R EVOLUTION & P OLITICAL V IOLENCE TODAYS AGENDA 1 Short video - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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REVOLUTION & POLITICAL VIOLENCE

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TODAY’S AGENDA

Short video on contemporary gangs in CA Violence and the drug trade in LA Guatemala: high crime Nicaragua: low crime

The book

Central America plagued by violence Puzzle: what is the source of violence in the region today? And why does it vary subnationally? Guatemala (high violence) vs. Nicaragua (low violence)

The northern triangle

Why is CA so violent?

Three factors: Changing drug routes Weak/complicit states Competition

The coca trade

Producers: Colombia, Bolivia, Peru Bulk of cocaine goes: Colombia/Ecuador —> Guatemala/Mexico —> US border Mostly boats, some air

Coca labs

Coca typically grown processed and packaged in Colombia

US Southern Command

US Southern Command

“Eastern Pacific flow currently accounts for more than 68% of documented cocaine movement,”

Changing drug routes

In the mid-1980s,

• ver 75% of US cocaine

moved through Caribbean US/international efforts in Caribbean moved drug routes west

Changing drug routes

By 2010, over 80% was going through Central America Note: all our data is seizures; might be lots we don’t know! Boat to CA —> cross border into Mexico —> cross into US

The three factors in Guate

Guatemala and the drug trade

“When it comes to Central American trafficking, all roads lead to Guatemala” Drug routes either up through the west or in Peten (looks like a hat) What stands out about the dark purple areas? Ports, capitals, borders

Why not directly to Mexico?

Mexican government has cracked down on direct shipments to Mexico Mexican state >> Guatemalan state Traffickers constantly adapt to state efforts

Adaptation

In 2009 Honduras experienced a coup Traffickers began diverting VZLA —> DR flights to Honduras Traffickers constantly adapting; state often just pushing crime around the corner

The scale of the problem

$4 billion dollars in cocaine passes through Guatemala Entire region spends $3 billion on counternarcotics Disproportionate economic power gives traffickers huge leverage

The weak/complicit state in Guate

Three key actors The police The courts The prisons

The police in Guate

All over LA, police weird mix of ineffective and predatory Low pay Extortion How does Yashar describe Guate police? Cooperate with drug traffickers “recycling” problem officers No professionalization Lack of internal accountability

Not just poor countries

Killing of Michael Brown by police sparks DOJ investigation into Ferguson PD

Right in our backyard

Questionable legality of civil asset forfeiture in the US

Police vs. military

In many developing countries, states turning to military or militarizing police forces Higher capacity, more force, but human rights violations abound What would you imagine is the trade-off here?

How do citizens navigate this?

Someone steals your car but police are ineffective, corrupt, or both; what do you do?

Community justice in Guate

Trafficking and violence

Yashar notes that homicide rate is low in Western Highlands Surprising given that’s where civil war hit hardest Violence here most famously extra-judicial killings These are also places where self-defense groups formed!

Current research in India

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• We mapped people’s social

networks across 170 slums in Bangalore, Patna, Jaipur (India) Who they talk to regularly, who they spend time with, who they might ask for a small favor

Current research in India

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Political Connectedness Political Density Social Connectedness Social Density

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More well connected people, and better connected slums: Pay less in bribes, more likely to get special favors

How?

How are these communities with better networks able to get better police services? Leverage size and ability to coordinate to exchange votes for better service (clientelism) Very important in slums where citizens have few legal rights!

The courts

What problems plague Guate’s courts? Weak response/ conviction rates Low capacity/few judges Low tech High corruption Low training Security issues

Prisons

How does Yashar describe Guate’s prisons? Overcrowded Inmates can still dictate crime outside of prison Complicity of guards

Prisons as sources of crime/radicalization

Sayyid Qutb

(1906 - 1966), Egyptian author and theorist

The formula

Violence = drug trade + weak states + competition

Competition in Guate

Who are the actors competing over the drug trade? Cartels (mexican) Gangs (maras)

Cartels

Does presence of cartel alone produce violence? Need competition; under one-sided control relatively peaceful

Peten

Three factors converge in Peten Incredible given mostly a national forest, low population density Few police, very corrupt, weak state Border to Mexico and Belize

Gangs

MS-13 Calle-18 Drug dealing Extortion vs. Mostly urban areas, the capital

Migration and gangs

MS-13 forms in… Los Angeles Salvadorian self- protection from

• ther gangs

Deportations from US part of spread to CA, especially El Salvador

Extortion on bus lines

Huge number of Guatemalans depend on buses to get from outskirts/ shanty-towns to city center Gangs frequently rob/“tax” these lines

Gang control

But sometimes communities prefer gang involvement Gang presence,

• n its own,

!= violence

Gang competition

Gangs compete over extortion rackets Gangs also compete over control of prisons

Title Text

Homicidal ecologies in Guatemala

Drug flows: border with Mexico, ports, cities Weak/complicit state: police/ state weak, compromised Competition: movement of Mexican cartels south, gang battle over extortion rackets

Nicaragua’s different

Nicaragua’s different

The banana wars

1898 — 1934 Set of US interventions to protect military/economic interests

The banana wars

Interventions: Panama Cuba: occupation after independence Dominican Republic: 1916 — 1924 Haiti: 1915–1934 Mexico Honduras: like 8 invasions Nicaragua: 1912 — 1933

The marines

The Nicaraguan revolution

“Tacho” Somoza, Dictator of Nicaragua 1937—1979

Somoza family put in charge, rule from 1937 — 1979 US helps quash rebellion against dictatorship Sandinista National Liberation Front defeats Somozas, takes power

“Sandinistas”

The contra war

Ex-Somoza supporters begin insurrection against Sandinista regime in 1980 Contra (“counter”) revolutionary war extremely bloody

Iran-contra affair

US support contras as part

• f Cold War anti-

communism

Contra war ends in 1988 under leadership of Violeta Chamorro Contras reintegrated into society

Sandinistas out of power

Sandinistas surprisingly lose elections in 1990 and peacefully turn over power Military and police laws in 1990s to make security forces less “partisan”

Guatemala’s civil war

1960 to 1996, 200k dead or missing Nicaragua: rebels win quickly, defend revolution Guatemala: long insurgency that ends in negotiated defeat The “centaurized” Guatemalan state doesn’t change much post war Nicaragua able to loosen grip of military on state

The three factors in Nicaragua

Violence = drug trade + weak states + competition

Nicaragua: blessed by geography

Nicaragua: competition

Areas with more competing cartels do have more violence, but nothing on the scale of Guate “For the most part, gangs in Nicaragua are small youth gangs that are territorial in nature…involved in petty crime.”

Nicaragua: the police

How does Yashar describe Nicaraguan police? Widely trusted High morale/loyalty Community policing Non-partisan High accountability Separation of military and police Professionalization

Loyalty in Nicaraguan police

Nicaraguan police seem more dedicated to social good; why? Part of the story is the Revolution, but that was a long time ago How do these commitments persist over time? Or how do the police do to foster this? Or maybe it’s easier to be loyal when there’s fewer cartels around

Community policing

Community policing

Community policing

What does this look like in Nicaragua (and in general)? Develop ties to community,

• esp. gangs

Active role in deterring crime (neighborhood watches, etc.) Community decides how/what to police Cop as community problem-solver vs. crime-punisher presence/patrols

Why the difference?

If Nicaragua’s approach works, why don’t Northern Triangle countries switch to this? Part of the reasons are static: geography of drug trade + institutional “inertia” But part of it is a choice about how to deal with the drug trade

Letting the drugs flow

Some evidence Nicaragua has largely decided to allow drug trade to happen, “regulating” it "People in the government know that the drugs are crossing there. But as long as they don't generate too much violence and too much conflict and disrupt the social

• rder, they can just pass."

Letting the drugs flow

But this could all go south