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Pol olicy Res espon onses t to o Low ow Fer ertility and R an d Rapi apid A d Aging i in Korea 2008 Moon, Chang-Jin Ph.D. Dean, School of Health and Welfare Pochon CHA University CONTE TENTS TS Low Fertility and Aging : Now


  1. Pol olicy Res espon onses t to o Low ow Fer ertility and R an d Rapi apid A d Aging i in Korea 2008 Moon, Chang-Jin Ph.D. Dean, School of Health and Welfare Pochon CHA University

  2. CONTE TENTS TS • Low Fertility and Aging : Now and Future • Causes of Low Fertility in Korea • Historical Review of Population Policy • Policy Responses to Low fertility and Aging • Recent Development of Pro-Elderly Programs • Conclusion 2

  3. Low F Fertility an and d Aging: Now an and d Fut utur ure ( (1) Changes in TFR and Aging Population T otal Fertility Rate (TFR) Proportion of Aging Population (POAP) 3.0 T 10 P F Replacement O Entry to aging society R fertility A (POAP: 7.2%, ’00) P (TFR: 2.1, ’83) 8 2.5 6 Shift to pop. quality 2.0 and welfare policy (TFR: 1.58, ’96) Down to 4 Shift to very-low fertility Pro-natal (TFR: 1.30, ’01) policy ('05) 1.5 2 Discontinuance of free Economic crisis distribution of FP services TFR: 1.08, ’05 (TFR: 1.54, ’97) (TFR: 1.58, ’89) 1.0 TFR: 1.13, ‘06 ’05 ’06 ’80 ’85 ’90 ’95 ’00 For 10 years since the mid-80's, TFR remained in the region of 1.6 Rapid decline of TFR after the Economic Crisis in 1997 → 1.13 in 2006 (one of the lowest in the world) 3

  4. Low F Fertility an and d Aging: Now an and d Fut utur ure ( (2) T rends in fertility rates Rapid decline in fertility: low fertility for more than 20 years; super-low fertility for more than 5 years TFR 4.53 3.47 2.83 1.67 1.65 1.60 1.47 1.30 1.26 1.17 1.19 1.16 1.08 1.13 No. of 101 Births 88 87 (ten thousand) 72 66 66 64 56 50 49 48 45 50 44 '70 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 4

  5. Low F Fertility an and d Aging: Now an and d Fut utur ure ( (3) Rapid aging It will take only 18 years for Korea to become an aged society (more than 14% elderly population from an aging society (more than 7% elderly population) Year Years taken Country Aging Aged Super-aged Aging to aged Aged to super-aged (7% →14%) (14% →20%) (7%) (14%) (20%) Korea 2000 2018 2026 18 8 Japan 1970 1994 2006 24 12 France 1864 1979 2018 115 39 Germany 1932 1972 2009 40 37 Italy 1927 1988 2006 61 18 US 1942 2015 2036 73 21 Source : NSO, ‘Population Projection’, 2006. 5

  6. Low F Fertility an and d Aging: Now an and d Fut utur ure ( (4) Changes in demographic structure Unit: 10 thousand 1980 2005 2050 2070 2025 65 15 T otal population 3,812 4,814 4,911 4,234 3,244 Economically active 2,372 3.453 3,356 2,242 1,537 population (EAP) Elderly population 146 437 977 1,616 1,421 Dep. ratio 6.1 12.6 29.1 72.0 92.5 Total population will decrease after reaching 49.3 million in 2018 EAP will decrease after reaching 36.2 million in 2016 6

  7. Low F Fertility an and d Aging: Now an and d Fut utur ure ( (5) Future Impact Reduced labor force and productivity  Reduced EAP: 34.53 million (’05) → 22.42 million (’50)  Aging of EAP : 38.0 years (’05) → 43.2 years (’30) → 43.5 years (’50) Reduced growth rates  Reduction in labor productivity, savings, consumption and investment - Declining potential growth: 5.08% (2000) → 1.53% (2040’s) - Fiscal instability: account deficits of 10% of GDP (2040’s) 7

  8. Low F Fertility an and d Aging: Now an and d Fut utur ure ( (6) Future Impact Financial constraints on social security  Increasing pension, health spending on the elderly, weakened tax base, etc. - No. of EAP per older person: 8 (’05) → 4 (’22) → 2 (’37) - Pension contribution burden: 30% (’50) → 39% (’70) The issue of inter-generational equality rises as the EAP’s burden increases. 8

  9. Causes es o of Low F Fer ertility Conflict between Economic burden plus Difficulties in Biological fertility traditional and new anxiety about the balancing work and reduction values on women’s role future family responsibilities Risks of sterility Unstable household Women’s increased Labor market economy and excessive demand for Increases in discrimination household spending participation in social miscarriage and against women Excessive care and participation stillbirth Absence of family- education spending on Persistence of women’s friendly employment children traditional roles climate Reduction of marriage rate Reduction of marrital fertility rate Declining fertility ※ First marriage for women: 25.4(’95) → 26.5(’00) → 27.8(’06) ※ First childbirth: 26.5(’95) → 29.0(’00) → 30.4(’06) ※ Rate of sterility for married women: 13.5% (’03), and pregnancy wastage 31.2% (’05) 9

  10. Historical Rev eview of of Pop opulat ation P Pol olicy Changes in Population Policy (1960~2006) Y ear Population Policy 1961 ■ Adoption of anti-natal policy • Five-year Economic Development Plans and Family Planning (’62) • Enactment of the Maternal and Child Health Law, legalization of medically necessary induced abortions (’73) • Priority for public housing to families with 2 or less children (’74) • Sterilization and contraception covered by Health Insurance(’82) 1996 ■ Abolition of anti-natal policy, shift to population quality and welfare 2005 ■ Adoption of pro-Natal Policy • Basic Law on Low Fertility and Aging Society; Presidential Committee on Low Fertility and Ageing Society (’05) • Initiation of the First Basic Plan in Response to Low Fertility and Population Aging(2006-2010) in Aug. 2006. 10

  11. Historical Rev eview of of Pop opulat ation P Pol olicy Model Slogan of Family Planning Program • Boys or G irls, Two is enough. • A Well- grown girl is better than ten boys. 11

  12. Les esson ons from om Other er Cou ountries (1) Sweden, 1.85(’06) France, 1.98(’06) US, 2.0(’06) • Sharing of family responsibilities • Sharing of family responsibilities • Labor market flexibility • Support for work-family balance • Support for work-family balance - Makes it easy for workers to balance work and family • Financial support for child- • Financial support for child- rearing rearing • Inexpensive private childcare services • Childcare infrastructure • Childcare infrastructure • High fertility rates among • Institutional acceptance of • Institutional acceptance of naturalized citizens various forms of family various forms of family • Social acceptance of • Social acceptance of immigration immigration ※ Family allowance as a % of (’01) : Sweden 2.9% , France 2.8% , US 0.4% , Korea 0.1% ※ Women’s economic participation rate(’03: Sweden 72.8% , France 56.7% , US 65.7% Korea 49.0% ) ※ Out-of-wedlock birth rate : Sweden 56% (’04) France 43.7% (’01) US 33.8% (’04) 12

  13. Les esson ons from om Other er Cou ountries (2) Germany, 1.3(’06) Spain, 1.3(’06) • Distinct role division between men and women • Distinct role division between men and women (Catholicism) (Catholicism) • Passive acceptance of nontraditional families • Passive acceptance of nontraditional families • Insufficient support for work-family balance, • Insufficient support for work-family balance, inflexible employment inflexible employment - 40% of women with a college degree decide • Y outh have barriers to self-support not to have children - Unemployment rate for those aged 25 or younger: 30% • Lack of support for childrearing and child - High housing prices education - Low family allowance • Lack of support for childrearing and child education • Poor childcare services for children aged 0 ∼ 3 • Lack of public childcare facilities • Family policy overly focused on poor households ※ Family allowance as a % of GDP(’01) : Germany 1.9% , Spain 0.5% , Korea 0.1% ※ Women’s labor force participation (’03): Germany 58.7% , Spain 46.8% , Korea 49.0% ※ Out-of-wedlock childbirth rate(’01): Germany 23.6% , Spain 17.7% 13

  14. Les esson ons from om Other er Cou ountries (3) Singapore 1.2(’06) Japan 1.32(’06) T aiwan 1.1(’06) • Work-family balance (employment flexibility) • Support for work-family balance (childcare leave) Policies • Childcare infrastructure • Childcare infrastructure (allowance, nannies) In • Financial support (child allowance) • Financial support (grandparent childcare place allowance) • Family-friendly employment climate • Family-friendly employment policy • Economic of Y outh • Support for marriage (housing support) • East Asian culture - Confucian patriarchy with distinct role division between men and women - Insufficient pro-family employment (Long working hours, inflexible labor market) Limita -tions - Low acceptance of out-of-wed families (cohabitation, unmarried mothers) • Lack of support for work-family balance • Piecemeal policy measures 14

  15. Pol olicy Res esponses to o Low ow Fer ertility and Aging Policy V ision and Goals (Basic Plan) Mid- to long- term goal: TF R 1.6 (2010’s), 1.8 (2020’s)  Slow-down of rapid changes in population structure for sustainable development of the nation  Super-low fertility is a recent phenomenon and can be reversed with policy efforts 15

  16. Pol olicy Res esponses to o Low ow Fer ertility and Aging Policy Directions • T o strengthen social role in childbirth and childbearing • T o achieve family-friendly and gender-equal culture • T o nurture healthy future generations • T o improve limited responses of local government to low fertility 16

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