Networks terminate connections even when users are prepared to pay - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Networks terminate connections even when users are prepared to pay - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Vytautas Valancius + Nick Feamster + Ramesh Johari * Vijay Vazirani + Presented by Kong Lam Slides adapted from authors + Georgia Institute of Technology, * Stanford University 1 Networks terminate connections even when users are prepared


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SLIDE 1

Vytautas Valancius+ Nick Feamster+ Ramesh Johari* Vijay Vazirani+

+ Georgia Institute of Technology, * Stanford University

Presented by Kong Lam Slides adapted from authors’

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SLIDE 2

 Networks terminate connections even

when users are prepared to pay for the path!

October 2005

31 Jul 2005: Level 3 Notifies Cogent of intent to disconnect. 16 Aug 2005: Cogent begins massive sales efgort and mentions a 15 Sept. expected de-peering date. 5 Oct 2005 : Level 3 disconnects Cogent. Mass hysteria ensues up to, and including policymakers in Washington, D.C. 7 Oct 2005: Level 3 reconnects Cogent During the “outage”, Level 3 and Cogent’s singly homed customers could not reach each

  • ther. (~ 4% of the Internet’s prefixes were

isolated from each other)

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SLIDE 3

 Denied peering opportunities exist in

every exchange

  • Disagreements over payment direction
  • Bilateral nature of contracts introduces

information asymmetry

Atlanta Exchange

ISP E ISP B

ISP A

ISP D ISP C

Denied peering and/or transit

  • pportunity

How could we improve this market?

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SLIDE 4

 Sellers

  • Sell segments from exchange to exchange

 Buyers

  • Buy multiple segments that form paths

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Replace bilateral contracts with path auctions

MINT Market Current Market

ISP B ISP A ISP C IX IX IX IX

BGP Sessions

IX IX IX IX

$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $

IX IX

$ $

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SLIDE 5

 Current market: pricing connections

  • No control to end-networks, coarse

granularity

 MINT market: pricing segments

  • High granularity, possibility to value/

construct entire paths

  • Pricing congestion, bw, delay, loss or

combinations Do you agree with such a market structure?

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SLIDE 6

 Market and connectivity effjciency

  • End networks can directly express their

valuation of network-to-network paths

  • No incentive to de-peer as long as end-

networks are valuing the paths

 Incentive to end-networks: path control  Incentive to transit networks: increased

revenue, direct policy expression through prices

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Forms a flat network. Incentives?

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 Modeling Internet as an

Auction

  • Sellers advertise prices

(ofgers) for each segment

  • Buyers issue bids for

“paths”

 Auction properties:

  • Continuous: ISPs are setting

the prices to attract traffjc

  • Combinatorial: Buyers

issue the bids for set of goods

  • First-price: the lowest cost

path is chosen

Segment Announcements Path Setup

ISP C ISP B

ISP A

ISP D ISP Y

Exchanges

Mediato r

ISP X Path Request

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SLIDE 8

 Mediator runs the auction, matches

bids and ofgers

  • Bidding for price with bandwidth, delay,

loss constraints

 What are the mediator’s incentives?

  • Charge for path requests
  • Allow multiple mediators to compete

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 Topology from Peering

DB

  • ~170 exchanges,~1000 ISPs
  • Capacity information

 Segment pricing

  • Randomized price bootstrap
  • Each ISP runs a heuristic to

maximize the utilization

 Bid arrivals and demand

curve

  • Uniformly random source

destination exchanges, Poisson arrival

  • Three difgerent demand

distributions

How fast statistical equilibrium is reached?

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 Ongoing work  Control Plane

  • Scalability of mediator

 Data Plane

  • Makes use of existing technologies
  • Tunneling, label switching

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 BGP is insuffjcient for diverse and

growing Internet

 MINT – alternative way of structuring

inter-domain bandwidth trade

  • Rather trading connectivity, trade transit

segments

 Multiple benefits

  • More control to the source
  • No notion of customer-provider or peer-

peer

  • Policy expression through price

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