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Monetary-fiscal policy interaction and fiscal inflation: A tale of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Monetary-fiscal policy interaction and fiscal inflation: A tale of three countries Martin Kliem 1 Alexander Kriwoluzky 2 Samad Sarferaz 3 1 Deutsche Bundesbank 2 MLU Halle-Wittenberg and IWH 3 ETH Zrich Central banks and crises - historical


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Monetary-fiscal policy interaction and fiscal inflation: A tale of three countries

Martin Kliem1 Alexander Kriwoluzky2 Samad Sarferaz3

1Deutsche Bundesbank 2MLU Halle-Wittenberg and IWH 3ETH Zürich

Central banks and crises - historical perspectives July 8th 2015

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Motivation

Characteristics of the current crisis:

◮ main monetary policy instrument at zero lower bound ◮ increasing sovereign debt and high fiscal deficits

Theories which model explicitly the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy are in the center of the policy debate.

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Motivation

Characteristics of the current crisis:

◮ main monetary policy instrument at zero lower bound ◮ increasing sovereign debt and high fiscal deficits

Theories which model explicitly the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy are in the center of the policy debate.

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Motivation

Characteristics of the current crisis:

◮ main monetary policy instrument at zero lower bound ◮ increasing sovereign debt and high fiscal deficits

Theories which model explicitly the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy are in the center of the policy debate.

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 5

Motivation

Characteristics of the current crisis:

◮ main monetary policy instrument at zero lower bound ◮ increasing sovereign debt and high fiscal deficits

Theories which model explicitly the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy are in the center of the policy debate.

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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This paper

Evidence in favor of this model (especially changing policy regimes) is scarce:

◮ U.S. data: Leeper, Bianchi and Ilut, Bhattarai, Lee, and Park

Aim of the paper:

◮ provide further evidence for models with changing monetary

and fiscal policy interaction

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 7

This paper

Evidence in favor of this model (especially changing policy regimes) is scarce:

◮ U.S. data: Leeper, Bianchi and Ilut, Bhattarai, Lee, and Park

Aim of the paper:

◮ provide further evidence for models with changing monetary

and fiscal policy interaction

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 8

This paper

Evidence in favor of this model (especially changing policy regimes) is scarce:

◮ U.S. data: Leeper, Bianchi and Ilut, Bhattarai, Lee, and Park

Aim of the paper:

◮ provide further evidence for models with changing monetary

and fiscal policy interaction

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 9

Our approach

  • 1. cross-country analysis

◮ contrast the US experience with two other countries:

Italy and Germany

◮ countries are similar (all G7-countries) and have been subject

to similar shocks

◮ narrative sources indicate differences in monetary and fiscal

policy interaction

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Our approach

  • 1. cross-country analysis

◮ contrast the US experience with two other countries:

Italy and Germany

◮ countries are similar (all G7-countries) and have been subject

to similar shocks

◮ narrative sources indicate differences in monetary and fiscal

policy interaction

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Our approach

  • 1. cross-country analysis

◮ contrast the US experience with two other countries:

Italy and Germany

◮ countries are similar (all G7-countries) and have been subject

to similar shocks

◮ narrative sources indicate differences in monetary and fiscal

policy interaction

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Our approach

  • 1. cross-country analysis

◮ contrast the US experience with two other countries:

Italy and Germany

◮ countries are similar (all G7-countries) and have been subject

to similar shocks

◮ narrative sources indicate differences in monetary and fiscal

policy interaction

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Our approach

  • 1. cross-country analysis (Italy, Germany, and the US)
  • 2. TVP-VAR model

◮ employ a more elaborate and parsimonious time series model ◮ perform a counterfactual analysis Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Our approach

  • 1. cross-country analysis (Italy, Germany, and the US)
  • 2. TVP-VAR model

◮ employ a more elaborate and parsimonious time series model ◮ perform a counterfactual analysis Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Our approach

  • 1. cross-country analysis (Italy, Germany, and the US)
  • 2. TVP-VAR model
  • 3. DSGE model

◮ structural interpretation of the findings Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Measure of monetary and fiscal interaction

We focus on the low-frequency relationship between inflation and fiscal stance:

  • 1. relationship between inflation and fiscal stance captures the

interaction between monetary and fiscal policy

  • 2. Lucas (1980): systematic change recovered best beyond

business cycle frequency at low frequencies

  • 3. DSGE model and different policy regimes:

different shocks drive the low-frequency relationship between deficits and inflation

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Measure of monetary and fiscal interaction

We focus on the low-frequency relationship between inflation and fiscal stance:

  • 1. relationship between inflation and fiscal stance captures the

interaction between monetary and fiscal policy

  • 2. Lucas (1980): systematic change recovered best beyond

business cycle frequency at low frequencies

  • 3. DSGE model and different policy regimes:

different shocks drive the low-frequency relationship between deficits and inflation

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 18

Measure of monetary and fiscal interaction

We focus on the low-frequency relationship between inflation and fiscal stance:

  • 1. relationship between inflation and fiscal stance captures the

interaction between monetary and fiscal policy

  • 2. Lucas (1980): systematic change recovered best beyond

business cycle frequency at low frequencies

  • 3. DSGE model and different policy regimes:

different shocks drive the low-frequency relationship between deficits and inflation

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Measure of monetary and fiscal interaction

We focus on the low-frequency relationship between inflation and fiscal stance:

  • 1. relationship between inflation and fiscal stance captures the

interaction between monetary and fiscal policy

  • 2. Lucas (1980): systematic change recovered best beyond

business cycle frequency at low frequencies

  • 3. DSGE model and different policy regimes:

different shocks drive the low-frequency relationship between deficits and inflation

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Measuring fiscal stance

◮ debt growth before interest payments ◮ it measures the change of outstanding liabilities due to fiscal

policy

◮ it is defined as primary deficits relative to debt (Sims (2011,

EER))

Zoom in: fiscal stance Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Measuring fiscal stance

◮ debt growth before interest payments ◮ it measures the change of outstanding liabilities due to fiscal

policy

◮ it is defined as primary deficits relative to debt (Sims (2011,

EER))

Zoom in: fiscal stance Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Narrative evidence and first pass at the data

Following Lucas (1980):

  • 1. filter the data
  • 2. run a regression of filtered inflation ˜

π on filtered deficits over debt: ˜ πt = β ˜ PrimDef t ˜ Debtt−1 + error

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Monetary/fiscal policy in the US

◮ Narrative evidence: In the 70s: Federal reserve bank acts as

the “junior partner” (Alan Meltzer) to the fiscal authority. The fiscal authority was not concerned with inflation.

◮ Well established policy change (Clarida et.al. (QJE, 2000),

Lubik and Schorfheide (AER, 2004), Bianchi and Ilut (2012))

◮ Breakpoint: Paul Volcker becomes Chairman (1979)

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Monetary/fiscal policy in the US

◮ Narrative evidence: In the 70s: Federal reserve bank acts as

the “junior partner” (Alan Meltzer) to the fiscal authority. The fiscal authority was not concerned with inflation.

◮ Well established policy change (Clarida et.al. (QJE, 2000),

Lubik and Schorfheide (AER, 2004), Bianchi and Ilut (2012))

◮ Breakpoint: Paul Volcker becomes Chairman (1979)

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Monetary/fiscal policy in the US

◮ Narrative evidence: In the 70s: Federal reserve bank acts as

the “junior partner” (Alan Meltzer) to the fiscal authority. The fiscal authority was not concerned with inflation.

◮ Well established policy change (Clarida et.al. (QJE, 2000),

Lubik and Schorfheide (AER, 2004), Bianchi and Ilut (2012))

◮ Breakpoint: Paul Volcker becomes Chairman (1979)

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Low-frequency relationship U.S.

−10 −5 5 10 15 −10 −5 5 10 15 β= 0.96

(a) US:1955-1979

−10 −5 5 10 15 −10 −5 5 10 15 β= 0.15

(b) US:1980-2009

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Monetary/fiscal policy in Germany

◮ Hyperinflation of the Weimarer Republik 1923 ◮ Bundesbank independent and pledged to controlling inflation

rate (Beyer, Gaspar, Gerberding, and Issing (2013))

◮ No strong attempts of the fiscal authority to weaken the

independence of the Bundesbank

◮ No breakpoint: stable monetary-fiscal policy interaction over

time

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Monetary/fiscal policy in Germany

◮ Hyperinflation of the Weimarer Republik 1923 ◮ Bundesbank independent and pledged to controlling inflation

rate (Beyer, Gaspar, Gerberding, and Issing (2013))

◮ No strong attempts of the fiscal authority to weaken the

independence of the Bundesbank

◮ No breakpoint: stable monetary-fiscal policy interaction over

time

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Monetary/fiscal policy in Germany

◮ Hyperinflation of the Weimarer Republik 1923 ◮ Bundesbank independent and pledged to controlling inflation

rate (Beyer, Gaspar, Gerberding, and Issing (2013))

◮ No strong attempts of the fiscal authority to weaken the

independence of the Bundesbank

◮ No breakpoint: stable monetary-fiscal policy interaction over

time

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Monetary/fiscal policy in Germany

◮ Hyperinflation of the Weimarer Republik 1923 ◮ Bundesbank independent and pledged to controlling inflation

rate (Beyer, Gaspar, Gerberding, and Issing (2013))

◮ No strong attempts of the fiscal authority to weaken the

independence of the Bundesbank

◮ No breakpoint: stable monetary-fiscal policy interaction over

time

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Low-frequency relationship Germany

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Monetary/fiscal policy in Italy

◮ in the 1970s, Banca d’ Italia had to stand ready as residual

buyer at government bond auctions (Bordo and Siklos, 2014)

◮ “Divorce” of Banca d’ Italia and the Tesoro beginning of 80s ◮ Worsening of fiscal balance during 1980s (Bartoletto et al,

2013)

◮ Breakpoint: negotiations about Maastricht treaty started

already in 1988

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Monetary/fiscal policy in Italy

◮ in the 1970s, Banca d’ Italia had to stand ready as residual

buyer at government bond auctions (Bordo and Siklos, 2014)

◮ “Divorce” of Banca d’ Italia and the Tesoro beginning of 80s ◮ Worsening of fiscal balance during 1980s (Bartoletto et al,

2013)

◮ Breakpoint: negotiations about Maastricht treaty started

already in 1988

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Monetary/fiscal policy in Italy

◮ in the 1970s, Banca d’ Italia had to stand ready as residual

buyer at government bond auctions (Bordo and Siklos, 2014)

◮ “Divorce” of Banca d’ Italia and the Tesoro beginning of 80s ◮ Worsening of fiscal balance during 1980s (Bartoletto et al,

2013)

◮ Breakpoint: negotiations about Maastricht treaty started

already in 1988

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Monetary/fiscal policy in Italy

◮ in the 1970s, Banca d’ Italia had to stand ready as residual

buyer at government bond auctions (Bordo and Siklos, 2014)

◮ “Divorce” of Banca d’ Italia and the Tesoro beginning of 80s ◮ Worsening of fiscal balance during 1980s (Bartoletto et al,

2013)

◮ Breakpoint: negotiations about Maastricht treaty started

already in 1988

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Low-frequency relationship Italy

−5 5 10 15 20 −5 5 10 15 20 β= 1.20

(c) Italy:1963-1989

−5 5 10 15 20 −5 5 10 15 20 β= 0.25

(d) Italy:1990-2009

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Summary narrative analysis

Low-frequency relationship between inflation and debt growth before interest payment:

◮ is time-varying ◮ is different for different countries at the same time ◮ (tentatively) depends on the interaction between monetary

and fiscal policy

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Summary narrative analysis

Low-frequency relationship between inflation and debt growth before interest payment:

◮ is time-varying ◮ is different for different countries at the same time ◮ (tentatively) depends on the interaction between monetary

and fiscal policy

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Summary narrative analysis

Low-frequency relationship between inflation and debt growth before interest payment:

◮ is time-varying ◮ is different for different countries at the same time ◮ (tentatively) depends on the interaction between monetary

and fiscal policy

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Summary narrative analysis

Low-frequency relationship between inflation and debt growth before interest payment:

◮ is time-varying ◮ is different for different countries at the same time ◮ (tentatively) depends on the interaction between monetary

and fiscal policy

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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A TVP-VAR model

◮ No exogenous break points ◮ No filtering of the data ◮ Additional variables: money growth, nominal interest rates,

  • utput growth

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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A TVP-VAR model

◮ No exogenous break points ◮ No filtering of the data ◮ Additional variables: money growth, nominal interest rates,

  • utput growth

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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A TVP-VAR model

◮ No exogenous break points ◮ No filtering of the data ◮ Additional variables: money growth, nominal interest rates,

  • utput growth

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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From a VAR model with unfiltered data to β

  • 1. Estimate the TVP-VAR model
  • 2. Compute the spectral density at frequency zero
  • 3. Whiteman (1984): Approximate the slope coefficient β as the

cross-spectral density Sπd and the spectral density Sd at frequency zero: β ≈ Sπd(0) Sd(0) (1)

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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From a VAR model with unfiltered data to β

  • 1. Estimate the TVP-VAR model
  • 2. Compute the spectral density at frequency zero
  • 3. Whiteman (1984): Approximate the slope coefficient β as the

cross-spectral density Sπd and the spectral density Sd at frequency zero: β ≈ Sπd(0) Sd(0) (1)

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 48

From a VAR model with unfiltered data to β

  • 1. Estimate the TVP-VAR model
  • 2. Compute the spectral density at frequency zero
  • 3. Whiteman (1984): Approximate the slope coefficient β as the

cross-spectral density Sπd and the spectral density Sd at frequency zero: β ≈ Sπd(0) Sd(0) (1)

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Median estimates low-frequency relationship

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 0.5 1 1.5 2 U.S. Italy Germany

Details with probability bands Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Counterfactuals

Our VAR model consists of: yt = ct +

p

  • j=1

Aj,tyt−j + Btεt εt ∼ (0,Ht) (2)

◮ coefficient matrices At , Bt (systematic response of the

economy)

◮ variances of the error term Ht

What would have been the estimate of the low-frequency relationship if the systematic response of the economy had been the same as in year XX in all years?

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 51

Counterfactuals

Our VAR model consists of: yt = ct +

p

  • j=1

Aj,tyt−j + Btεt εt ∼ (0,Ht) (2)

◮ coefficient matrices At , Bt (systematic response of the

economy)

◮ variances of the error term Ht

What would have been the estimate of the low-frequency relationship if the systematic response of the economy had been the same as in year XX in all years?

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Counterfactual I

What would have been the estimate of the low-frequency relationship if the systematic response of the economy had been the same as in year 1995.1 in all years?

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Counterfactual: US fixed to 1995.1

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 actual counterfactual 1995Q1

◮ Low-frequency relationship disappears during 70s

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Counterfactual: Italy fixed to 1995.1

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 actual counterfactual 1995Q1

◮ Very weak low-frequency relationship during 70s and 80s

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Counterfactual II

What would have been the estimate of the low-frequency relationship if the systematic response of the economy had been the same as in year 1976.1 in all years?

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Counterfactual: US fixed to 1976.1

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 actual counterfactual 1976Q1

◮ Low-frequency relationship stays constant

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 57

Counterfactual: Italy fixed to 1976.1

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 actual counterfactual 1976Q1

◮ Low-frequency relationship stays constant

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Summary TVP-VAR analysis

◮ Results do not depend on fix break point ◮ Responsible for change in the low-frequency relationship:

◮ change in the systematic part of the economy in Italy and the

US

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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Summary TVP-VAR analysis

◮ Results do not depend on fix break point ◮ Responsible for change in the low-frequency relationship:

◮ change in the systematic part of the economy in Italy and the

US

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 60

Summary TVP-VAR analysis

◮ Results do not depend on fix break point ◮ Responsible for change in the low-frequency relationship:

◮ change in the systematic part of the economy in Italy and the

US

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 61

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 62

The DSGE Model

◮ We set up a simple standard closed-economy New Keynesian

DSGE model

◮ habit formation ◮ sticky prices with indexation ◮ stochastic growth

◮ We estimate the model for US data between 1982:Q4 and

2008:Q2

◮ We run counterfactual experiment regarding monetary/fiscal

policy regime

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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The DSGE Model

◮ We set up a simple standard closed-economy New Keynesian

DSGE model

◮ habit formation ◮ sticky prices with indexation ◮ stochastic growth

◮ We estimate the model for US data between 1982:Q4 and

2008:Q2

◮ We run counterfactual experiment regarding monetary/fiscal

policy regime

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 64

The DSGE Model

◮ We set up a simple standard closed-economy New Keynesian

DSGE model

◮ habit formation ◮ sticky prices with indexation ◮ stochastic growth

◮ We estimate the model for US data between 1982:Q4 and

2008:Q2

◮ We run counterfactual experiment regarding monetary/fiscal

policy regime

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-65
SLIDE 65

The DSGE Model

◮ We set up a simple standard closed-economy New Keynesian

DSGE model

◮ habit formation ◮ sticky prices with indexation ◮ stochastic growth

◮ We estimate the model for US data between 1982:Q4 and

2008:Q2

◮ We run counterfactual experiment regarding monetary/fiscal

policy regime

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-66
SLIDE 66

The DSGE Model

◮ We set up a simple standard closed-economy New Keynesian

DSGE model

◮ habit formation ◮ sticky prices with indexation ◮ stochastic growth

◮ We estimate the model for US data between 1982:Q4 and

2008:Q2

◮ We run counterfactual experiment regarding monetary/fiscal

policy regime

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-67
SLIDE 67

The DSGE Model

◮ We set up a simple standard closed-economy New Keynesian

DSGE model

◮ habit formation ◮ sticky prices with indexation ◮ stochastic growth

◮ We estimate the model for US data between 1982:Q4 and

2008:Q2

◮ We run counterfactual experiment regarding monetary/fiscal

policy regime

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-68
SLIDE 68

Policy regimes

◮ Policy is modeled by feedback rules ◮ Policy regimes are determined by feedback coefficients:

◮ φb: response of taxes to changes in debt ◮ φπ: response of nominal interest rates to a change in inflation Details policy rules Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-69
SLIDE 69

Policy regimes

◮ Policy is modeled by feedback rules ◮ Policy regimes are determined by feedback coefficients:

◮ φb: response of taxes to changes in debt ◮ φπ: response of nominal interest rates to a change in inflation Details policy rules Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 70

Policy regimes

◮ Policy is modeled by feedback rules ◮ Policy regimes are determined by feedback coefficients:

◮ φb: response of taxes to changes in debt ◮ φπ: response of nominal interest rates to a change in inflation Details policy rules Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 71

Policy regimes

◮ Policy is modeled by feedback rules ◮ Policy regimes are determined by feedback coefficients:

◮ φb: response of taxes to changes in debt ◮ φπ: response of nominal interest rates to a change in inflation Details policy rules Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 72

Counterfactual Analysis

1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22

φπ φb

(e) Active Money / Passive Fiscal

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 −0.1 −0.08 −0.06 −0.04 −0.02 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.6 2 2 2.4 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4 4.44.8

φπ φb

(f) Passive Money / Active Fiscal

Figure: Low-frequency relationship between primary deficits over debt and inflation.

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-73
SLIDE 73

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-74
SLIDE 74

Conclusion

We establish “stylized” facts about low-frequency relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation

◮ variation across time and countries ◮ narrative evidence suggests dependence on monetary and

fiscal policy interaction Structural interpretation using a DSGE model:

◮ changing interaction between monetary and fiscal policy can

explain low-frequency movements of fiscal stance and inflation

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-75
SLIDE 75

Conclusion

We establish “stylized” facts about low-frequency relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation

◮ variation across time and countries ◮ narrative evidence suggests dependence on monetary and

fiscal policy interaction Structural interpretation using a DSGE model:

◮ changing interaction between monetary and fiscal policy can

explain low-frequency movements of fiscal stance and inflation

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-76
SLIDE 76

Conclusion

We establish “stylized” facts about low-frequency relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation

◮ variation across time and countries ◮ narrative evidence suggests dependence on monetary and

fiscal policy interaction Structural interpretation using a DSGE model:

◮ changing interaction between monetary and fiscal policy can

explain low-frequency movements of fiscal stance and inflation

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-77
SLIDE 77

Conclusion

We establish “stylized” facts about low-frequency relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation

◮ variation across time and countries ◮ narrative evidence suggests dependence on monetary and

fiscal policy interaction Structural interpretation using a DSGE model:

◮ changing interaction between monetary and fiscal policy can

explain low-frequency movements of fiscal stance and inflation

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-78
SLIDE 78

Conclusion

We establish “stylized” facts about low-frequency relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation

◮ variation across time and countries ◮ narrative evidence suggests dependence on monetary and

fiscal policy interaction Structural interpretation using a DSGE model:

◮ changing interaction between monetary and fiscal policy can

explain low-frequency movements of fiscal stance and inflation

Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 79

Fiscal stance

◮ Surplus over debt:

st bt−1 =

  • (1 + rt) − bt

bt−1

  • (3)

◮ Interpretation: net return on the investment due to interest

and retirement of bonds.

◮ In steady state this is the real interest rate. ◮ A change measures reduction in future obligations. ◮ Deficits are the opposite, i.e. a increase in future obligations.

Back Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 80

Time-varying β for the U.S.

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 0.5 1 1.5 2

back Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-81
SLIDE 81

Time-varying β for Italy

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5

back Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

slide-82
SLIDE 82

Time-varying β for Germany

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 −0.5 0.5 1

back Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion

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SLIDE 83

Policy rules in the model

fiscal policy rule: ˜ τt = ρτ˜ τt−1 + (1 − ρτ)φb˜ bt−1 + ετ,t monetary policy rule: ˆ rt = ρRˆ rt−1 + (1 − ρR)

  • φπ ˆ

πt + φy

  • ˆ

yt − ˆ yN

t

  • + εR,t

→ φb and φπ determine the policy regime: active monetary passive monetary passive fiscal DETERMINACY indeterminacy active fiscal no solution DETERMINACY

back Narrative analysis TVP-VAR model Structural interpretation Conclusion