as valuable in themselves and not for (and to the extent that) they help the person” (Sen 1999, 19). This allows for two readings, one under each of the distinctions (1) and (2).1 This makes functionings and capabilities ambiguously

• valuable. Re-analysing the fetishism objection could lead us

toward a theory that does not suffer from this unclarity.

(1) intrinsic—extrinsic (2) Instrumental—final

1

7

• 2. Capabilities and Functionings as

Ambiguously Valuable

Hurka (2002) claims that a theory is fetishist insofar as it treats instrumental values as intrinsic values. I would agree with Hurka’s intended meaning. It comes out in referencing Nussbaum’s (1990) mentioning “ends” and “tools”. This would amount to amending the terminology to fit Korsgaard’s (and therefore also Richardson’s (2015) and Robeyns’s (2017)). The fetishism objection is about treating instrumental values as though they were final values. If we make this terminological shift, however, we must be cognizant of the effects on the axiological foundation. That is, we must carefully disentangle the intrinsic from the final good.

8

• 2. Capabilities and Functionings as

Ambiguously Valuable

In Sen’s (1980, 216) words, “Rawls takes primary goods as the embodiment of advantage, rather than taking advantage to be a relationship between persons and goods” (emphasis in original). We can summarise the fetishism objection as stating that we should focus not on the instrumental value but on the (ambiguously denoted) value established by the dyadic relationship, R, between a commodity or condition, C, and a person, P, such that the functioning R(C, P) holds. As for (singular) capabilities, we may take this as a freedom relationship, F, between a functioning and a person, giving us the schema F(R(C, P), P). This can help us locate the value.

9

• 2. Capabilities and Functionings as

Ambiguously Valuable

Achievement relationship: R Freedom relationship: F Commodity or condition: C Person: P Schema for functionings: R(C, P) Schema for capabilities: F(R(C, P), P) Are functionings and capabilities intrinsically valuable? The intrinsic value lies not only in the commodity or condition, C, nor just in P’s enjoyment, but in the relationships F and R. So, yes. They are intrinsically valuable.

10

• 2. Capabilities and Functionings as

Ambiguously Valuable

This might have been the end of the story. If functionings and capabilities are intrinsically valuable, and the fetishism objection is about treating instrumental values as though they were intrinsic values, then what else is there to investigate? Well, this inappropriately combines distinctions 1 and 2.2 Intrinsic values are not necessarily indicative of (personal) advantage. Substitute C in R(C, P) with a debilitating disease, D, and it should become clear. The object would be intrinsically valuable, but finally disvaluable. So, intrinsic value is not to be identified with advantage. Moreover, we see that functionings and capabilities are not necessarily positive final values.

(1) intrinsic—extrinsic (2) Instrumental—final

2

11

• 3. The Normative Force of the Fetishism

Objection

If functionings and capabilities are necessarily intrinsic values, but not necessarily positive final values, then… How would the capability approach framework avoid the fetishism objection? By focusing on positive final values. But it does not necessarily do so, as indicated by the debilitating disease case.

12

• 3. The Normative Force of the Fetishism

Objection

Even if the solution would be to focus on such final values, it is not clear that the main issue for Rawls is the focus on instrumental values rather than final values. If, for instance, we were to secure a vial containing a pathogen, giving this vial to a person would not primarily be bad because it is a means, but because it is a means to something undesirable. Therefore, important normative force comes from claiming something of non-desirable value to be of desirable final

• value. This is a generalized form of the fetishism objection

that I call ‘the finalism charge’. The fetishism objection is a particular version of this more general “axiological attack”.

13

• 4. Formulating the Finalism Charge

To only focus on relationships between goods or conditions and people is inappropriate since it does not take the kind of relationship that obtains into account, i.e. if it is positively finally valuable. Thus, when Sen (1980, 218) argues that focusing

• n Rawls’s primary goods “still is concerned with

good things rather than with what these good things do to human beings” I pause to add an emphasis on what it is that these goods do to us.

14

• 4. Formulating the Finalism Charge

To (i) treat wealth as an instrument to well-being is arguably more benign than to (ii) treat a freedom to infect oneself with a debilitating disease as an embodiment of advantage simply because the second’s value resides in itself. The first example is fetishist. The other falls victim to the finalism charge. The charge amounts to treating something as a positive final value which in fact is not such a value. This finding seems somewhat negative, but it can be handled

• constructively. It can be taken as a sign that axiological work

remains to be done in the capability approach framework.

15

• 4. Formulating the Finalism Charge

What allows this finalism charge to arise? Robeyns (2017, 41), reminds us that “[f]unctionings and capabilities are value-neutral categories” and that they “are constitutive elements of human life, which consists of both wellbeing and ill-being”. I call the conjunction of these statements “the value-neutrality claim”. At the same time, it is argued that functionings and capabilities are typically the ends that we are to promote. This is a claim I call “the final value thesis”. The value-neutrality claim and final value thesis create

• tension. They jointly enable the finalism charge’s application.

16

• 4. Formulating the Finalism Charge

To treat capabilities and functionings as embodiments of advantage is like arguing that suffering and pleasure are embodiments of advantage on the hedonist’s view. Surely something has gone wrong in this story. To argue that suffering and pleasure make up the space of well- being is not a problem. To count suffering as beneficial, however, would be. Of course, this does not actually happen on the hedonist’s view, but something analogous at least appears to happen in the capability approach framework. We might not notice it, since the capability approach framework does not provide us with analogous positively and negatively valenced concepts. The tension is, however, present.

17

• 4. Formulating the Finalism Charge

The categories of ‘capability’ and ‘functioning’ are in this way on the same level as ‘mental states’ would be under hedonism. To claim that personal advantage consists in mental states is too uninformative to count as a full answer. The same goes for the capability approach’s conceptual apparatus mutatis mutandis. So, if we adhere to the value-neutrality claim, and accept the claim that functionings and capabilities are measures of final value (but not just positive) we cannot at the same time accept that they are measures of advantage. This grounds the finalism charge, i.e. that we should not treat finally non-positive states or freedoms as finally positive states or freedoms.

18

• 5. A Note on How to Resolve the Tension

The value-neutrality claim and final value thesis jointly underlie the finalism charge. The tension can be resolved by giving up either claim. The end-result will be that functionings and capabilities can be redefined as proper metrics of advantage, or that functionings and capabilities make up the space of advantage and disadvantage, but where new concepts for the valenced versions need to be developed.

19

• 5. A Note on How to Resolve the Tension

Proposed resolution: If we wish reject or accept the final value thesis but accept or reject the value-neutrality claim, we should introduce yet another operator into the schemas of functionings and capabilities provided above. This is a valuational function that serves as a gatekeeper, picking out (positive) final values. Call this function ‘G’ and let it represent either a set of properties {x, y, z,…, n} that are morally relevant, or the values obtained through some procedural valuational exercise {v1, v2, v3…, vn} – which does not matter for now.

20

• 5. A Note on How to Resolve the Tension

Proposed resolution: We need to capture a subset of the functionings and capabilities from the total set of value-neutral value-objects. From those R- or F-terms that either instantiate properties or are linked to procedurally established values which are members of the set G we create the subset of prudential value-objects from the total set of value-neutral value-objects. This task requires substantial theorizing. The function that G could serve is to operate similarly to how Kant’s categorical imperative is purportedly used to deduce maxims for actions.

21

• 5. A Note on How to Resolve the Tension

Admittedly, G is a formal construct at this point. However, it suggests that a substantial principle be formulated which carries significant normative weight within it, so that our relevant subsets of functionings and capabilities are appropriately picked out. If this is not done, then the finalism charge applies. We should avoid this. Pluralism works well, “omni-ism” does not.

22

• 6. Conclusion
• 1. Fetishism is treating instrumental values as final values.
• 2. Finalism is treating non-desirable values as desirable final
• values. It is a generalized version of the fetishism objection.
• 3. The capability approach framework is sensitive to the finalism

charge, despite giving us intrinsic values.

• 4. Theories, understood as substantial developments of the

framework, can avoid this issue by supplying us with a theory of final value – candidates can be objectivist or procedural.

• 5. Insofar as our theories should avoid being finalist, we not only

can, but should provide such theories of final value.

23

References

Hurka, Thomas. 2002. “Capability, Functioning, and Perfectionism.” Apeiron Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 137-62. Korsgaard, Christine M. 1983. “Two Distinctions in Goodness.” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2, pp. 169-95. Marx, Karl. 1887 (1992). Capital: Volume I. New York: Penguin Books. Nussbaum, Martha. 1990. “Aristotelian Social Democracy.” In Liberalism and the Good edited by Douglass, R. B., Gerald Mara, and Henry Richardson. New York: Routledge. Rawls, John. 1971 (reprinted 2005). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press. Richardson, Henry S. 2015. ‘Using Final Ends for the Sake of Better Policy-Making’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 16 (2), pp. 161-72. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2015.1036846 Robeyns, Ingrid. 2017. Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Re-Examined. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers. http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0130 Sen, Amartya. 1980. “Equality of What?” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1, pp. 195-220.

• --. 1999. Commodities and Capabilities. Delhi, New York: OUP.

24

KTH ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Thanks!

Sebastian Östlund (Research Engineer, KTH) kontakt@sebastianostlund.se