Open Source Physical Security: Can we have both privacy and - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Sep 12, 2022 278 likes •591 views

Open Source Physical Security: Can we have both privacy and safety? Chris Peterson Foresight Institute www.foresight.org Please check the logic "The best weapon of a dictatorship is secrecy, but the best weapon of a democracy

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Open Source Physical Security: Can we have both privacy and safety?

Chris Peterson Foresight Institute www.foresight.org

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Please check the logic

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"The best weapon of a dictatorship is secrecy, but the best weapon

f a democracy should

be the weapon of

penness."

—Niels Bohr

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No Secret Software for Public Voting Data! The E-voting mess — We could have nipped it in the bud.

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The Future

It’s not just electronic
It’s material as well
Molecules matter as much as bits
A big part of the future — and the future
f freedom — is nanotech

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Nanotech: 3 stages

Materials Devices Systems

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One molecule

Nanotech can do it now too

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Nanotech- based sensors

“The detector generates a continuous 'spectrum' of information about any chemical agents in its presence...” “easily programmable”

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Sewer monitoring has begun

“The test doesn’t screen people directly but instead seeks out evidence of illicit drug abuse in drug residues and metabolites excreted in urine and flushed toward municipal sewage treatment plants.”

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“We found a drug molecule — Everybody out for a breath check!”

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Things worth detecting: weapons of mass destruction

Explosives, chemicals, nukes — today
Bioweapons – in early stages — nasty, but

delicate and hard to control)

Nanoweapons — later — like bioweapons,

but tougher and more controllable)

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Time GDP per capita goes up Cost of WMD comes down $

Technological Advance

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Fear + poor WMD data =

Sudan pharmaceutical plant, August 1998

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Result: more surveillance Electronic, video, biological, chemical Being integrated into national system

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Transparency vs privacy

DC doesn’t notice our debates — they just move forward

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Top-down approach to bottom-up problem

Centralized
Mandatory
Monolithic
Limited in participation
Secretive
Leads toward Surveillance State

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Bottom-up physical security

Decentralized
Minimal
Voluntary/privatized
Experimental
Collaborative
Open
Transparent

“Track the problem, not the people”

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Who can figure out whether & how to collect public sensing data?

Need a community that understands the

relationships between:

Security
Privacy
Functionality
Freedom

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Graphic: Gina Miller

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Open Source Physical Security: What would it be like?

Open source style development
Citizen controlled
Privacy oriented
Verifiably limited
Detects materials of concern
Does not track individuals or

nonweapons (e.g. drugs)

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What might we regard as worth detecting?

Real problems
Anthrax (NYC, DC, FL 2001)
Sarin (Tokyo, 1995)
Ricin (London 2002, Las

Vegas 2008)

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Who gets the data?

Communities negotiate
Mutual data exchange, e.g. anthrax within 100 km
Agreements on how to treat the data
“Communities” size can vary from household to

nation, depending on what is detected (e.g., TNT vs nukes)

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Do we not have a “freedom to sense”?

Proposed law in New York City that will require people to get a license before they can buy chemical, biological, or radiological attack detectors

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“Who would have guessed that the folks with the pocket protectors would turn out to be the ones with the right stuff?”

—LA Times

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Electrical geek Mechanical geek

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