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Moderator-controlled Information Sharing by Identity-based Aggregate Signatures for Information Centric Networking Tohru Asami 1 , Byambajav Namsraijav 1 , Yoshihiko Kawahara 1 , Kohei Sugiyama 2 , Atsushi Tagami 2 , Tomohiko Yagyu 3 , Kenichi

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Moderator-controlled Information Sharing by Identity-based Aggregate Signatures for Information Centric Networking

Tohru Asami1, Byambajav Namsraijav1, Yoshihiko Kawahara1, Kohei Sugiyama2, Atsushi Tagami2, Tomohiko Yagyu3, Kenichi Nakamura4, Toru Hasegawa5

1The University of Tokyo 2KDDI R&D Laboratories 3NEC Corporation 4Panasonic Corporation 5Osaka University

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Ag Agenda

  • Introduction
  • Moderator Controlled Information-Sharing Service

(MIS)

  • Identity-Based Aggregate Signatures (IBAS)
  • Implementation of IBAS in NDN
  • Evaluation Results
  • RSA vs IBAS packet size comparison
  • Throughput (computational overhead)
  • Conclusion
  • Future Discussions

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Introduction

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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Usage Useful Availability

Sa Safety co confirmation methods at at th the 2011 Tō Tōhoku ea earthquake e and tsunami

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Usage & Useful (%) Useful/Usage = Availability

The availability of SNS was around 50%. How to increase it?

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In Introductio ion

Goal

  • All-weather social networking service (SNS)
  • Available even if the central server is down

Propose

  • Moderator-controlled information sharing

(MIS) service: an ICN-based distributed SNS

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Moderator Controlled Information-Sharing Service (MIS)

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Mo Mode derator r Cont ntrolled d Inf nform rmation- Sh Sharing Service ce (MIS)

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Administrator

Moderator1 Moderatorn Moderator2 ……….. Peer1 Peer2 Peer3 Peerm

  • routing
  • timestamp
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Ro Roles of Entities

  • Peer
  • publish messages to moderated groups
  • subscribe messages from moderated groups
  • Moderator
  • check the messages in their group
  • timestamp the moderated messages
  • relay moderated messages to the peers
  • Administrator
  • moderates the public group
  • conducts initial setups

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to assure non-repudiation with signature

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Mo Mode derator r Cont ntrolled d Inf nform rmation- Sh Sharing Service ce (MIS) at a Disaster

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Bob Alice David (Moderator of group: David’s Friends)

Administrator (Moderator of the public group)

Shelter#2 GW Shelter#1 GW

John Groups Public David’s friends

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Re Requirements fo for MIS (A (All-we weather SNS) Without relying on a central server:

  • Peer can publish/subscribe a message if

an accessible moderator exists

  • Subscriber can verify the publisher and

moderator’s authenticity

  • Assure non-repudiation

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Ad Advantages of ICN for MIS Content signatures

  • authentication of received messages

Network caches and routing

  • Fault tolerant even if the

administrator is unreachable

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Dis Disad advan antag ages of ICN for MIS

Central verification authority of public key infrastructure (PKI) must be reachable

  • In a disaster scenario, one may not be able to

verify a message’s signature if a required Certification Authority (CA) is out of reach.

Large overhead for short messages

  • Each message contains two signatures

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Solved by ID-based Signatures Solved by Aggregate Signatures

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Identity-Based Aggregate Signatures (IBAS)

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Ag Aggregate si signatures s and Id Iden entity-ba based d si signatures

  • Aggregate signatures：aggregating n signatures on

n distinct messages from n distinct users into a single signature of constant size

  • Identity-based signatures: IDs such as email

address or phone number is used instead of public

  • keys. Verifier only needs PKG’s public parameter

and the signer’s ID to verify a message.

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m1 σ1 m2 m3 σ1∪σ2 σ1∪σ2∪σ3

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Pr Propose ICN with Identity-ba based Ag Aggregate Si Signatures (I (IBAS)

IBAS [1]: combination of aggregate signatures and IBS IBAS operations

  • Setup
  • Private key distribution
  • Individual signing
  • Aggregation
  • Verification

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Private Key Generator (PKG) m1 m1 || σ1

Verifier (Subscriber)

Public Parameter ID1, ID2

Accept / Reject Signer 1 (Publisher)

ID1 private key1

Signer 2 (Moderator)

private key2 ID2 m1|| m2 ||(σ1∪σ2) m2 (Master Key, Public Parameter)

Offline Online

[1] Gentry, Craig, and Zulfikar Ramzan. "Identity-based aggregate signatures.”

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Implementation of IBAS in NDN

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Im Implem lemen entat atio ion of

  • f I

IBAS S in in NDN DN[1

[1] Extend NDN’s open source C++ library ndn-cxx [2].

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  • Add a new

SignatureType named SignatureSha256Ibas which tells that the content is signed using IBAS.

  • Use PBC Library[3] for

pairing and other elliptic curve computations.

[1] https://github.com/byambajav/ndn-ibas [2] https://github.com/named-data/ndn-cxx [3] https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/

Application (Moderator-Controlled Information Sharing) KeyChain Validator IbasSigner Pairing & Elliptic Curve Computation

signIbas() / signAndAggregateIbas() verifySignatureIbas() PBC Library New ndn- cxx & New New

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Evaluation Results

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Ev Evaluation Scenario

Measure following two metrics

  • Signature size: for a disaster scenario
  • Computational overhead of signature generation and

verification: for normal condition

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Government (Moderator) Bob (Subscriber) (1) Alice (Publisher) (2) (4) (3)

(a)

verify, sign, and aggregate

(c)

compare this packet’s size

sign verify

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Ev Evaluation Scenario: Assumptions

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  • IBAS’s offline steps (setup and private key

distribution) are done beforehand.

  • In PKI, the subscriber has all the certificates

required for signature verification in advance.

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Results: RSA vs IBAS pack cket size co comparison

Structure of a data packet sent from moderator to subscriber

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21 <Signature made by Moderator> Moderator: Government Accepted: Thu Oct 02 09:15:30 2014 From: Alice Published: Thu Oct 02 08:53:09 2014 I am OK. <META-INFO-TYPE TLV-LENGTH ContentType> /moderators/Government/safetyConfirmation /wonderland/Alice/2/9 <Signature made by Publisher> 1(DATA-TLV)+3(TLV-LENGTH) Bytes

Name 74Bytes Signature 342 bytes MetaInfo 5 Bytes Content 452+x Bytes

<Aggregation of individual signatures made by Moderator and Publisher> Moderator: Government Accepted: Thu Oct 02 09:15:30 2014 From: Alice Published: Thu Oct 02 08:53:09 2014 I am OK. <META-INFO-TYPE TLV-LENGTH ContentType> /moderators/Government/safetyConfirmation /wonderland/Alice/2/9 1(DATA-TLV)+3(TLV-LENGTH) Bytes

Name 74 Bytes MetaInfo 5 Bytes Content 110+x Bytes Signature 157 bytes Signature 347 bytes

(a) RSA-2048 (b) IBAS

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Re Results: Message size reduced by 60%

Packet size* of different signature methods (byte)

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Thus, in case of a message “I’m OK” (6 bytes) the size of the packet sent from moderator to subscriber will be 888B and 356B for RSA-2048 and IBAS respectively

*size also depends on the participators’ names

message content size

IBAS(512, 160) IBAS(512, 160)

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Re Results: Assumptions of c computational

  • v
  • verhead com
  • mparison
  • n

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  • Choose signatures of almost same strength:

RSA-2048, ECDSA-256, and IBAS(224, 112)

Comparable Strengths IFC (e.g., RSA) and ECC (e.g., ECDSA)

[1] [2]

[1] NIST, “Recommendation for Key Management” [2] Yasuda et al, “On the strength comparison of the ECDLP and the IFP “

qbits rbits

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Ev Evaluation environment

  • OS: Ubuntu 14.04
  • Hardware specifications
  • Model name: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3520M
  • CPU frequency: 2.9GHz
  • Cache size: 4MB

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Re Results: Computational overhead is 2. 2.4 4 times bigger than that of RSA

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Video communication: IBAS(224, 112) can achieve throughput of 2.4Mbps when each packet’s content size is 1497bytes (IEEE802.3).

IBAS(224, 112) ⩬ ECDSA-256 ⩬ 2.4 x RSA-2048

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Conclusion & Future Discussions

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Co Conclusion

  • All-weather SNS: Moderator Controlled

Information-Sharing Service (MIS)

  • Core technology of MIS is Identity-based Aggregate

Signatures (IBAS)

  • Implementation on NDN is evaluated against the

traditional PKI signatures.

  • 60% smaller packet size:

suitable for usages at a disaster

  • 2.4 times larger computational overhead:

2.4Mbps throughput on Intel i7-3520M@2.9GHz in normal condition

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Fu Future Discussions

  • IBAS key parameter size choice
  • Distribution of secret parameters and

key revocation

  • Improve current implementation

toward a testbed experiment as a real world application

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Th Thank you for your attention

Q&A Acknowledgements Parts of this research was funded by the joint EU FP7/NICT GreenICN project, under EU grant agreement 608518 and NICT contract 167.

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