North Korean Security Challenges Post Kim Jong-il Daiwa - - PDF document

North Korean Security Challenges – Post Kim Jong-il Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation seminar 15 March 2012 Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS First, I must say to the Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation and to Shihoko Ogawa for

• rganizing this event and inviting me to speak: arigatoh gozaimasu.

Last year when IISS wrote a dossier on North Korean Security Challenges: A net assessment, we were pessimistic about the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. We discussed a broad spectrum of security challenges posed by North Korea: wide-ranging in geographic impact and multifaceted in nature. North Korea’s most direct threats are to its immediate neighbours, firstly, of course, to the ROK, by manner of conventional and asymmetric capabilities, including nuclear, chemical weapons, possibly biological weapons, long-range artillery, special operations forces, and cyber warfare. The threat is enhanced, and real, by virtue of North Korea’s propensity to initiate hostility. In the cyber domain, the attacks are on-going. Japan next feels the threat, especially from North Korea’s ballistic missiles, which, if not

• utfitted with WMD today, could be in the future. Nodongs armed with a 1,000kg warhead

probably cannot reach Tokyo, but they can reach Osaka, Nagoya and other areas of dense

• population. In 2010 North Korea also displayed the Musudan missile, whose 2,400km range

includes all of Japan, including US bases in Okinawa, although the missile has never been tested and probably is not operational. China is not directly threatened, but is deeply concerned about any eventually that could cause a refugee flow and tension in yet another of China’s border areas. North Korea’s human rights violations, inability to feed its people, and inherent systematic flaws could lead to implosion that produces China’s nightmare scenario, however much Chinese deny that such a thing could happen. All countries, whether in Asia or Europe

• r elsewhere face a threat from North Korea’s drug trafficking, currency counterfeiting,

money laundering, endangered species trafficking, smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes and pharmaceuticals, insurance fraud and other forms of state crime, not to mention the still unsettled crimes of abductions.

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Countries around the world are also threatened by North Korea’s willingness to transfer nuclear and missile technologies to any would-be buyer, including, possibly to terrorist

• groups. In April 2003 during talks with the US and China, a North Korean negotiator

threatened vaguely but ominously that Pyongyang might transfer nuclear weapons. In 2005 Vice Minister Kim Kye-gwan told an American reporter that the US “should consider the danger that we could transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists”. The evidence is clear that in the past ten years, North Korea provided assistance to both Libya and Syria in efforts to develop nuclear weapons programs. There is also some evidence, albeit unconfirmed, that North Korea may also have been engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran and Myanmar. Among these countries, Libya is no longer a customer. The Assad regime in Syria may also be on the way out. And Myanmar appears to be coming in from the cold. This leaves Iran as North Korea‘s only reliable partner, but a very important one. Some observers have alleged that the extensive cooperation between North Korea and Iran in the missile field also extends to their nuclear programs. Such cooperation would seem to have a compelling logic: North Korea has weapons-related technology in both plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment and building, and testing nuclear explosive devices, while Iran has the money and oil that North Korea needs. However, allegations of Iranian– North Korean nuclear cooperation have not been substantiated. The IISS dossier saw no evidence that North Korea might trade away its nuclear arsenal for any diplomatic or economic gain. And we argued that the dynastic succession that was beginning to unfold in Pyongyang and the uncertainties this entails exacerbate the potential for conflict. We said the designated successor will face severe disadvantages because of his lack of experience, his fragile power base, the political constraints on economic reform and the military’s role in politics. In almost all respects, the external and internal conditions are less favourable for this second generation succession than for the first dynastic transfer after the death of regime founder Kim Il-sung in 1994. This could make North Korea an even more dangerous nation, more inclined to engage in further military provocations, to cling to its weapons of mass destruction and to offer them for sale to any would-be buyer.

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In pursuit of the goal of becoming a ‘strong and prosperous great nation’ by this year, such military capabilities are all that the regime can summon. We also predicted that the death of Kim Jong-il will be a Moment of Truth and that he probably was in the last decade

• f his life. Well, that turned out to be true.

We said : “ If Kim Jong-il dies in the next few years, there is no guarantee that without paternal protection his son will be successful in taking over, or even that the North Korean elite and system will hold together.” That hasn’t proven to be true. So far, so good, from Kim Jong-un’s point of view. Not that we predicted collapse; but we said collapse and ensuing Korean unification was a more distinct possibility. It is too early to judge the succession a success. The fundamental crises that could cause a tipping point remain acute. North Korea’s moribund economy remains beset by

• contradictions. The leadership is fearful of introducing the market reforms that are necessary

to escape their poverty trap. The nation is unable to feed its people, and is falling further behind all its neighbours every year. Moreover, the population increasingly realizes this, through various channels to the outside. The nation also faces what might be called an existential crisis. In the context of a divided nation, North Korea has always falsely portrayed itself as the guardian of Korean

• nationalism. But in practice, the North has surrendered its vaunted juche philosophy of

‘independence’ since it depends crucially on Chinese aid and political support. Leap Day Deal Following on from the shock of Kim Jong-il’s death in late December, the last month saw another significant development when North Korea agreed a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests and on work at the enrichment facility at Yongbyon, in exchange for US food assistance. We did not predict this. I am on record as saying after the death that Kim Jong-un would not be able to say no to veteran military officials who would want to conduct additional tests

• f both their nuclear devices and of missile systems. The military officers would want to

ensure that strategic weapons reliably work. The last two nuclear tests were significantly

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smaller than the first tests of other nuclear states, which probably means they were a fizzle. It cannot ruled out, however, that North Korean officials were telling the truth when they said that they were aiming for these small yields by using much smaller amounts of plutonium than is normal. North Korea’s tests of medium-range missiles were also only partially successful. The Taepodong-1 launched in August 1998 failed after the third stage separated and the intended satellite fell into the ocean. The Taepodong-2 launched in July 2006 exploded 42 seconds after lift-off. The April 2009 launch of the Unha-2 failed to put a satellite into orbit as the third stage either did not successfully separate from the second stage or did not ignite

• properly. The Musudan missile that was paraded in October 2010 has never been tested. Nor

has North Korea tested the Nodong variation that appears to have been imported from Iran. So why did North Korea agree to a moratorium on further nuclear tests and long-range missile tests? One answer may lie in the definition of “long-range missile launches.” “Long-range” is not a term of art. Ballistic missiles are generally categorized as short-range, meaning up to 1,000km; medium-range, of 1,000-3,500k; intermediate-range of 3,500- 5,000km; and intercontinental. Nodongs are medium-range; they can fly 1100km, though the range falls to 900km if they are carrying a 1-tonne warhead. So I don’t know that Nodongs are included in the moratorium, and almost certainly not North Korea’s shorter-range Hwasong-5 and -6 (otherwise known as Scud B-s and C-s. which fly 300 and 500km, covering most of South Korea). And what does North Korea mean by ‘missile launches.” It insisted that its Unha-2 test April 2009 was not a missile launch covered by UNSC 187 (which mandated that North Korea “suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme”). Russia and China sided with North Korea in this interpretation. The US, Japan, ROK, Britain and other European states said it was clearly an activity related to the ballistic missile program, because so many aspects of a missile and a space launch vehicle are the same, although the trajectory and the purpose are very different. The Leap Day moratorium could be in for interpretation trouble if North Korea decides to conduct another space launch. Another answer to why North Korea agreed to the nuclear and missile moratorium is that North Korea’s systems primarily serve a political purpose. North Korea perceives its nuclear

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weapons as a way of ensuing its prestige and influence on the international stage despite its small size and economic backwardness. Nuclear weapons also bolster the regime’s internal legitimacy. Nuclear weapons are a rare example of technological superiority over Seoul, and part of the campaign to build a ‘strong and prosperous nation.’ Nuclear weapons also act as a political deterrent against forced regime change. They don’t have to work perfectly for any of these political benefits. Similarly with missiles. If your adversaries think the mock-up Musudan missiles in your military parade represent a real system that has been deployed to bases around the country, they you don’t need flight-tests to achieve the deterrent purpose. If the test was unsuccessful, it would even undercut the deterrent benefit. Finally, one can’t rule out the possibility that North Korea missile testing will continue after a fashion, just not on its own soil. It is probable that Iran and Pakistan in the past provided Pyongyang with data related to warhead re-entry from their own tests on missiles derived from the Nodong. Iran might still be doing so. The decision to accept a moratorium doesn’t mean North Korea is any closer to giving up its nuclear arsenal. Accepting a freeze is a well-practiced play in the North Korea game

• plan. I don’t mean to denigrate the moratorium. No testing is far better than testing. But

accepting the principle of denuclearization doesn’t mean denuclearization. North Korea hasn’t given up any of its weapons, nor any of its plutonium. In recent years, Pyongyang has no longer referred to the possibility of relinquishing its nuclear assets in return for political and economic concessions. Rather, it now speaks in terms of the US dealing with the DPRK as an equal nuclear state, even stating hopes of concluding a deal in the same way that the US did with India. Pyongyang now says that it is ‘unimaginable’ to expect it to return to the NPT as a ‘non-nuclear state’. It has also said that it will only feel no need to retain its nuclear weapons once the American ‘nuclear threat is removed and South Korea is cleared of its nuclear umbrella’. The first of these conditions is highly subjective and the second is very unlikely (as it would require the end of the US–South Korea alliance). It thus appears that Pyongyang perceives its nuclear weapons as a permanent feature.

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The Leap Day Agreement did include a moratorium on uranium enrichment activity at Yongbyon, with monitoring by the IAEA “while productive dialogues continue”. The latter wording is reminiscent of the uranium enrichment suspension deal that France, Germany and the United Kingdom struck with Iran in 2004, which similarly was only to be “sustained while negotiations proceed”. North Korea’s moratorium on enrichment does not cover enrichment activities at facilities other than the one at Yongbyon shown to Sig Hecker in November 2010. There must be at least two other related facilities that have not been revealed: one for production of the uranium hexafluoride gas that is spun in the centrifuges and a pilot plant was probably was copied in order to construct and equip the one at Yongbyon. The one Hecker saw there could not have been set up in only 19 months without a pilot plant serving as a model. There will also be centrifuge workshops and assembly facilities. All those additional plants must be declared and be subject to IAEA monitoring for there to be even a prima facie case that North Korea’s enrichment program has been suspended. It is also not clear what exactly a moratorium on enrichment activity at Yongbyon

• means. Can enrichment research and development work continue along with centrifuge

manufacture? After the first Iran enrichment suspension in 2003, Tehran insisted on doing all

• f that, as well as uranium conversion of yellowcake to gasified uranium. At Yongbyon, will

the centrifuges have to be shut down completely, or will they be allowed to keep spinning with inert gases, a process known as “warm shut-down”? When centrifuges are shut down completely (“cold shutdown”), they are in danger of self-destruction, like a toy top that wobbles out of control once its velocity is slowed. If North Korea intends to resume enrichment once talks break down – as they almost surely will, sooner or later – it will insist

• n warm shut-down. There is a lot that still needs to be negotiated.

Likewise the details of IAEA inspection. North Korea has always had a contentious relationship with the Vienna-based agency, and will surely try to restrict IAEA access to the minimum level necessary to keep the Americans from walking away from the deal. The IAEA will have to be able to inspect the output of the centrifuges but they may be excluded from the control room, for example, and from examining the machines up close. Iran doesn’t allow that either. But by measuring the output at least the IAEA should be able to determine r how well the machines have been working – indeed whether they have been enriching at all,

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and to what level. That will provide valuable information to anybody keen to know how close North Korea is to being able to add highly enriched uranium to its stockpile of plutonium for use in weapons. According to the State Department announcement – but not the North Korean Foreign Ministry version -- the IAEA will also be able to confirm the disablement of the 5MW reactor and associated facilities. The reactor has been shut down since July 2007. The next summer the cooling tower was famously toppled and some other disablement steps were taken. The disablement was not complete, however, and the IISS and others have judged that it would not take more than about six months for plutonium production to resume at the reactor. It would be good if IAEA monitoring could find an answer to the mystery of why North Korea kept the reactor shut down these past nearly five years. It might be because they decided clandestine enrichment facilities were easier to hide, but other explanations cannot be ruled

• ut.

Let me end on a positive note. The night before the Leap Day Deal I received an embargoed preview of it. So I was ready the next day with a commentary in the Foreign Policy on-line magazine, in which I called the deal a modest success. It doesn’t eradicate the North Korean threat, but it augurs well for Kim Jong-un's foreign-policy smarts. Reports earlier this week from New York that North Korea’s lead negotiator wants to establish a point-of-contact office in Washington and vice versa in Pyongyang are another interesting sign. I won’t get carried away, because I have seen this movie before. In 1994, the US and DPRK were supposed to establish liaison offices in each other’s capital. I was one of the Korean speakers in the State Department at the time, so my name was on the list of officers possibly to be sent to Pyongyang. It never happened. And I am still waiting to set foot in North Korea for the first time. I am hoping finally to get a visa this June.