privacy preserving inference in crowdsourcing systems
play

Privacy-Preserving Inference in Crowdsourcing Systems Liyao Xiang - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Privacy-Preserving Inference in Crowdsourcing Systems Liyao Xiang Supervisor: Baochun Li Oct. 9, 2017 University of Toronto Localization via Crowdsourcing ? A d AC d AB ? B C d BC In a crowd, some users know about their locations


  1. Privacy-Preserving Inference in Crowdsourcing Systems Liyao Xiang Supervisor: Baochun Li Oct. 9, 2017 University of Toronto

  2. Localization via Crowdsourcing ? A d AC d AB ? B C d BC ‣ In a crowd, some users know about their locations while some don’t. With distance observations between them, how to localize each user? 2

  3. Localization via Crowdsourcing time t time t Upload Z i,t, D ij Upload Z j,t, D ji user i user j Prior estimate Z i,t Prior estimate Z j,t Return Z* i,t Return Z* j,t Run inference alg. ‣ Each user sends their prior estimates and distance observations to a central server, who returns the most likely position for each. ‣ What if users would like to keep their locations private? 3

  4. Privacy-Preserving Localization ? A d AC d AB ? B C d BC ‣ In a crowd, some users know about their locations while some don’t. With distance observations between them, how to localize each user without breaching privacy? 4

  5. Privacy-Preserving Localization ? A d AC d AB ? B C d BC ‣ In a crowd, some users know about their locations while some don’t. With distance observations between them, how to localize each user without breaching privacy? 5

  6. Particle Representation ‣ User’s Location ‣ A user’s location is represented by a set of particles Z i,t = { z 1 , …, z R }, Z t = { Z 1,t , …, Z N,t }. ‣ At time t, the server finds the most likely distribution of Z t given Z t-1 and D . Z ∗ t = arg max P ( Z t | Z t − 1 , D ) . Z t 6

  7. First Attempt ‣ To encrypt all particles and run the inference in the encrypted domain. However, encrypted operations are constrained. 7

  8. Particle Representation ‣ User’s Location ‣ A user’s location is represented by a set of particles Z i,t = { z 1 , …, z R }. Each particle is associated with a weight { w 1 , …, w R }. ‣ For example, if the location estimate is {z 1 , z 2 , z 3 } with probabilities {0.6, 0.2, 0.2}, then the location is more likely to be z 1 than z 3 . 8

  9. Particle Representation ‣ Users upload each particle’s weight {E(W 1 ), …, E(W R )} and distance observations to others E(D) in encryption. ‣ Server updates each particle’s weight. 9

  10. Privacy-Preserving Inference ‣ Server computes partial information Ci,r for each particle r of each user i ( j is observed by i): 1 Y Y E pk (ln w j,s ) · E pk ( d ( z i,r , z j,s ) 2 ) − c i,r = 2 σ 2 j ∈ N ( i ) s ∈ { 1 ,...,R } d ( zi,r,zj,s ) 1 · E pk ( D 2 ij ) − · E pk ( D ij ) σ 2 2 σ 2 X X (ln w j,s − ( d ( z i,r , z j,s ) − D ij ) 2 / 2 σ 2 )] . = E pk [ j ∈ N ( i ) s ∈ { 1 ,...,R } 10

  11. Privacy-Preserving Inference ‣ With secret key sk, user i updates the weight Wi,r for its particle r ( d js is the calculated distance between particle s of user j and particle r of user i ): i,r = w k − 1 w k exp[ E sk ( c i,r )] i,r X X = w k − 1 (ln w j,s � ( d js � D ij ) 2 / 2 σ 2 )] exp[ i,r j ∈ N ( i ) s ∈ { 1 ,...,R } Y Y = w k − 1 exp(ln w j,s � ( d js � D ij ) 2 / 2 σ 2 ) i,r j ∈ N ( i ) s ∈ { 1 ,...,R } � ( d js � D ij ) 2 ⇣ ⌘ Y Y = w k − 1 w j,s · exp i,r 2 σ 2 j ∈ N ( i ) s ∈ { 1 ,...,R } Y Y ' w k − 1 Pr ( z i,r , z j,s | D ij,t ) . i,r j ∈ N ( i ) s ∈ { 1 ,...,R } 11

  12. Privacy-Preserving time t U p l o a d Z i , t , E( Localization with w ) a Prior Z i,t. n d E(D) D . o w Crowdsourcing n l o a d C Run inference. i , t . Decrypt and update prior with Z * i, t. Upload Z i, t+1 , E( w ) and E(D) . Download C i, t+1. time t+1 Prior Z i,t+1. 12

  13. But, with R particles, adversary can still guess correct location with Prob. 1/R. 13

  14. Data Perturbation ‣ Idea: perturb Z i,t = { z 1 , …, z R } as Y i,t = { y 1 , …, y R }. ‣ Perturbation: add Gaussian noise to Z i,t that N (0 , σ 2 ) satisfies location differential privacy. 14

  15. Privacy Definition ‣ Location Differential Privacy: A mechanism M satisfies ( ✏ , � )-di ff erential privacy i ff for all z , z 0 that are d ( z, z 0 ) apart: Pr [ M ( z ) ∈ Y ] ≤ e ✏ Pr [ M ( z 0 ) ∈ Y ] + � , p and ✏ = ⇢ d 2 ( z, z 0 ) + 2 ⇢ log(1 / � ) d ( z, z 0 ) , where ρ is a constant specific to the perturbation mechanism we adopt. 15

  16. Interpretation of Privacy Definition ‣ Location Differential Privacy: the projected distributions of all the points within the same dotted circle are at most ✏ apart from each other. ϵ 1 < ϵ 2 ϵ 1 < ϵ 2 z” M(z)(Y) M(z’)(Y) M(z’’)(Y) z’ d(z, z”) ) ’ z , z ( d z ϵ 1 ϵ 1 ϵ 2 ϵ 2 ‣ As the distance between the two locations is smaller, ✏ is smaller, indicating that it is harder to distinguish the two locations, i.e., higher privacy level. 16

  17. Privacy Definition ‣ User Differential Privacy If we report Z = ( z 1 , ..., z R ) as Y = ( y 1 , ..., y R ), then the probability of reporting Y given Z is: Y Pr [ M ( Z ) ∈ Y ] = Pr [ M ( z i ) ∈ Y ] . i The user enjoys ( ✏ 0 , � )-di ff erential privacy with ✏ 0 = ⇢ Rd 2 ( Z, Z 0 ) + 2 p ⇢ log(1 / � ) Rd 2 ( Z, Z 0 ) . 17

  18. Perturbed Private Inference ‣ Collecting Y , the server computes the pairwise distances between each pair of perturbed particles as: q ˜ d ( y, y 0 ) = || y − y 0 || 2 2 − 4 σ 2 . 18

  19. How can we guarantee the inference result the same with the unperturbed case? 19

  20. Privacy and Utility Analysis ‣ Utility results: We proved is an unbiased ˜ d ( y, y 0 ) estimator of d ( z, z 0 ) ‣ Privacy guarantee: We proved our perturbation scheme satisfies location differential privacy and user differential privacy. Compared to previous work, we improve the privacy level by with the same utility level. √ R 20

  21. Performance Evaluation ‣ Overhead Running Time of the MAP Inference Convergence of the Particle Distribution 0.8 Average Running Time (ms) R = 50 Highest Particle Weight R = 75 12000 R = 100 0.6 0.4 7000 0.2 2000 0 0 20 40 60 80 10 20 30 40 50 No. of Iterations (5 Iterations × 15 Timeslots) Number of Users 21

  22. Performance Evaluation ‣ Simulation results using random way point (RWP) model. Position Error of 20 Users( σ = 0.5) Position Error of 20 Users(R = 100) 1 1 R = 50 R = 75 R = 100 0.8 0.8 R = 125 R = 150 0.6 0.6 CDF CDF Unperturbed 0.4 0.4 σ = 0.2 σ = 0.7 σ = 1.0 0.2 0.2 σ = 1.5 σ = 2.3 0 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25 Position Error (m) Position Error (m) 22

  23. Performance Evaluation ‣ Comparison experiment and real-world experimental results. Comparison with Hilbert Curves on RWP Model Average Position Error of 7 Users in Different Settings 1 10 Unperturbed σ = 0.2, ε = 23.23 Average Position Error(m) 0.8 8 σ = 0.7, ε = 4.09 σ = 1.0, ε = 2.65 σ = 2.3, ε = 1.03 0.6 6 CDF 0.4 4 Hilbert Curves (n = 64) Hilbert Curves (n = 512) 2 0.2 Private Inference ( σ = 5.0) Private Inference ( σ = 10.0) 0 0 0 5 10 15 0 10 20 30 40 Sequence number Position Error (m) 23

  24. Thank you! 24

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend