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Towards Privacy-Preserving Ontology Publishing F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah Technische Universitt Dresden October 27, 2018 F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 1 / 1 Privacy-Preserving Ontology Publishing In privacy,


  1. Towards Privacy-Preserving Ontology Publishing F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah Technische Universität Dresden October 27, 2018 F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 1 / 1

  2. Privacy-Preserving Ontology Publishing In privacy, repair may not be enough! Given an ontology O , a policy P = { α 1 , . . . , α n } is a finite set of axioms to be hidden, i.e., an attacker should not be able to see α i as a consequence of O . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 2 / 1

  3. Privacy-Preserving Ontology Publishing In privacy, repair may not be enough! Given an ontology O , a policy P = { α 1 , . . . , α n } is a finite set of axioms to be hidden, i.e., an attacker should not be able to see α i as a consequence of O . Suppose O | = α i for some α i ∈ P i.e., O does not comply with P . Let O ′ be a repair of O w.r.t. α i such that O ′ �| = α i for all i . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 2 / 1

  4. Privacy-Preserving Ontology Publishing In privacy, repair may not be enough! Given an ontology O , a policy P = { α 1 , . . . , α n } is a finite set of axioms to be hidden, i.e., an attacker should not be able to see α i as a consequence of O . Suppose O | = α i for some α i ∈ P i.e., O does not comply with P . Let O ′ be a repair of O w.r.t. α i such that O ′ �| = α i for all i . But, when O ′ is published on the Web, . . . an attacker may know an ontology O ′′ such that O ′′ �| = α i , but O ′ ∪ O ′′ | = α i . In this case, it is still not safe to publish O ′ . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 2 / 1

  5. Privacy-Preserving Ontology Publishing What people already did: In (Cuenca Grau & Kostylev, 2016): Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing Information to be published: a relational dataset with (labeled) nulls Policy is a conjunctive query. Considering three privacy properties when publishing datasets: policy-compliant, policy-safety, and optimality . Published information does not have background knowledge. What we want to do: Privacy-Preserving Ontology Publishing (PPOP) Addressed in the context of Description Logic Ontologies F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 3 / 1

  6. PPOP with Role-Free ABoxes in EL Starting point : EL Ontologies with role-free ABoxes and empty TBoxes. An ABox A is role-free if all the axioms β ∈ A are only in the form of D ( a ) . W.l.o.g., only one concept assertion in A speaks about one individual If C 1 ( a ) ∈ A and C 2 ( a ) ∈ A , then ( C 1 ⊓ C 2 )( a ) ∈ A reduced Safe Ontologies − − − − → Safe Concepts Information to be published for an individual a : an EL concept C Policy is a finite set of EL concepts D 1 , . . . , D p , such that D i �≡ ⊤ for all i ∈ { 1 , . . . , p } . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 4 / 1

  7. Compliance, Safety, and Optimality Given a policy P = { D 1 , . . . , D p } and an EL concept C , the EL concept C ′ is compliant with P if C ′ �⊑ D i for all i ∈ { 1 , . . . , p } . safe for P if C ′ ⊓ C ′′ is compliant with P for all EL -concepts C ′′ that are compliant with P . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 5 / 1

  8. Compliance, Safety, and Optimality Given a policy P = { D 1 , . . . , D p } and an EL concept C , the EL concept C ′ is compliant with P if C ′ �⊑ D i for all i ∈ { 1 , . . . , p } . safe for P if C ′ ⊓ C ′′ is compliant with P for all EL -concepts C ′′ that are compliant with P . a P -compliant (safe) generalization of C if C ⊑ C ′ and C ′ is compliant with (safe for) P . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 5 / 1

  9. Compliance, Safety, and Optimality Given a policy P = { D 1 , . . . , D p } and an EL concept C , the EL concept C ′ is compliant with P if C ′ �⊑ D i for all i ∈ { 1 , . . . , p } . safe for P if C ′ ⊓ C ′′ is compliant with P for all EL -concepts C ′′ that are compliant with P . a P -compliant (safe) generalization of C if C ⊑ C ′ and C ′ is compliant with (safe for) P . a P -optimal compliant (safe) generalization of C if C ⊑ C ′ , C ′ is a P -compliant (safe) generalization of C , and there is no P -compliant (safe) generalization of C s.t. C ′′ ⊏ C ′ . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 5 / 1

  10. Illustration on Compliance, Safety, and Optimality Consider a policy P = { D } specifying what information should be kept “secret” about linda D = Patient ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ ∃ works _ in . Cardiology ) Assume information C is published about linda C = Patient ⊓ Female ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ Male ⊓ ∃ works _ in . Cardiology ) Note C is not compliant with D , i.e., C ⊑ D . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 6 / 1

  11. Illustration on Compliance, Safety, and Optimality Consider a policy P = { D } specifying what information should be kept “secret” about linda D = Patient ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ ∃ works _ in . Cardiology ) Assume information C is published about linda C = Patient ⊓ Female ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ Male ⊓ ∃ works _ in . Cardiology ) Note C is not compliant with D , i.e., C ⊑ D . Generalizing C to C 1 yields a compliant concept C 1 = Female ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ Male ⊓ ∃ works _ in . Cardiology ) But, C 1 is not safe for D since if the attacker knows Patient ( linda ) , then C 1 ⊓ Patient ⊑ D is revealed. F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 6 / 1

  12. Illustration on Compliance, Safety, and Optimality Consider a policy P = { D } specifying what information should be kept “secret” about linda D = Patient ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ ∃ works _ in . Cardiology ) Assume information C is published about linda C = Patient ⊓ Female ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ Male ⊓ ∃ works _ in . Cardiology ) Note C is not compliant with D , i.e., C ⊑ D . Let us make it safe ! C 2 = Female ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ Male ⊓ ∃ works _ in . ⊤ ) But, C 2 is still not optimal since more information than necessary is removed. F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 6 / 1

  13. Illustration on Compliance, Safety, and Optimality Consider a policy P = { D } specifying what information should be kept “secret” about linda D = Patient ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ ∃ works _ in . Cardiology ) Assume information C is published about linda C = Patient ⊓ Female ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ Male ⊓ ∃ works _ in . Cardiology ) Note C is not compliant with D , i.e., C ⊑ D . Let us make it safe ! C 2 = Female ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ Male ⊓ ∃ works _ in . ⊤ ) But, C 2 is still not optimal since more information than necessary is removed. Make it optimal ! C 3 = Female ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Doctor ⊓ Male ⊓ ∃ works _ in . ⊤ ) ⊓ ∃ seen _ by . ( Male ⊓ ∃ works _ in . Cardiology ) F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 6 / 1

  14. Characterizing Compliant Let con ( C ) be the set of all atoms A or ∃ r . E occurring in the top-level conjunction of C . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 7 / 1

  15. Characterizing Compliant Let con ( C ) be the set of all atoms A or ∃ r . E occurring in the top-level conjunction of C . con ( C ) covers con ( D ) iff for all F ∈ con ( D ) , there is E ∈ con ( C ) such that E ⊑ F F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 7 / 1

  16. Characterizing Compliant Let con ( C ) be the set of all atoms A or ∃ r . E occurring in the top-level conjunction of C . con ( C ) covers con ( D ) iff for all F ∈ con ( D ) , there is E ∈ con ( C ) such that E ⊑ F ⇒ Characterizing C ⊑ D . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 7 / 1

  17. Characterizing Compliant Let con ( C ) be the set of all atoms A or ∃ r . E occurring in the top-level conjunction of C . con ( C ) covers con ( D ) iff for all F ∈ con ( D ) , there is E ∈ con ( C ) such that E ⊑ F ⇒ Characterizing C ⊑ D . Compliance C is compliant with P iff con ( C ) does not cover con ( D i ) for any i ∈ { 1 , . . . , p } . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 7 / 1

  18. Characterizing Compliant Let con ( C ) be the set of all atoms A or ∃ r . E occurring in the top-level conjunction of C . con ( C ) covers con ( D ) iff for all F ∈ con ( D ) , there is E ∈ con ( C ) such that E ⊑ F ⇒ Characterizing C ⊑ D . Compliance C is compliant with P iff con ( C ) does not cover con ( D i ) for any i ∈ { 1 , . . . , p } . Complexity for Compliance Deciding whether C ′ is compliant w.r.t. P is in PTime. F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 7 / 1

  19. Characterizing Compliant Let con ( C ) be the set of all atoms A or ∃ r . E occurring in the top-level conjunction of C . con ( C ) covers con ( D ) iff for all F ∈ con ( D ) , there is E ∈ con ( C ) such that E ⊑ F ⇒ Characterizing C ⊑ D . Compliance C is compliant with P iff con ( C ) does not cover con ( D i ) for any i ∈ { 1 , . . . , p } . Complexity for Compliance Deciding whether C ′ is compliant w.r.t. P is in PTime. One optimal P -compliant generalization can be computed in ExpTime . The set of all optimal P -compliant generalizations can be computed in ExpTime . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 7 / 1

  20. Characterizing Safety Assume P is redundant-free : every D i , D j ∈ P are incomparable w.r.t. subsumption . F. Baader & A. Nuradiansyah DL 2018 October 27, 2018 8 / 1

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