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Prospects for U.S. Russian relationship during D. Trumps presidency (pre)viewed through the prism of the two countries vital national interests. Simon Saradzhyan January 13, 2017. Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 1 Winston Churchill


  1. Prospects for U.S. –Russian relationship during D. Trump’s presidency (pre)viewed through the prism of the two countries’ vital national interests. Simon Saradzhyan January 13, 2017. Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 1

  2. Winston Churchill in 1939 : “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma...” Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 2

  3. Winston Churchill in 1939: “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 3

  4. When asked in January 2016 whether if Russia had made any mistakes in relations with the West in the past 25 years, Russian president Vladimir Putin said: “Yes, it has. We have failed to assert our national interests, while we should have done that from the outset.” Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 4

  5. Russia’s vital national interests (in U.S. vital national interests: Converge / Diverge / No equivalent: order of importance): • • • Prevent armed aggression against Not applicable; No equivalent; Russia and secession of territories from Russia; • • • Ensure Russian allies' survival and Ensure U.S. allies' survival and Diverge more than converge; their active cooperation with their active cooperation with the Russia; ensure Russia is U.S. in shaping an international surrounded by friendly states, system in which U.S. can thrive; among which it can play a lead role and in cooperation with which it can thrive; • • • Prevent emergence and/or Maintain a balance of power in Diverge more than converge; expansion of individual hostile Europe and Asia that promotes powers and/or hostile alliances on peace and stability with a or near Russian borders; continuing U.S. leadership role; • Prevent emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on U.S. borders; Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 5

  6. Russia’s vital national interests U.S. vital national interests: Converge / Diverge / No (in order of importance): equivalent: • • • Establish and maintain Establish and maintain Converge more than diverge; productive relations, productive relations, consistent with Russian consistent with American national interests, with the national interests, with nations United States, China and core that could become strategic European Union members; adversaries, including China and Russia; • • • Ensure the viability and Ensure the viability and Converge; stability of major markets for stability of major global major flows of Russian systems (trade, financial exports and imports; markets, supplies of energy, and the environment); • • • Ensure steady development Not applicable; No equivalent, though U.S. is and diversification of the theoretically interested in Russian economy, its integration of the Russian integration into the global economy into the global economy; economy; Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 6

  7. Russia’s vital national interests U.S. vital national interests: Converge / Diverge / No (in order of importance): equivalent: • • • Prevent neighboring nations Prevent the use and slow the Converge, but differ in from acquiring nuclear arms spread of nuclear weapons and methods of advancing this and long-range delivery other weapons of mass interest; systems; secure nuclear destruction, secure nuclear weapons and materials; weapons and materials and prevent proliferation of intermediate and long-range delivery systems for nuclear weapons; • • • Prevent large-scale or Prevent large-scale or Converge to a significant sustained terrorist attacks on sustained terrorist attacks on extent; Russia; the American homeland; Total: Diverge = 2; Converge = 4; No equivalent = 1. Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 7

  8. So why are relations so bad and volatile even though U.S.-Russian interests converge more than diverge? ( Who is to blame ?) • Conflicts over such issues, as color revolutions, missile defense and NATO expansion. • Almost no one in U.S. Congress has a stake in good U.S.-Russian relations. • Lack of solid economic foundation (In 2015 U.S. was 8 th on the list of Russia’s trading partners behind Japan, accounting for 4% of Russia’s trade last year. In 2015 Russia was 32 nd largest trading partner of US behind Venezuela). • Lack of bureaucratic foundation: Abolishment of Track 1 dialogue (presidential commission suspended), abolishing of NIS office at DoS, DoD, DoE (only NIC still has that office – see A. Stent’s book “Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in 21st Century.” ) • In absence of these foundations, personal relations between leaders disproportionally impact overall relationship ( see A. Stent’s book ) . Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 8

  9. What is to be done? • Acknowledge that Russia matters/cannot be ignored [ (a) prevention of accidental war (can escalate into a nuclear exchange – so deconfliction and transparency) and (b) proliferation (JCPOA), (c) counter-terrorism, (d) China, (e) energy, etc.)] – See “A Blueprint for Donald Trump to Fix Relations with Russia” by G. Allison and D. Simes in NI. • Acknowledge that the best outcome is selective partnership (in spheres where interests converge) and managing of competition (in areas where interests diverge) • Hold a summit and resume Track 1 dialogue to discuss (a),(b), (c),(d),(e), as well as arms control, cyber, conflicts in Ukraine/FSU and Syria. Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 9

  10. What is to be done? • Refrain at least for now from beefing up beyond the already announced tripwires in Europe (especially as Russia plans to cut defense expenditures by a quarter in 2017-18). • Emphasize U.S. adherence to protection of human rights and rule of law, but also stress regime change in Russia is not a U.S. objective. – Also keep in mind that democratic reforms can occur in Russia only if Russians want them and that promotion of such reforms from abroad have quite often backfired in the past. • Expand economic cooperation (Trump’s business experience is a plus). • Keep in mind that history matters. Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 10

  11. Additional Slides Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 11

  12. Russia will continue to matter to U.S./West in short- to-medium term • Nuclear weapons. • Essential role in preventing proliferation of WMD. • Most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism until Ukraine crisis. • Countering ISIS and al-Qaeda. • Preventing Afghanistan from becoming a failed state again. • Oil and gas. • Managing China’s rise. • UNSC and G-20. • Largest country by land area, vital for transit of goods. • Brains and technologies. • Potential as a spoiler. Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 12

  13. Russia by Numbers vis-à-vis U.S. (2015, source: Russiamatters.org) Category Russia U.S. Deployed strategic nuclear warheads No. 1 No. 2 1,796 1,367 Oil production No. 3 No. 1 11,029.7k barrels/day 15,043.5k barrels/day Natural gas production No. 2 No. 1 20,437 bln ft 25,728 bln f GDP (PPP) No. 6 No. 2 (constant 2011 international $) $3,498 billion $16,890 billon Global exports No. 15 No. 2 $340 billion $1,505 billion Global imports No. 23 No. 1 $194 billion $2,308 billion Bilateral trade Exports: Exports: No. 30 No. 16 Imports: Imports: No. 20 No. 4 Population No. 9 No. 3 144,096,812 321,418,820 Total area No. 1 No. 3 9,826,675 km 2 or 6,106,013 mi 17,098,242 km or 10,624,355 mi (Crimea excluded) Life expectancy No. 110 No. 31 70.4 years Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 78.9 13

  14. Country's GDP PPP constant 2011 dollars as share of world's GDP % Country Code Year 1999 Year 2015 % change in 2015 since 1999 CHN 7.1415% 17.1282% 139.84% USA 20.8608% 16.0181% -23.21% IND 4.2649% 7.0029% 64.20% DEU 4.9413% 3.3698% -31.80% RUS 2.9379% 3.0846% 5.00% BRA 3.1835% 2.8006% -12.03% GBR 3.1237% 2.3740% -24.00% FRA 3.4125% 2.3448% -31.29% ITA 3.3145% 1.9209% -42.05% Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 14

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  16. Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 16

  17. Simon Saradzhyan, January 2017 17

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