POLI 437: International Relations of Latin America First 1/3 of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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POLI 437: International Relations of Latin America First 1/3 of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

POLI 437: International Relations of Latin America First 1/3 of class is over Time to honestly assess your class participation Send me an email before Tuesday point score in each category paragraph justifying score THIS WEEK Drug flows


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POLI 437:

International Relations

  • f Latin America
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First 1/3 of class is over Time to honestly assess your class participation Send me an email before Tuesday point score in each category paragraph justifying score

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THIS WEEK

Drug flows State & civilian responses to crime Gangs and competition

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=55&v=rryDND06LHU&feature=emb_logo

CORRIDOS IN MEXICO

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NARCO-CORRIDOS

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRXUWwn86FE

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NARCO-NOVELAS

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0MlCfKSwUn0

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RELIGION

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NARCO-CULTURE

Cultural obsession with depicting “narco” lifestyle in soaps, films, music Controversial: simply depicting, or glorifying? Is it exploitative of real suffering?

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Latin America has largely traded civil war violence for criminal violence Crime is a central topic today, especially with respect to violence

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NORTHERN TRIANGLE

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WHY SO VIOLENT?

Three factors: Changing drug routes Weak/complicit states

  • Org. competition
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Producers: Colombia, Bolivia, Peru Bulk of cocaine goes: Colombia/Ecuador —> Guatemala/Mexico —> US border Mostly boats, some air

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GROW IN COLOMBIA

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US SOUTHERN COMMAND

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68% of all coca moves through Pacific

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CHANGING DRUG ROUTES

Height of Pablo Escobar era (1980s), 75% of coca moved through Caribbean Massive US effort to shut down Caribbean transit moved routes west

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By 2010, over 80% was going through Central America Note: all our data is seizures; might be lots we don’t know! Boat to CA —> cross border into Mexico —> cross into US

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Arguably one of the most violent countries in the world in 2000s

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Not as choice of a transit location for drug routes But scale of problem for region is huge $4 billion in cocaine passes through Guatemala, entire region spends $3 billion on fighting drug war

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But position along PA HWY + small coastline for parceling drugs Border with Guatemala completely porous

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VIDEO

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGG7lRJJkJk

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The biggest moving piece for crime and violence in El Salvador are street gangs Why do gangs even exist? Why do people form gangs? State absence

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MS-13, biggest gang in El Salvador, formed in… Los Angeles Formed to protect Salvadorians immigrants from other gangs But why doesn't the state offer this protection? And why is protection even necessary?

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Due to political/moral/economic reasons, there are certain markets states won’t regulate Drugs Prostitution Gambling Illegal migration Prohibition means private agents have to conduct business without recourse to the state, police, or legal system

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Economic agents face a lot of vulnerability + uncertainty Coca producer in Peru can’t sue a buyer who won’t pay Buyers can eliminate competition, not compete over price Product not subject to common standards or regulation

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Large % of drug transactions are rip-offs Cannot discriminate using price!

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How do you do this without a state to enforce property rights, contracts? Wield violence individually Repeat interactions, networks Might work at small-level, but scale to entirely of supply route Private actors might be better if someone can establish monopoly of violence

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Gangs are less like firms and more like proto-states Fill power-vacuum left by states in areas it can’t / won't regulate Offer protection/enforcement to private actors in exchange for rents (“tax”) Protect exchange Prevent ripoffs Retaliation/ mediation

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Of course, with monopoly, gangs extort everyone Extorting bus routes is a huge business for gangs in El Salvador Bus lines from gang-controlled neighborhoods systematically extorted at tune of $26 million/year

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Bus companies have incorporated extortion into their business model

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Gangs enforce payment through violence 2014-2015, 800 bus workers murdered “Most dangerous job in the world”

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MS-13 Calle-18 Drug dealing Extortion vs. Mostly urban areas, the capital Why violence? Competition over territory ~ 30k members

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Why territory? Rents Extortion New members And why just one gang? Pricing power = extract monopoly prices

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What factors increase territorial competition? Changes in relative power Changes in rents Changes in organizational structure Existing “agreement” no longer viable Changing drug routes Death of leaders, consolidation of org.

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Mexican anti-narcotic efforts shift drug routes

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Sandra Ávila Beltrán Jesus Reylando Zambada Ignacio Coronel Villareal

2007 - 2010: Sinaloa Cartel suffers multiple decapitations Explosion in levels of violence around this time

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TAKEAWAYS

Central America is transit point in drug flows from South to North America Illicit nature of drugs means gangs push to fill power vacuum Territorial competition is a key source of violence in CA today, esp. El Salvador

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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51439020

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Weak/complicit states key part of crime in Latin America How does Yashar describe the legal system in El Salvador? Mix of ineffective and predatory

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INEFFECTIVE POLICING

Sources of inefficiency in El Salvador’s police Weak infrastructure Bad performance incentives Corruption

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Prisons are overcrowded, run by gangs Substantial organized crime takes place in prisons

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SAO PAULO’S PRIMEIRO COMANDO DA CAPITAL (PCC)

Extremely organized, bureaucratized Synchronized riots across prisons to demand concessions

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“Consignment” model of selling drugs vs. free-lance Alleviates credit constraints

  • n dealers, but creates

agency problems

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Overcome agency problems via meticulous record-keeping

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Evidence that prison actually helps gangs conduct business Gang members can expect they or someone near them will end up in prison, where there’s no protection from gang Incentive to not cheat the gang, pay back debts, etc. How does gang enforce contracts

  • utside of prison?
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Police lack equipment/training for processing homicides Homicide clearance rates = low single-digits Reduces disincentives to murder

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Very low street-level presence, absenteeism high Low disincentives to commit crime, low crime- reporting Though some research to suggest foot police just push crime "around the corner”

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Not great pay, but bigger problem is low wage growth prospects Best paid police - worst paid police = 10% Rest of public sector ~ 80% Weak relationship between pay, promotions, and performance

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One response has been to “militarize” police; SWAT-like units What’s the trade-off here? Firepower, human rights abuses Not just “inaccuracy”; abuse of power —> power asymmetry, frustration, dehumanizing “enemy"

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Even while ineffective, police are also predatory and corrupt In CA, some of this is legacy of the civil wars Police forces inherited bad institutions + ideology from civil war period Corrupt military officers, soldiers, involved in drug/weapons trade in police force

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NOT JUST POOR COUNTRIES

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Lots of crime, violence; police are ineffective or corrupt How do citizens navigate this? How does living in these contexts shape people and their perspectives?

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LYNCHINGS

Spontaneous mobs, organized groups Stay tuned for data, maybe later in semester More likely in places where people had to defend themselves in civil war Why some communities but not

  • thers? Which crimes? Is this

deterrence or revenge?

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Wealthy living in large urban areas have retreated into heavily fortified “gated communities” Private security, internal malls, shops, spas, etc.

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What might some of the consequences be of this increased segregation?

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1 in 5 Latin Americans report being victims of crime (Bateson) What effect does victimization have on people? mobilizes them to seek change, vote more, etc. Support punitive responses even at the expense of rule of law

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“tough on crime” (“mano dura”) policies are at center of politics in LA Discretionary crimes, reduction in procedural rights, use of military ARENA held power in El Salvador for almost two decades in part on appeal to voters wanting harsher punishment

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Bolsonaro also ran on mano dura policy Idea that there’s tradeoff between fighting crime and democratic rule

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There’s a class dimension to these beliefs Support in many cases increases in wealth But lower-middle and middle-class often key parts of “mano dura” coalitions Why?

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Part of answer is middle-class can’t afford the protections of the rich + won’t bear brunt of "mano dura” Another part might be a sense that they’ve “done what they were supposed to” and resent dealing with crime