NPT: state of play and possible evolution Dr Rebecca Johnson, - - PDF document

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NPT: state of play and possible evolution

Dr Rebecca Johnson, Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy Presentation to the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) on 'The review of the NPT', Thursday, 29 January, 11.00 - 12.30. (This presentation accompanies the powerpoint, giving background unable to be fitted into the initial 10 min opening, and may be adapted so as to avoid duplicating the preceding presentation by the first speaker.) In the run-up to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, four challenges stand out: 1) Disarmament – Lack of implementation of the 2010 disarmament action plan, following

• n from reneging on the “13 Steps” adopted by consensus by states parties to the 2000 NPT

Review Conference. 2) Middle East – Failure to make progress on the central 2010 commitment to hold “a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution;” 3) Proliferation – Notably concerns about the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea – and ‘nuclear security’ – focussing on preventing nuclear trafficking and terrorism 4) Nuclear energy after Fukushima – Unlikely to hear repeats of the triumphalism about ‘nuclear renaissance’ that dominated in 2010, but increased concerns about safety. There will be support for the IAEA, the additional protocol and medical and small scale nuclear uses, but diminished interest in nuclear power as such. Taking these in reverse: Re 4) There will be a lot of posturing on Article IV, mainly from France, Russia and certain states from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), especially from Iran and various Arab states, but there is little appetite for making this a central issue, amid continuing public and insurance anxieties over nuclear safety and lack of convincing solutions for radioactive waste disposal after 60 years of trying. There may be more voices than in 2010 arguing that large nuclear power projects are not necessary and contribute to greater insecurities in terms of safety, environment, security and proliferation, perhaps accompanied by calls for the Article IV promotion of nuclear energy to be restricted to small scale uses such as medical, scientific and agricultural. Re 3) I have put these together because the agendas of non-proliferation and security are closely connected in terms of political strategy, leadership and emphasis. Four nuclear-armed states – India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea – are outside the NPT. There will be ritualistic calls for universality and for these to join the NPT as non-nuclear- weapon states (or rejoin/comply in the case of North Korea), but no-one expects this to influence anyone’s policies in the real world. The situations in Iran and North Korea are being managed through diplomacy involving government representatives and key geopolitical players. The P5 + 1 (or EU3 + 3) are taking the lead with Iran, with more constructive engagement from the IAEA and President Hassan

2 Rouhani’s administration. North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, development of nuclear weapons and periodic nuclear tests are a direct challenge to the Non-Proliferation regime, but are being managed diplomatically through bilateral and Six Party Talks, but as North Korea does not attend NPT meetings, the most that is expected is that the US and China will broker some form of agreed criticism. Under Pres. Rouhani, Iran’s nuclear diplomacy is likely to be more nuanced than in recent NPT conferences, but much will depend on how the US delegation behaves on this issue. There will undoubtedly be clashes, especially in the context of efforts to address the Middle East impasse, but Iran per se is unlikely to be centre stage in 2015. Nuclear security is of course relevant to the NPT but was prioritised as a political issue by Western governments since 9/11, with initiatives such as George W Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative and Pres. Obama’s Nuclear Security Summits. Though many developing governments in the NPT are sceptical about the emphasis given by Western states to the nuclear security agenda, few oppose outright. The nuclear security mechanisms are generally formulated as parallel processes intended to support the NPT, and their advocates argue that these initiatives enable them to implement their NPT obligations more effectively, especially with regard to Article II. Re 2) Achieving agreement on appointing a Middle East facilitator and holding a regional conference was the centre piece that made adoption of a final document possible in 2010. The fact that no such conference has been convened, despite the assiduous shuttle diplomacy

• f the Finnish Facilitator, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, will likely have negative impact on the

2015 Review Conference. Considerable efforts are being expended by the P5 and others to find some kind of fix to avoid the Middle East becoming a make or break issue for the Review Conference. I’d be happy to respond to questions on any of the above NPT-related issues, but will focus the rest of my presentation on the core issue of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is a fundamental obligation expressed through the NPT’s preamble and Articles VI and VII in particular. Complaints about the poor pace of compliance by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) with the disarmament objectives and obligations of the NPT have been a basic feature of all NPT meetings since it entered into force in 1970. Until 1996 the key demand was a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Once that was achieved – after over 40 years of civil society campaigning finally overcame opposition in the key nuclear-armed governments – a range of disarmament-enhancing steps have been put forward by the nuclear free states at all the meetings, but without seeing these implemented:  1995 Principles and Objectives  2000 “13 Steps”  2010 Action Plan (Action points 1 – 6) The NWS focus mainly on Actions 4+5, which address only reducing (not eliminating) numbers, risks, operational status, role of nuclear weapons in security postures etc. Look at ACTION 3, however, and recall that in both 2000 and 2010 emphasis was put on making all steps irreversible. While formally accepting the commitments made through the NPT and at every subsequent review conference, the Nuclear-armed Five in the NPT (N5) have continued to modernise and refine their arsenals, while claiming that the numerical reductions they made when the Cold War ended should satisfy the nuclear free states. These reductions were welcomed, but there

3 are still 16,000 nuclear weapons… and now in the hands of 9 states, many of which are intent

• n building new generations.

Concerned about proliferation (with 4 nuclear-armed states outside the NPT), and losing patience with all the itemised – and then ignored – plans for step by step disarmament, the majority of states don’t want the NPT to become irrelevant. Some states and analysts at the 2010 Review Conference recognised that disarmament and nonproliferation would only be achieved if nuclear weapons are universally stigmatised and

• banned. The core problem they identified was that for the NWS – and for some of their allies

– nuclear weapons still held status and value, whether defined in terms of the ‘top table’, ‘punching above a state’s weight’, ‘projecting power’, ‘deterrence and ultimate insurance’ or ‘freedom of military action’ – as different nuclear-armed leaders have proclaimed in recent

• years. Though in the vast majority, the nuclear free states were treated as second class

citizens, and their security needs and interests were ignored, as nuclear weapons continued to be designed, produced, deployed and embedded in the security policies of nine states and a few of their allies. For the NPT this situation was unsustainable. Determined to strengthen the tools available to NPT states and prevent irrevocable erosion, a group of progressive states – including several Europeans – backed a new paragraph on humanitarian consequences and law, which was adopted by consensus. NPT OPTIONS for the future: DECLINE or TRANSFORM “The [NPT 2010] Conference expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.” This is the key text intended to frame the specific actions in the 2010 action plan. It is in this light that actions 1-6 need to be understood. To make this clear, at the first Preparatory Committee meeting (PrepCom) in Vienna in 2012, Switzerland sponsored a statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament, calling for nuclear weapons to be outlawed as well as eliminated. Norway convened a ground-breaking Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons (HINW) in Oslo in March 2013, which was followed by Mexico (Nayarit) in February 2014, and then Austria. South Africa and then New Zealand took the humanitarian disarmament statement over and in subsequent NPT PrepComs and also in the UN General Assembly (First Committee). By 2014, 155 UN member states had signed. An unprecedented 157 governments, together with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, UN agencies, humanitarian relief organisations, parliamentarians from several countries, academics and civil society, notably the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN, a network of over 400 NGOs in 100 nations), then participated in the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons. There were two outcome documents from Vienna that have relevance here: a summary of the findings; and a commitment from Austria made at the highest levels of its government – the Austrian Pledge, which has been opened for other states to sign, both provided in your dossiers.

4 The Vienna findings build on the expert evidence from Oslo and Nayarit. They take into account presentations and interventions from nuclear dependent and nuclear armed states as well as from the nuclear free NPT members, but still make sobering reading:  The impacts of nuclear weapons detonations – whether by intentional use or accident – would be catastrophic and unconstrained by national borders.  National and international relief agencies would be overwhelmed.  The risks are unacceptable – and higher than previously thought – and the consequences much worse.  Nuclear use – especially if multiple as likely through war or miscalculation, would cause human misery and long term environmental and developmental harm, not only for direct survivors but across the world. The Austrian pledge, which the government felt impelled to make in view of the findings, goes further than the summary, recognising that there is no consensus on next steps, and that this will be discussed next at the 2015 NPT Conference. Briefly reiterating the threats and evidence, the Austrian Pledge begins to tackle the challenging question of what states need to do to prevent such risks of humanitarian

• catastrophe. Emphasising that “it is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that

nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances”, Austria calls on governments to “identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons”. Austria puts particular onus on all states parties to the NPT, while also pledging to work with “all stakeholders to achieve this goal… … in efforts to stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks”. The Austrian government has now written to all governments enclosing the summary and the Austrian Pledge, and invited them all to support and associate themselves with these findings and the humanitarian approach to achieve security without nuclear weapons. There is an important role for parliamentarians from all parties and nations in this. You are the elected representatives of the people with responsibility for ensuring that governments act in the people’s best interests. Here in the European Parliament, and working with your colleagues in your national parliaments (and also the InterParliamentary Union, appropriate UN bodies and parliamentary networks), please develop, sign and carry to your governments and institutions resolutions and other means of supporting disarmament and nonproliferation. There have been some irresponsible statements made by some diplomats and officials from a handful of countries accusing the nations supporting the humanitarian initiatives and conferences such as those held in Oslo, Nayarit and Mexico of undermining the NPT. On the contrary, learning the lessons of history, it is clear that demonstrating the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and diplomatic actions such as Austria’s Pledge will prove to be important ways to reinforce and implement the NPT and other relevant treaties and agreements relating to disarmament, non-proliferation and security. Recall, for example, how the European parliament endorsed negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the early 1990s, even when some governments (including Britain, France, the United States and China) were opposed. Due to public and parliamentary pressure, as well as diplomatic initiatives, CTBT negotiations got underway in

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• 1994. Those ongoing negotiations to prohibit nuclear testing in a parallel treaty were the

major factor in restoring sufficient confidence in the NPT at its 1995 Review Conference to ensure its prolongation after 25 years. Twenty years later, if you don’t want the NPT to become further eroded and discredited, then it is incumbent on everyone to support the next rational steps to fill the gap. Endorsing the Austrian Pledge may seem a small step to take – and indeed it is – but it will be significant in revitalising the non-proliferation and disarmament agreements at the heart of the NPT, giving the review conference at least some hopes, ideas and tools to overcome the insecurity and frustration that so many nuclear free nations are feeling as a handful of governments invest in new generations of these weapons of mass destruction, thereby holding the rest of the world hostage. Thank you.