Prevalence of Malicious DNS and Proposed Solutions Christopher - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

prevalence of malicious dns and proposed solutions
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Prevalence of Malicious DNS and Proposed Solutions Christopher - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Prevalence of Malicious DNS and Proposed Solutions Christopher Davis and Zachary Hanif Sunday, March 11, 12 Introduction Chris Davis Emerging Threats & University of Toronto Fellow IPTrust, DefIntel, Damballa... Mariposa, Conficker,


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Prevalence of Malicious DNS and Proposed Solutions

Christopher Davis and Zachary Hanif

Sunday, March 11, 12

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Introduction Chris Davis

Emerging Threats & University of Toronto Fellow IPTrust, DefIntel, Damballa... Mariposa, Conficker, Storm...

Sunday, March 11, 12

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Introduction Zach Hanif

IPTrust, Georgia Tech, GTRI Mariposa, Zeus, many other APTs Machine Learning, Big Data (Hadoop, Cassandra...) Many additional Botnet takedowns and sinkholes

Sunday, March 11, 12

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What Are We Doing Now

60-80k malware samples processed daily 5 separate malware analysis systems 10’s of thousands of bad domains per day Tracking > 20k active Botnets

Sunday, March 11, 12

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The Problem

Malware is custom designed to evade detection, stay resident, and display coordinated action Anti-virus solutions are generally ineffective “...8 out of 10 pieces of malicious code are going to get in.” -Graham Ingram, AUSCERT “Every second, 14 adults become the victim

  • f cyber crime.” -Symantec via

theregister.co.uk

Sunday, March 11, 12

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Scope of the Problem

Majority of banks Fortune500 Many international government departments Airlines Hotel chains Oil and gas companies Utilities and infrastructure

Sunday, March 11, 12

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High Profile Botnet Compromises

Sony RSA Google Nasdaq Dalai Lama Mitsubishi Heavy Industries UN, International Olympic Committee

Sunday, March 11, 12

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Current Response

Anti-virus IDS/IPS - not designed to detect compromises Court ordered domain takedowns - too many bad domains, and other issues. See “Guidance for preparing domain name

  • rders, seizures, and take downs” - Dave

Piscitello (ICANN) NXD mailing list - good but small scale

Sunday, March 11, 12

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Proposed Solution

100% public benefit non-profit - Malicious domain clearing house / registrar ICANN backed Emerging Threats sponsored Community support (ISC, Dagon, Wesson, etc...)

Sunday, March 11, 12

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Goals/Mission

Analyze immense amounts of malware to identify malicious domains Identify, analyze, validate, confirm Sinkhole C2s & identify victims Notify victims & provide free remediation assistance Remove, in a coordinated fashion, malicious domains from registrars

Sunday, March 11, 12

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Clearing House Offerings

Daily bad domain feed (zero error) EPP/RPP bad domain transfers/sinkholing Bad actor DB with credential and login data for LEO Peer reviewed analysis Move the bad traffic off your pipe

Sunday, March 11, 12

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Technical Challenges

Identify malicious domains with zero error C2 / Compromised domain Bad domain transfer mechanism and fees Sinkhole robustness and victim identification Victim notification and remediation Must maintain victim privacy while being able to work towards resolution

Sunday, March 11, 12

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Social Challenges

Registrar/registry buy-in Simply cannot work without this support Requires substantial support from the community Needs ISPs, NGOs, CERTs, etc for remediation and customer notification Large industry partners (Google, Microsoft, etc)

Sunday, March 11, 12

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First Steps

Provide a per-registrar feed of C2 domains and evidence of their maliciousness Support the Snort/Suricata projects through custom rulesets New TLD monitoring Easier to prevent an issue then root it out after the fact

Sunday, March 11, 12

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Q&A

Sunday, March 11, 12