On Iran’s universal cash subsidies
Massoud Karshenas (SOAS) and Hamid Tabatabai (Ex-ILO) LSE Conference – London – 20 February 2018
On Irans universal cash subsidies Massoud Karshenas (SOAS) and Hamid - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
On Irans universal cash subsidies Massoud Karshenas (SOAS) and Hamid Tabatabai (Ex-ILO) LSE Conference London 20 February 2018 Purpose 2 To present Irans nationwide cash subsidy scheme (genesis, impact, prospects and lessons).
Massoud Karshenas (SOAS) and Hamid Tabatabai (Ex-ILO) LSE Conference – London – 20 February 2018
Launched in Dec 2010, the scheme consists of paying
Cash subsidy is not a Universal Basic Income (UBI)
Shared features: paid by the government, universal,
Main differences: not meant as UBI, not sufficient to
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Subsidised items: Fuel, electricity, water, bread Pre-reform give-away prices: petrol 10 US cents / litre;
Annual subsidy bill: $100 billion (mostly on energy) Subsidy system being:
Inefficient: wasteful consumption, pollution, smuggling to
Costly: rapidly rising bill Unfair: 70% going to richest 30% of the population
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Initial plan: Target 70% of population (below mean
HH (mis)classifications caused widespread discontent
Coverage eventually rose to a peak of 96% of
Law passed in 2010; Implemented in Dec. 2010
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Easily discernible effects:
Established right to universal cash benefits Established a nationwide constituency that resists roll-back Novel funding mechanism (higher energy prices rather than government
budget, in theory!)
Spread banking services throughout the country (monthly cash subsidies are
deposited automatically in bank account of HH heads)
Roll-out handled smoothly (confirming implementation capacity) Loss of 70% of purchasing power over the 7 years of programme due to
inflation (no change in nominal transfer, see Table)
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Year Urban CPI (2016=100) Cash subsidy nominal index (fixed amount throughout) Cash subsidy real index (2010 =100) 2010 33.2 100.0 100.0 2011 40.3 100.0 82.4 2012 52.6 100.0 63.1 2013 70.9 100.0 46.8 2014 81.9 100.0 40.5 2015 91.7 100.0 36.2 2016 100.0 100.0 33.2 2017 110.0 100.0 30.2
Energy consumption: Only short term impact (the reform process
Poverty: Most likely positive Income distribution: Most likely positive labour supply (conflicting accounts) Presumed pressure on government budget, already battered by
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Among reasons advanced:
Drain on government resources Preferred alternatives for use of resources (health, education, infrastructure,
etc.)
Little justification for universality (why pay the rich?) Promotes a culture of hand-outs Ex-president Ahmadinejad (scheme’s initiator) now politically ostracised
“Solution” sought: Target “the needy”, with possibly larger transfer amount. “Solution” in practice: Inflation (70% loss of transfer value in 7 years)
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Dropping 5 million out of 75 million, but 1.5 million (30%)
In 2016, 840,000 dropped but 60% restored More recent exclusions beset with more errors Further exclusions may affect over 30 million Criteria for further exclusions: Not specified yet, but
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Not labelled as UBI (a concept virtually unknown in Iran) Identified as part of solution of a widely acknowledged
Novelty of funding mechanism Systematic preparation and information dissemination Weakening the scheme: Poor arithmetic, turbulent environment
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