R EVOLUTION & P OLITICAL V IOLENCE TODAYS AGENDA 1 Legacies of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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R EVOLUTION & P OLITICAL V IOLENCE TODAYS AGENDA 1 Legacies of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Poli-416: R EVOLUTION & P OLITICAL V IOLENCE TODAYS AGENDA 1 Legacies of war 2 What comes after war? More war 3 Trauma, justice, and rebuilding Housekeeping Thursday is review for final Answer whatever questions/doubts you have


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Poli-416:

REVOLUTION & POLITICAL VIOLENCE

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1 2 3

TODAY’S AGENDA

Legacies of war What comes after war? More war Trauma, justice, and rebuilding

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Housekeeping

Thursday is review for final Answer whatever questions/doubts you have Update website tonight/tomorrow

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https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/bfpd8q/ los_angelesarea_gangsters_fighting_for_assad_in/

Worlds collide

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Many wars eventually come to an end What comes after? More war Trauma and rebuilding

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By 2000s, 90% of all civil wars were “repeat” civil wars Same actors, at war again, after some peaceful duration Yet many conflicts just end (El Salvador, Peru, Northern Ireland) Why do so many conflicts recur? Or spur new wars?

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Post-US invasion elections bring Shi’a to power, led by Maliki Creates Shi’a-only coalition, excludes Sunni from power Cooperated with (paramilitary) Shi’a militias Lethal repression of peaceful Sunni protests, torture, mass arrests

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What did “the hell after ISIS” say about this? ISIS capitalized on these tensions by making calls to sectarian war

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Sometimes war recurs because winners abuse the losers This fear of abuse is why negotiations are so difficult in the first place Given war recurrence is very costly, why do this? Misguided expectations Fear, unsteady hold on power Weak control of security forces

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With uncertain hold on power, Maliki takes from Hussein playbook “‘In short, Maliki’s one- man, one-Dawa-party Iraq looks a lot like Hussein’s one-man, one- Baath Party Iraq.’”

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Uncertainty and fear of retaliation or challenge can spur post-conflict violence Relevant actors must have security guarantees These might be provided by third parties (short run) Or institutional arrangements, such as power-sharing agreements or decentralization (long-run)

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Civil Society

Some evidence that bringing civil society into peace processes can help reduce conflict resurgence Involvement of churches, political parties, social

  • rganizations, etc., increases legitimacy and trust

in post-conflict government Civil society organizations can constrain people who support warring sides

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Civil Society

Basic idea: have civil society representatives at peace talks to represent their constituents interests Growing interest in this idea, but there are problems

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Colombia’s peace process

Women’s groups, minority groups bring language promoting inclusion/protection/promotion of women’s LGBT issues

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“The agreement violates evangelical principles like that

  • f family values when it

equates respect for women with these [LGBT] groups” Evangelicals (~10 million) vote “NO” in high proportions

Evangelicals not on board

Rewritten agreement removes sensitive passages

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The whole referendum idea was to bring public in to peace process Experiment right during referendum Two agreements —> Choose one (repeat over and over)

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200% min. wage for demob. 90% min. wage for demob. No aid (baseline) Reintegration - aid: large transfer small transfer No transfer (baseline) Reform - land: Substitution program Manual eradication Aerial erradication (baseline) Reform - drug policy: FARC competes + seats FARC competes No compete (baseline) Political - elections: FARC pay victims FARC ask forgiveness No reparations (baseline) Justice - reparations: jail for all FARC jail for HR violators No jail (baseline) Justice - retribution:

  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0%

Pr(choose agreement)

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200% min. wage for demob. 90% min. wage for demob. No aid (baseline) Reintegration - aid: large transfer small transfer No transfer (baseline) Reform - land: Substitution program Manual eradication Aerial erradication (baseline) Reform - drug policy: FARC competes + seats FARC competes No compete (baseline) Political - elections: FARC pay victims FARC ask forgiveness No reparations (baseline) Justice - reparations: jail for all FARC jail for HR violators No jail (baseline) Justice - retribution:

  • 10.0%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0%

Pr(choose agreement) Voted no Voted yes

Voters very divided on questions of punishment NO voters wanted more punishment most of all

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Civil society

Bringing in civil society might strengthen agreements But also brings more people to the table who can veto agreements Might also bring (tangential) societal conflicts into peace building