ON THE EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN GRAPHICAL AND TABULAR REPRESENTATIONS - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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REFSQ17, Essen, Germany March 2nd, 2017 ON THE EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN GRAPHICAL AND TABULAR REPRESENTATIONS FOR SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT Katsiaryna Labunets 1 , Fabio Massacci 1 , Federica Paci 2 1 University of Trento, Italy


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SLIDE 1

ON THE EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN GRAPHICAL AND TABULAR REPRESENTATIONS FOR SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT

Katsiaryna Labunets1, Fabio Massacci1, Federica Paci2

1University of Trento, Italy (<name.surname@unitn.it>) 2University of Southampton, UK (F.M.Paci@soton.ac.uk)

REFSQ’17, Essen, Germany March 2nd, 2017

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SLIDE 2

The Problem [1/2]

  • Several security risk assessment

(SRA) methods and standards to identify threats and possible security requirements are available

  • Academia relies on graphical methods

(e.g. Anti-Goals, Secure Tropos, CORAS)

  • Industry opts for tabular methods

(OCTAVE, ISO 27005, NIST 800-30)

  • REFSQ’17 representation stats:
  • 5 papers discuss graphical notations

(i*, Use Сases, BPMN diagrams),

  • 3 papers on mixed methods,
  • 1 paper studied requirements in

natural language.

2

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SLIDE 3

The Problem [2/2]

  • Are graphical methods actually better?
  • No clear winner from the past experiments
  • [ESEM 2013]:
  • Graph > Table w.r.t. # of threats (p < 5%)
  • Table > Graph w.r.t. # of security controls (p < 5%)
  • Graph =? Table w.r.t. perceived efficacy (not statistically

significant)

  • [EmpiRE at RE 2014]:
  • Graph =? Table w.r.t # of threats and controls (not statistically

significant)

  • Graph > Table w.r.t. perceived efficacy (p <5%)
  • Are they really different?

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Both methods have clear process Tabular method has less clear process

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SLIDE 4

Research Questions

  • RQ1: Are tabular and graphical SRA methods equivalent

w.r.t. actual efficacy?

  • RQ2: Are tabular and graphical SRA methods equivalent

w.r.t. preceived efficacy?

How to answer?

4

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SLIDE 5

Difference tests

  • Problem
  • H0: μA= μB
  • Ha: μA.≠ μB
  • Test: t-test, Wilcoxon, Mann-Whitney, etc.
  • we can only reject the null hypothesis H0.
  • we cannot accept the alternative hypothesis Ha.
  • Lack of evidence for difference ≠ evidence for equiavalence
  • How different two methods should be in order to be considered

different?

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Equivalence test

  • Two One-Sided Tests (TOST) [Schuimann, 1981]
  • Problem
  • ẟ defines the range whithin which two methods are

considered to be equivalent

  • Percentage ([80%;125%] by FDA or [70%;143%] by EU) for rational

data

  • Fixed value (e.g. 0.6 for ordinal values on 1-5 Likert scale with 3 as a

mean value) for ordinal data

  • We can use t-test, or Wilcoxon, or Mann-Whitney, etc.

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SLIDE 7

Experimental Design

  • Goal
  • Compare graphical and tabular representation w.r.t. to the actual

and perceived efficacy of an SRA method when applied by novices.

  • Treatments
  • Method: Graphical and tabular SRA methods used in industry
  • Task: Conduct SRA for each of four security tasks
  • 1. Identity Management security (IM),
  • 2. Access Management security (AM),
  • 3. Web Application and Database security (WebApp/DB),
  • 4. Network and Infrastructural security (Network/Infr).
  • Experiment: we conducted two controlled experiments in 2015 and

2016 years.

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SLIDE 8

Experimental Execution

  • ATM Domain
  • Remotely Operated Tower (ROT) Scenario by Eurocontrol
  • Unmanned Air Traffic Management (UTM) Scenario by NASA
  • Methods:
  • Graphical CORAS by SINTEF
  • Tabular SecRAM by SESAR
  • Participants were provided with a catalogues of security threats and

controls*

  • Participants: 35 and 48 MSc students in Computer Science were

involved in ROT2015 and UTM2016 controlled experiments

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* M. de Gramatica, K. Labunets, F. Massacci, F. Paci and A. Tedeschi. “The Role of Catalogues of Threats and Security Controls in Security Risk Assessment: An Empirical Study with ATM Professionals”. In Proc. of REFSQ’15.

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SLIDE 9

Experimental Protocol

GROUP 1

BACKGROUND

Q1 PARTICIPANTS

TRAINING APPLICATION

RESEARCHERS

EVALUATION

REPORTS METHODS FOCUS GROUPS INTERVIEW FINAL METHOD IMPRESSION

Q32 DOMAIN EXPERTS

GROUPS DELIVER RESULTS REPORT QUALITY ASSESSMENT

METHOD DESIGNERS + DOMAIN EXPERTS GROUP X

ROT/UTM SCENARIO GRAPHICAL METHOD TABULAR METHOD TRAINING ON SECURITY TOPICS IM AM WebApp/DB Network/Infr Groups

  • f Type A

Groups

  • f Type B

Groups

  • f Type B

Groups

  • f Type A

Groups

  • f Type A

Groups

  • f Type B

Groups

  • f Type B

Groups

  • f Type A

INITIAL METHOD IMPRESSION

Q31

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Type A Type B ROT2015 9 groups 9 groups UTM2016 13 groups 11 groups

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SLIDE 10

Results: Actual Efficacy

Exp Act. Efficacy Tabular Mean Graphical Mean ẟmean Tab-Graph TOST p-value ROT2015 Threats 3.17 2.95 +0.22 0.0009 SC 3.28 2.97 +0.31 0.001 UTM2016 Threats 3.28 3.24 +0.04 6.3*10-6 SC 3.31 3.29 +0.02 2.4*10-7

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Table ≈ Graph (both experiments) w.r.t. quality of threats and controls

Actual Efficacy: whether the treatment improves performance

  • f the task
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SLIDE 11

Results: Perceived Efficacy

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Exp Perc Efficacy Tabular Mean Graphical Mean ẟmean Tab-Graph TOST p-value ROT2015 PEOU 3.63 3.20 +0.43 0.08 PU 3.54 3.05 +0.37 0.18 UTM2016 PEOU 3.74 3.60 +0.14 2.6*10-5 PU 3.67 3.29 +0.38 0.03

ROT2015

  • PEOU & PU: Tabular ? Graphical – inconclusive

UTM2016

  • PEOU & PU: Tabular ≈ Graphical
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SLIDE 12

Threats to Validity

  • Difference between two experiments (internal validity)
  • Low statistical significance (conclusion validity)
  • Use of students instead of practitioners (external validity)
  • Simple scenario (external validity)

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Conclusions

  • No difference? – check equivalence test
  • How to measure Actual Efficacy: Quantity vs. Quality?
  • Both graphical and tabular methods have similar support

for SRA

  • Clear process matters!
  • What is next?
  • Comprehensibility of risk modeling notations
  • Labunets et al. “Model Comprehension for Security Risk Assessment:

An Empirical Comparison of Tabular vs. Graphical Representations”. Empirical Software Engineering, 2017.

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