NDS2 Secure storage, sharing and publishing of data in the NDS - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

NDS2 – Secure storage, sharing and publishing

• f data in the NDS

Maciej Brzeźniak, Supercomputing Dept. of PSNC, www.psnc.pl

TF-Storage meeting @Dubrovnik, Sep., 26-27th 2012 Project funded by: NCBiR for 2011-2013 under „KMD2” project (no. NR02-0025-10/2011)

Project partners – 10 Polish universities and supercomputing centres:

NDS2 - presentation plan

• Background and project status

– NDS and BADSS – NDS2

• NDS2: Secure storage and sharing

– Secure storage clients:

• ndsCryptoFS (Win/Linux)
• Java GUI, CLI, library and Android
• Appliance – virtual/physical – for institutions

– Client-side encryption & integrity control

• Concept and some details
• Performance

– Secure sharing inside NDS2 – concept and keys management – Secure publishing – general information

2

Background: NDS & BADSS (1)

• NDS (2007-2009)

– R&D project: distributed, replicated data storage – Virtual Filesystem in user space – implemented using FUSE library – Standard user interfaces: SFTP (SSHd), WebDAV, Web application, GridFTP – Replication:

• Automatic, system-side, synchronous and asynchronous
• Performed using NFS (local replicas) and GridFTP (remote ones) protocols

– Funded from national sources

• BADSS (2009-2012)

– Deployment of NDS for academic community – 10 sites in Poland – Tapes: 12,5 PB in 5 sites – Disks: 2 PB – Funded from EU structural sources – PLATON project

• Assumptions for NDS and experience from NDS deployment:

– No need for dedicated access tools – OK for users, BUT… – No encryption of the data supported by system:

• Data encrypted only during transfer (SSL)

and on tape media (LTO5 encryption) + disks de-magnetization

• Users may encrypt data on their side:

– Manually – impractical with large data – Automatically – with external tools, that supports on-the-fly encryption

– ‚POSIX-like’ access to data:

• Linux: SSHfs – works for most use-cases => OK
• Windows:

– Problems with native Webdav client in some versions of Windows – To have a stable solutons for accessing big files extra (paid) clients are needed => possibly it’s best to provide your own client (however it’s not easy)

Background: NDS & BADSS (2)

NDS2 project status

• NDS2 (2011-2013) – extension of NDS project (2007-2009)
• NDS2 =

NDS – reliable, replicated and distributed storage + secure storage & sharing & publising + versioning + ACLs support + user management de-centralisation

• Progress:

– Some prototypes worked out already:

• nds2CryptoFS 4 Linux and Windows
• Android client without encryption

– Some are under development:

• Java-based GUI application
• Appliance for institutions
• Android client with encryption
• Project partners – 10 Polish universities and computing centres
• Funded by: NCBiR for 2011-2013 under „KMD2” project (no. NR02-0025-10/2011)

Clients for NDS2

• Assumptions:

– We address most popular platforms (Windows, Linux) with native client providing POSIX-like access to data – JAVA GUI can be used for remaining plaforms – Android client as a proof-

• f-concept for mobile users

(currently no plan for IOs)

• Clients being developed:

– nds2CryptoFS 4 Linux – nds2CryptoFS 4 Windows – Java-based GUI application – Appliance for institutions – Android client

6

NDS filesystem + support for encryption keys mgmt Linux user

SSHFS + extensions

Windows user Appliance

for institutions

SSHFS + extensions Commercial ‚FUSE-like’ and SFTP libraries

GUI and Android user

Java crpto libraries

NDS2: Client-side cryptography

• Linux: SSHFS + extensions

– FUSE-based project – We ‚patched’ the SSHFS code:

• it calls cryptographic functions (encryption & digests)
• while serving read and write operations of VFS layer

– Prototype exists! Ready for testing.

Linux user

SSHFS + extensions WAN

NDS2: Client-side cryptography

• Windows:

– Commercial Virtual FS library (FUSE-like) and commercial SFTP client library

– Why we use paid libraries?:

– Portability among diferent versions of Windows – Wanted a ‚quick win’ and the working solution ASAP – We focus on cryptography and feautres on top

• f the filesystem (secure storage, sharing, ACLs…)
• Virtual FS library:

– We considered DOKAN but the project looks not to be well maintained

• SFTP library:

– Open source libraries have serious performance limitations

– Client prototype exist! Ready for testing.

Windows user

Commercial ‚FUSE-like’ and SFTP libraries

WAN

• GUI application (1)

– Allows storage & retrieval of files and provides filesystem structure view:

• Put, get, move, delete etc.
• Drag & drop support

– Sharing management:

• Initialisation and control of sharing

– SHARE DIRECTORY creation – Assigning the directory with the sharing keypairs

• Access control lists management (ACLs)

– Advanced, user-level metadata access and management:

• (Automated) annotation, tagging control etc.
• Meta-data based search (free form/structured)
• (on the roadmap)

– Implementation:

• Java library (used for CLI, GUI and Android app.)
• Shell integration for Windows and Linux

(on the roadmap)

NDS2: Client-side cryptography

WAN

Operating system supporting JAVA

Data and filesystem meta-data User meta-data & control

Java crpto libraries

• GUI application (2) – screenshot of the prototype (Polish version)

NDS2: Client-side cryptography

Client-side cryptography

• Appliance for institutions – idea:

– REMOTE STORAGE SPACE:

• storage space in NDS2 system
• VFS with transparent, on-the fly encryption and digests

– LOCAL STORAGE SPACE:

• local storage for local usage – people need it anyway;

e.g. workspace for users within the small organisation

• exported to LAN by SMB protocol;

– LOCAL and REMOTE spaces synchronized (scheduled or on-demand) – Appliance administration – basic web console:

• Defining storage, shares and backup/synchronization schedules
• Managing user accounts

– User accounts:

• Appliance is the user of NDS2 system
• Internal accounts – may be taken from LDAP or defined manually

– Status: concept is still evolving:

• e.g. should the intenal disk be persistent storage or cache only?

NDS filesystem + support for encryption keys mgmt

Appliance

for institutions

SSHFS + extensions

WAN LAN

SMB server

Local disk space Remo space crypto

Client-side cryptography

• Appliance for institutions – possible implementations:

Box for small groups/ instiutions Rack server for bigger institutions VMware vAppliance Small (19,5x70x18,6cm) and silent, green (fits below the desk):

• CPU with AES-NI support (not a problem these days)
• 2 x 2,5” HDDs or 2x green SSDs inside

(up to ~ 2 TB of RAW internal storage)

• Must be cheap! e.g. ~600 EUR/box (not more than PC)

Rack server:

• CPUs with AES-NI on board
• Low voltage! (being green, costs)
• 4x 3,5” or 8x 2,5” SSD (up to 12 TB of RAW storage)
• Reasonable costs - ~2500EUR with 12TB of capacity

Virtual machine:

• E.g. vApp easy to run on vmware cluster or another VM image
• No assumptions on hardware – just needs LUN for local

storage and account in NDS2 for backups and sync’s Some ‚fancy’ hardware for users:

• Smart cards + readers (expresscard or USB)
• Psychological ‚trick’ (works for some users)

Client-side cryptography

• Appliance for institutions – discussion:

– RISK analysis

• Hardware = cost – must be included in the service delivery model
• Hardware = failures – too much hassle? – outsourcing? – but it costs
• Hardware problem = data loss?

– Disk failures:

» RAIDs helps in case of single disk failure » Frequent backups/sync’s protects in case of total crash – Server failures: » Data not available at local storage for a while, but NOT LOST » Access to data still possible using software client (keys needed) » Certificate for authorisation securely stored on smart card (SC) » MASTER keys for encryption on SC (future) or other media (e.g. SD) » Appliance configuration data on SD card and/or in the remote storage » Hardware may be easily exchanged

– Experimental work

• we will build some prototype and check users’ buy-in

• Android application:

– Challenge 1: User-friendly, intuitive interface

• Core functionality only – simplicity:

– Data storage and retrieval – Remote filesystem’s view and file access » Local caching of files – e.g if user reads PDF file – Device memory/storage view » Click to upload to NDS2 – Interface integration: » e.g. „send to NDS2” function in file browser

• No sharing, user-level metadata mgmt etc.

– At least not in 1st approach

– Challenge 2: Encryption / digests performance / battery:

• Benchmarks for ARM CPUs promising comparing to WLAN bandwidth
• AES support planned for ARMv8 architecture
• Encryption may exhaust battery
• However, note that typically Android will be used

for small files (PDFs, DOCs, photos etc.)

– Again, an experimental work:

• Proof-of-concept for Android

NDS2: Client-side cryptography

WAN

Android OS

Data and filesystem meta-data

Java crpto libraries

V1 screenshot

Secure data storage (1)

• Confidentiality thanks to encryption
• Integrity control thanks to digests
• Assumptions and decisions:

– We need performance –> symmetric encryption (AES 256 counter) – We don’t want to keep per-file keys on the user side

• let’s store them in the system (encrypted)
• MASTER KEY asymm. + symmetric FILE KEYs

– Converged encryption? – NO, we generate key for each file – ‚Strong’ digests (i.e. preventig us from collisions) – SHA512 calculated per block (64k)

• File format overhead: 512bits=64Bytes / 64kBytes = 1/1024 = 0,09765625 %
• Issues:

– Only the user has a MASTER KEY:

• User is responsible for proper key protection -> may be a problem for less ‚aware’ users
• Some tools needed, e.g. ‚backup to USB dongle or SD card’ feature of GUI application
• User education needed!

Secure data storage (2)

• File format:

– Header:

• File’s symmetric key encrypted with user’s public key
• In default setup (no sharing), only the owner may know the secret symmetric key
• While sharing, additional‚ ’headers’ stored in the system;

they contain the file key encrypted with sharing users’ public keys

– N x data block, each block has:

• Data part: encrypted with the unique symmetric FILE KEY – generated per file
• Control part: contains digest, encrypted by the FILE KEY

Secure data storage (3)

• Performance:

– Encryption: AES256 counter:

• Regular PC

– reading data + encrypting (no writes): – Intel Core 2 Duo E7400 2.80 GHz, RAM: 4 x 1024MB DDR2, Fedora 14 64 bit, kernel 2.6.35 or Win 7 Pro SP1 64 bit » C + openssl, Java + Bouncy Castle ~46 MB/s » C# + Bouncy Castle 20 MB/s » C# + Commercial Library 47 MB/s – in-RAM operations faster: » C + openssl ~100 MB/s

• More if you exploit AES-NI

Intel Core i7 3.4GHz 8GB RAM Ubuntu 11.10 – SFTP (AES-256): C + openssl 150 MB/s – In-RAM encryption ~ 1 GB/s (or more) – Most libraries (and Java VM) can exploit AES-NI!

– SHA512 digests:

• Regular PC:

2 x Six-Core AMD Opteron 2435 2.6 GHz (2 cores used by VM), 2 GB RAM, Centos 5.6 – gcc: 4.1.2, OpenSSL: 0.9.8e, Boost: 1.33.1, ~ 1,2 GB/s

Secure data storage (4) – comparison

with other solutions discussed during meeting

Feature Trusted Cloud Drive SpiderOak NDS2 Encryption keys for files Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Who knows the secret key Trusted Cloud Drive provider (on-premises) Only end-user Only-end user Namespace encryption? Namespace (meta-data) stored on-premises Yes No, considered for 2nd approach Secure sharing Planned Planned Planned Dedicated client needed No Yes Yes Filesystem-like access? (drive letter/ local mount) Win: BitKinex / other Linux: DAVfs No Yes: ndsCryptoFS4 Windows and Linux Mobile client WebDav file manager,

• ther WebDAV clients

Custom Custom (Android in 1st approach) Files cut to fragments while stored in the system? No Yes, files stored in ‚blocks’ in the system Only logically, one file on the storage Assummed storage back-end Disks / clouds Disks HSMs and/or disks

Safe data sharing & publishing (1)

• Secure data sharing with internal NDS2 clients

– ACLs for physical access control to files – Encryption + appropriate keys handling for security; assumptions:

• Users don’t trust the service provider
• Some users from the same institution (it may be large – see universities)

don’t want to use the same encryption keys as their colleagues

– Current concept (still evolving):

• File encryption keys protected by per-directory or per-user-group

key pair (called PROXY KEYS), known to the sharing group

• Keys exchange automatic, however initiated by share owner using GUI:

– The user (owner) creates SHARE directory… – and defines members of sharing group (determined by setting ACLs to individuals or for a ‚system’ group) – PROXY keypair is associated to this SHARE, then securely exchanged with allowed users using their public keys – PROXY private key is needed to access the FILE KEYs for the shared files – PROXY public key is needed to create new files in shared folder

• Will work for all interfaces: ndsCryptoFS for Linux, Windows, GUI and Android

Safe data sharing & publishing (2)

• Sharing data with external World

– Secure sharing: FileSender-like use-case:

• Temporary storage of data
• Import/export voucher
• Multiple files per voucher
• Encryption & digests supported
• Planned deployment: SANDBOXed environment:

– Servers/infrastructure – separate from NDS2 – for security – No interactions from sandbox->NDS2; all actions initiatied from NDS2 side

• Possible integration with FileSender (open topic)

– Secure publishing:

• Data put to the public www servers for permanent storage
• Read-only access from World
• Publication link generated by the system

to be shared with other users, put to CMS or to website

• Planned deployment: dedicated, publication SANDBOX:

– Infrastructure separate from NDS2 – for safety reasons – Multiple www servers and storage systems + load balancing + client proximity – for performance reasons – No interactions from sandbox->NDS2; all actions initiatied from NDS2 side

More information:

• NDS: National Data Storage:

– nds.psnc.pl – nds@psnc.pl

• BADSS: Backup and Archival Data Storage Service for Polish Science:

– storage.pionier.net.pl

• PLATON project:

– www.platon.pionier.net.pl