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Preserving Privacy in GPS Traces via Uncertainty-Aware Path - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Preserving Privacy in GPS Traces via Uncertainty-Aware Path Cloaking Baik Hoh, Marco Gruteser (WINLAB) Hui Xiong (Rutgers Univ.) and Ansaf Alrabady (General Motors Corp.) WINLAB Research Review May. 2007 1 Motivation: Traffic Monitoring


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WINLAB Research Review May. 2007

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Preserving Privacy in GPS Traces via Uncertainty-Aware Path Cloaking

Baik Hoh, Marco Gruteser (WINLAB) Hui Xiong (Rutgers Univ.) and Ansaf Alrabady (General Motors Corp.)

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Location Privacy Project

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Motivation: Traffic Monitoring Through Probe Vehicles

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Location Privacy Project

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Location privacy challenges in traffic monitoring system

Still insider attacks and remote break-ins possible Anonymous Trace log files Home Bank Hospital Service Provider Tracking Algorithms recover trace (Median trip time

  • nly 15min)

Access Control Encryption Home Identification Reidentification of traces through data analysis

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Location Privacy Project

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Objectives

Objectives

Strong anonymity: rotection against tracking and reidentification

for all drivers, regardless of vehicle or building density

Maintain data accuracy sufficient for traffic monitoring

Assumptions:

Trustworthy privacy server available to execute centralized

algorithm

Adversary has no prior information about the subjects being

tracked

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Location Privacy Project

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Prior Approaches

K-anonymity provides

privacy guarantees but does not meet accuracy requirements

Best effort algorithms

do allow outliers (long tracking), thus do not meet privacy requirements

  • Subsampling
  • Swing & Swap
  • Mix Zones
  • Path Confusion

3 5 7 9 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 Anonymity level (k) Mean location error [m] Number of probe vehicles = 2000 Number of probe vehicles = 5500

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Location Privacy Project

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Approach: Guaranteed Time-to- confusion

Insight: Degree of privacy risk

strongly depends on how long an adversary can follow a vehicle

Time to confusion (TTC)

measures time between two points where a tracking uncertainty remains lower than a confusion threshold

Tracking Uncertainty can be

define based on entropy and

  • Target tracking algorithm uses spatio-

temporal correlation to choose the next location sample of an anonymous user

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Location Privacy Project

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Algorithm: Uncertainty-aware Path Cloaking

Confusion Time Uncertainty threshold Timeout window (=5min) Confusion time update

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Location Privacy Project

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Evaluation

Data set: 24-hour GPS traces of 2000 probe vehicles on a

70km-by-70km area (built from ~200 actual vehicles)

Metrics: Tracking time and (relative) road coverage

2.8 2.9 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 x 10

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4.66 4.67 4.68 4.69 4.7 4.71 4.72 4.73 4.74 x 10

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x in UTM [m] y in UTM [m]

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Location Privacy Project

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Evaluation: Protection against Target Tracking

80 85 90 95 100 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 Relative weighted road coverage [%] Maximum time to confusion [min] 0.4 0.99 0.9 Random sampling Uncertainty−aware (Tout = 5min)

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Location Privacy Project

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2.8 2.9 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 x 10

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4.67 4.68 4.69 4.7 4.71 4.72 4.73 4.74 x 10

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Snapshot of privacy-preserved GPS traces: black dots are removed samples (5min,0.95)

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Location Privacy Project

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Summary

Time-to-confusion: can be widely used in analyzing a location

privacy of location traces database

Guaranteeing Bounded Privacy: Uncertainty-Aware Path Cloaking,

effectively suppresses tracking time outliers even in a sparse area

High data accuracy: Uncertainty-Aware Path Cloaking achieves data

quality similar to original location traces (without privacy protection)

Further Work:

  • Map-based tracking model could be used in computing entropy in our proposed algorithm
  • Inference attack with a priori knowledge on a selective individual needs to be analyzed

further

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Location Privacy Project

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Questions?