PRC RC T HRE HREATS T O A CADEMIA 1) Theft of trade secrets, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
T HE C HINA I NITIATIVE T HE HE D EPARTMEN OF J USTICE R ESPONDS ENT OF TO E CONOMI MIC A GGRESSI THE C HINESE SE G OVERNMEN TO SSION BY TH ENT AND O THER ER N ATIONAL S ECURITY T HREATS AN Adam S. Hickey PRC RC T HRE HREATS T O A CADEMIA 1)
THE
HE DEPARTMEN ENT OF OF JUSTICE RESPONDS TO TO ECONOMI MIC AGGRESSI SSION BY TH THE CHINESE SE GOVERNMEN ENT AN AND OTHER ER NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS
Adam S. Hickey
1) Theft of trade secrets, sensitive (controlled) technology, and other intellectual property 2) Influence that compromises the free and open exchange of ideas
U.S. Department of Justice, National Security Division
80% of all federal eco economic c es espio ionage ge prosecutions have alleged conduct that would ben enef efit the e Chin ines ese e state.
60% % of trade de se secre ret th theft cases have had some nexu xus to China. na.
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Courtesy of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
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salaries, advanced research facilities, and bestows titles and prestige to lure experts to China.
the program.
incentives to steal, violate export controls, or (at a minimum) a conflict
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earcher hers at Nationwide Children’s Hospital (NCH) for approximately ten years.
identification, and treatment of a range of conditions, including cancer.
el m method hod o
isol
ation
treatment.
nded a a Chines nese c e compan any to monetize the technique Zhou developed, using ng i intellec ectual ual p proper perty that at b belong
ed to NCH.
for NCH’s intellectual property.
acy t to
eal t trad ade s secret ets, and other offenses.
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Victim Com Compan pany (VC) C) i is a a leader i in n the he f fiel eld of open-channel controller technology for solid state hard (SSD) drives.
prof
essor at at a a PR PRC C uni niver ersity, and later became a visi siti ting p profe fesso sor r at a Texas university; at the same time, Bo Mao was also working for Company 1, a compe petitor
abor
ng on resear earch w with a a colleague i eague in Texas as and sought ght access ss t to the V VC’s t technol hnology
ensibl bly for resear earch h purposes; the VC provided access to its technology to Bo, who agreed to the VC’s restrictions on its IP
evidence indicates that Bo, or someone else, was attempting to reve verse se-engi engineer neer the technology.
IVERSIT SITIES IES BENEFIT NEFIT FROM ROM THEFT EFT
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ao Zhan hang g and Wei Pang charged in a thirty-two count indictment which charged six individuals with econo
pionag
e and thef heft
de secre crets ts for their roles in a long-running effort to obtain U.S. trade secrets for the be benefit of
niversities and and com
anies c cont
by the PR he PRC C gov
ernm nment nt.
ersity i in Southe hern C n Califor
nia a during their doctor
al studi dies es in electrical engineering, where they conducted resear earch h that w was funded nded by DARPA.
stol
en IP to obt
prof
essor
ps at Tianjin University, a leading PR PRC C Ministry of
Education
nt v vent ntur ure e in the PRC, enabled Tianjin University to construct and equip a state-of-the-art facility in the PRC state- sponsored Tianjin Economic Development Area, and to obtain commercial and military contracts.
NMENT ENT EXPLOIT ITS ACADE ADEMIA IA
Jersey, was arrested for a cons
to
visa f a fraud.
a Assoc
ation
for I Internat national
Exchang hange o
Personne
(CAIEP IEP), controlled by the PRC’s State A e Adminis istration o
eign gn Experts A ts Affairs (SAF AFEA), which is responsible for the recruit itmen ent a and certificatio ion o
ersea eas talen ent and experts to work in China, and for organiz izing o g over ersea eas t trainin ing g for Chinese technical professionals.
er t the PRC’s ’s o
ectiv ives es by recruiting U.S. experts for projects and positions in China, certifying U.S. universities as SAFEA EA training institutes, and participated in S&T conferences which provided opportunities for recruitment.
purportedly to study at a university in Georgia, when in fact this employee was going to work for CAIEP EP, in New York, to recruit in the U.S., and not conduct academic research.
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communications
about threat and obligations
contracts, and collaborations
foreign financial interests and affiliations
cybersecurity
technology control plans
federal security and intelligence agencies
protections
and students
program
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mpus support t to overse seas s Chinese se students ts abroad; most of the activities do not present a threat.
funding fr from the he Chi hinese Communist Par arty (C (CCP) and and/or hav have direct link nks to
he Chi hinese gov
nment
leveraged to chill ill acade demic ic fre reedo doms.
pter pu public blicly ly critic riticiz ized d a Chin inese grad aduat ation
speech” and democracy in the U.S. and had criticized the Chinese government; the spe speaker la later apo pologiz ized d and asked for “forgiveness” and according to reports, the CSSAs re resp sponse was s pr prais ised d by a Chin inese Embassy ssy offic icia ial.
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Post-WWII Order China’s World Order
One Belt One Road
Convention on Law of the Sea (CLOS), UN
increased use of UN veto power
militarizing artificial islands
manipulation, disputes over WTO
stakeholders, tight political control
elections
churches, and other religious minorities
Cent Army 13