Preparing for the Next Shock
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Preparing for the Next Shock Thomas Baunsgaard Deputy Division - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Preparing for the Next Shock Thomas Baunsgaard Deputy Division Chief Fiscal Affairs Department African Fiscal Forum November 9-10, 2011 Cape Town 1 Where could the next fiscal shocks come from? External shocks Commodity price shocks
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Commodity and fuel prices are volatile
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50 100 150 200 250 1990Jan 1992Jan 1994Jan 1996Jan 1998Jan 2000Jan 2002Jan 2004Jan 2006Jan 2008Jan 2010Jan 2011Jul food price index
metal price index
Real GDP growth rate (%)
2 4 6 8 10 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Sub-Sahara Africa emerging & developing
Revenue volatility tends to be higher in countries where the terms of trade is volatile…
…and where the domestic growth rate is volatile
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Revenue volatility vs. terms of trade volatility (1990-2010) Revenue volatility vs. growth volatility (1990-2010)
AGO CMR TCD COG GNQ GAB NGA BWA CPV GHA LSO MUS NAM SEN SYC ZAF SWZ ZMB BEN BFA ETH GMB KEN MDG MWI MLI MOZ NER RWA SLE TZA UGA CAF COM ZAR CIV ERI GIN GNB TGO
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 5 10 15
Revenue-to-GDP (std-dev) Terms of Trade (std/mean)
AGO CMR TCD COG GAB NGA BWA CPV GHA LSO MUS NAM SEN SYC ZAF SWZ ZMB BEN BFA ETH GMB KEN MDG MWI MLI MOZ NER RWA SLE TZA UGA CAF COM ZAR CIV ERI GIN GNB TGO
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 5 10 15
Growth (std-dev) Revenue-to-GDP (std-dev)
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50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Global Food Prices Global Oil Price Global Metals Prices (Index) Baseline Simulated Sources: WEO, and IMF staff estimates. Note: Global food prices are assumed to increase by 28% in 2011, 47% in 2012, relative to the baseline; global oil prices by 23% in 2011 and 47% in 2012; and metal prices by 23% in 2011 and 46% in 2012.
Based on market expectations, embedded in commodity future options, commodity prices would continue to increase in 2011–12.
Commodity prices, (Index, 2005 = 100)
And a downturn in global growth
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1 2 3 4 5 6
Global growth
Baseline Downside
Sources: WEO, and IMF staff estimates. 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (proj.) 2012 (proj.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LICs' growth
Baseline Downside scenario
A 1½ percentage point decline in global growth in 2011–12 would shave off an estimated 1 percent from LIC growth.
(Median, percentage change)
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Fiscal space of all African LICs (% of GDP)
1 2 3 4 5 6 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
median 75th percentile 25th percentile
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Fiscal space (% of GDP, African LICs, non-oil exporters, median)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 2009 2010 2011 2012 baseline 2012 commodity shock 2012 growth downturn
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Fiscal space (% of GDP, African LICs, oil exporters, median)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2009 2010 2011 2012 baseline 2012 commodity shock 2012 growth downturn
Higher food and fuel prices would leave an additional 31 million people in poverty in 2012, more than half in Sub-Saharan Africa.
35.9 2.5 9.6 52.0 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.2 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 10 20 30 40 50 60 ASI LAC MEU SSA Share of total increase in poverty (percent; left axis) Impact on poverty rate (percentage points; right axis) Sources: WEO, and IMF staff
A double dip growth shock would leave an additional 23 million people in poverty by 2012, more than half in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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44.4 2.3 2.9 50.4 2.5 1.5 0.5 1.6 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 10 20 30 40 50 60 ASI LAC MEU SSA Share of total increase in poverty (percent; left axis) Impact on poverty rate (percentage points; right axis) Sources: WEO, and IMF staff
Food and fuel make up half of the consumer basket in LICs
Higher food and fuel prices affect the poorest most, but middle- income households also impacted
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49% food, 45% fuel, 6%
Composition of CPI basket (LICs, median)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Household Consumption Decile
Reduction in real household consumption (in percent)
Asia Latin America and Caribbean Middle East and Europe Sub-Saharan Africa
Sources: WEO, and IMF staff estimates.
consumed by the poor
programs and proxy-targeting
stimulate small-holder agricultural production
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5 10 15 20
Fiscal response in 2009
(Median)
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Real government expenditure growth Change in fiscal balance in percent of GDP Ample fiscal space and reserve coverage Mixed buffers Low fiscal space and reserve coverage
Policy buffers are key for
But building buffers has an
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Link Link
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