T HE C HINA I NITIATIVE T HE HE D EPARTMEN OF J USTICE R ESPONDS ENT OF TO E CONOMI MIC A GGRESSI THE C HINESE SE G OVERNMEN TO SSION BY TH ENT AND O THER ER N ATIONAL S ECURITY T HREATS AN Adam S. Hickey
PRC RC T HRE HREATS T O A CADEMIA 1) Theft of trade secrets, sensitive (controlled) technology, and other intellectual property 2) Influence that compromises the free and open exchange of ideas
M AD IN C HIN INA 2025 2025: ADE IN “A R R OADM AP TO T HEFT ” ADMAP U.S. Department of Justice, National Security Division
E CONOMIC E SPIONAGE IN THE U.S. • About 80 80% of all federal eco economic c es espio ionage ge prosecutions have alleged conduct that would ben enef efit the e Chin ines ese e state. • About 60 60% % of trade de se secre ret th theft cases have had some nexu xus to China. na. 4
W HAT AT H AS AS C HI HINA S TOLE OLEN ?
T HE HE PRC RC’ S T ECHNI NIQUE QUES 6 Courtesy of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
T ALENT NT P ROGRAMS • Started by PRC government in 2008. • The PRC government funds above-market salaries, advanced research facilities, and bestows titles and prestige to lure experts to China. • Approximately 7,000 Chinese scientists have returned to China under the program. • While association with a Talent Program is not illegal, it can create incentives to steal, violate export controls, or (at a minimum) a conflict of interest. • Ask employees, partners, consultants if they are participating. 7
U.S. S. V . Z HOU HOU , C HE HEN • Defendant spouses were employed as resear earcher hers at Nationwide Children’s Hospital (NCH) for approximately ten years. • Defendants researched exosome isolation, which plays a key role in the research, identification, and treatment of a range of conditions, including cancer. • Zhou developed a novel el m method hod o of exos osom ome i isol olat ation on which NCH could use for treatment. • But Zhou and Chen founded nded a a Chines nese c e compan any to monetize the technique Zhou developed, using ng i intellec ectual ual p proper perty that at b belong onged t ed to NCH. • The defendants were paid more than $800,000 for NCH’s intellectual property. • Zhou, Chen charged with cons onspirac acy t to o stea eal t trad ade s secret ets, and other offenses. 8
U.S. S. V . B O M AO • The Vi Victim Com Compan pany (VC) C) i is a a leader i in n the he f fiel eld of open-channel controller technology for solid state hard (SSD) drives. • Bo Mao was a pr prof ofes essor at at a a PR PRC C uni niver ersity, and later became a visi siti ting p profe fesso sor r at a Texas university; at the same time, Bo Mao was also working for Company 1, a compe petitor or of VC, which was seeking VC’s technology. • While in the PRC, Bo Mao was collab abor orating ng on resear earch w with a a colleague i eague in Texas as and sought ght access ss t to the V VC’s t technol hnology ogy, o ostens ensibl bly for resear earch h purposes; the VC provided access to its technology to Bo, who agreed to the VC’s restrictions on its IP • Company 1 was directing Bo’s research on the Victim Company’s technology; evidence indicates that Bo, or someone else, was attempting to reve verse se-engi engineer neer the technology. • Bo charged with wire fraud. 9
PRC U RC U NIVER IES B ENEFIT NEFIT F ROM ROM T HEFT IVERSIT SITIES EFT • PRC nationals Hao ao Zhan hang g and Wei Pang charged in a thirty-two count indictment which charged six individuals with econo onomic espi pionag onage e and thef heft of trade of de secre crets ts for their roles in a long-running effort to obtain U.S. trade secrets for the be benefit of of uni niversities and and com ompan anies c cont ontrolled b by the PR he PRC C gov over ernm nment nt. • Zhang and Pang met at a univer ersity i in Southe hern C n Califor orni nia a during their doctor oral al studi dies es in electrical engineering, where they conducted resear earch h that w was funded nded by DARPA. • Zhang and Pang used s stol olen en IP to obt obtain pr prof ofes essor orships ps at Tianjin University, a leading PR PRC C Ministry of of Edu Education on school. • The stolen trade secrets, converted through a joint nt v vent ntur ure e in the PRC, enabled Tianjin University to construct and equip a state-of-the-art facility in the PRC state- sponsored Tianjin Economic Development Area, and to obtain commercial and military contracts. 10
T HE PRC RC G OVERNM ENT E XPLOIT ITS A CADE NMENT ADEMIA IA • In September 2019, a PRC government employee, Zhongsan Liu, who was living in New Jersey, was arrested for a cons onspiracy t to o com ommit vi visa f a fraud. • Liu entered the United States in 2017 to work for the China A a Assoc ociat ation on f for I Internat national onal Exchang hange o of P Personne onnel ( (CAIEP IEP), controlled by the PRC’s State A e Adminis istration o of Forei eign gn Experts A ts Affairs (SAF AFEA), which is responsible for the recruit itmen ent a and certificatio ion o of o over ersea eas talen ent and experts to work in China, and for organiz izing o g over ersea eas t trainin ing g for Chinese technical professionals. • Liu worked to further er t the PRC’s ’s o objec ectiv ives es by recruiting U.S. experts for projects and positions in China, certifying U.S. universities as SAFEA EA training institutes, and participated in S&T conferences which provided opportunities for recruitment. • Liu helped obtain a J-1 visa for a PRC government employee to enter the United States, purportedly to study at a university in Georgia, when in fact this employee was going to work for CAIEP EP, in New York, to recruit in the U.S., and not conduct academic research. 11
W HAT AT S HOUL HOULD B E P ROTE TECTED ? 12
B ES EST S ECURIT ITY P RA RACTI CTICE CES • Awareness building and • Protection of IP and use of communications technology control plans • Coordination within institution • Regular interactions with federal security and intelligence • Training of faculty and students agencies about threat and obligations • Foreign travel safeguards and • Review of foreign gifts, grants, protections contracts, and collaborations • Vetting of international visitors • Review of faculty and student and students foreign financial interests and affiliations • Export control compliance program • Protection of data and cybersecurity 13
C HI NESE S TUDE ND S CHOL HINE TUDENT AND CHOLARS • CSSAs were established to provide on on-camp mpus support t to overse seas s Chinese se students ts abroad; most of the activities do not present a threat. • Some chapters in the U.S. have reportedly received fund funding fr from the he Chi hinese Communist Par arty (C (CCP) and and/or hav have direct link nks to o the he Chi hinese gov overnm nment nt. In certain instances, those connections have reportedly been leveraged to chill ill acade demic ic fre reedo doms. • In one notable instance, a CSSA chapte pter pu public blicly ly critic riticiz ized d a Chin inese grad aduat ation on speaker at a U.S. school who had praised the “ fresh air of free speech ” and democracy in the U.S. and had criticized the Chinese government; the spe speaker la later apo pologiz ized d and asked for “ forgiveness ” and according to reports, the CSSAs re resp sponse was s pr prais ised d by a Chin inese Embassy ssy offic icia ial. 14
T HE HE B IG IG P IC ICTUR TURE Post-WWII Order China’s World Order China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), World Bank, International Monetary Fund One Belt One Road Rejection of CLOS ruling on the South China Sea, Peaceful settlement of international disputes, e.g. Convention on Law of the Sea (CLOS), UN increased use of UN veto power Unilateral claims to the South China Sea, constructing and Open shipping, international navigation rights militarizing artificial islands Price dumping, massive economic espionage, currency Free and fair trade manipulation, disputes over WTO State-owned enterprises, politicians as major Free enterprise stakeholders, tight political control Global spread of multiparty democracies with free and fair One-party state elections Repression of Falun Gong, Uighurs, Dalai Lama, Christian Religious freedom churches, and other religious minorities State-controlled media, the Great Firewall of China, 50 Press freedom, Internet freedom Cent Army 13
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