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TODAY’S AGENDA
COIN lessons from WW1 What is COIN? Approaches to COIN Challenges and tensions in COIN
R EVOLUTION & P OLITICAL V IOLENCE TODAYS AGENDA 1 COIN - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
R EVOLUTION & P OLITICAL V IOLENCE TODAYS AGENDA 1 COIN - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Poli-416: R EVOLUTION & P OLITICAL V IOLENCE TODAYS AGENDA 1 COIN lessons from WW1 2 What is COIN? 3 Approaches to COIN 4 Challenges and tensions in COIN What does this have to do with COIN? Irregular warfare not quite new
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What does this have to do with COIN?
Irregular warfare not quite new technology But big, powerful countries struggled to adapt Redefined warfare
US experience in Vietnam (1970s) French experience in Algeria (1960s)
COIN is very difficult
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What is COIN?
COIN = counter-insurgency The approach a state takes to battle an insurgency What are the characteristics of an insurgency? Identification problem Hit-and-run tactics, indirect confrontation
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More than one COIN
“enemy-oriented” "people-oriented”
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People-oriented or “COIN"
Enemy can’t be defeated militarily Actions cause reactions Popular support is crucial “hearts and minds” Clear, hold, and build, Maintain active presence
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Enemy-oriented,
- r the anti-COIN
Enemy will only be defeated militarily Popular support is very unlikely (cards stacked against state) More operations? Less presence? Taking action is unavoidable Hearts and minds doesn’t work and is very costly
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The Manual
What perspective does the manual we read follow? Examples?
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This is a source of heated debate (defined by manual we read!) General David Patreaus
People-centered Enemy-centered
Karl Eikenberry (former chief of Combined Forces Afghanistan)
“The typical 21-year-old Marine is hard- pressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law…can he really be expected to do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal elder?”
The COIN Debate
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The Challenge of COIN
Eliminate insurgents; (how)? Don't take too many casualties Win over (or don’t anger) locals (how?)
Gather intelligence confrontations
- Min. casualties
- Min. abuse
Keep troops safe Hearts and minds
Note these goals are all in tension with one another! How?
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Eliminating insurgents: Decapitation
One idea for defeating insurgents is to kill or capture the leadership How might decapitation help? How might it hurt?
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Example: The FARC
Simon Trinidad Raul Reyes Alfonso Cano
2009 - 2012: FARC suffers multiple decapitations Less activity, peace negotiations begin
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Example: The Sinaloa Cartel
Sandra Ávila Beltrán Jesus Reylando Zambada Ignacio Coronel Villareal
2007 - 2010: Sinaloa Cartel suffers multiple decapitations Explosion in levels of violence around this time
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Why?
One story: orgs that are more bureaucratized are more vulnerable Another story: orgs that are more “loot” driven than “ideologically” driven are less vulnerable
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The locals: Minimizing casualties
Casualty (examples?) rates are always non-zero Intelligence is imperfect Civilians respond to casualties Though ethnic attachments might moderate response Which side of the debate does this finding “help”?
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The locals: minimizing abuse
Civilian abuse is always non-zero Why do troops abuse civilians?
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How to minimize abuse
One part of the story is troop quality and ability to monitor Troop quality varies across countries/groups (how?) Troop quality also varies across time
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The Troop Quality Dilemma
But most states have volunteer armies or limited supply (roughly) States want high-quality soldiers Use selection criteria to filter out “bad” soldiers (what effect does this have on soldier supply?)
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Priming the pump
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Bowe Berghdal (and other stories)
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Outsourcing
States sometimes use mercenaries or private militias (why?) What effect might this have on rates of abuse? Inability to monitor —> abuse
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Hearts and Minds: public works
Public goods, community engagement, road building (what’s the logic here?) USAID, Peace Corps, etc.
Public school project in Vietnam
Is it sustainable? And are insurgents unaware of this?
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Hearts and Minds: public works
How does this work? Can it backfire? “Man on the moon” syndrome?
- 1. Insurgent violence = local support
- 2. Public works reduce local support
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Hearts and Minds: Active presence
“sharing risk” from manual What’s the logic here? Presence is costly and risky, both for troops and civilians
“sniper at work” sign in Catholic neighborhood of Northern Ireland
Is it sustainable? And are insurgents unaware of this?
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