Modeling Worm Spread Often well described as infectious epidemics - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Modeling Worm Spread Often well described as infectious epidemics - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Modeling Worm Spread Often well described as infectious epidemics Simplest model: homogeneous random contacts Classic SI model dI IS N: population size = S(t): susceptible hosts at time t di dt N i ( 1 i )


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Modeling Worm Spread

  • Often well described as infectious epidemics

– Simplest model: homogeneous random contacts

  • Classic SI model

– N: population size – S(t): susceptible hosts at time t – I(t): infected hosts at time t – β: contact rate – i(t): I(t)/N, s(t): S(t)/N

N IS dt dS N IS dt dI β β − = =

) 1 ( i i dt di − = β

) ( ) (

1 ) (

T t T t

e e t i

− −

+ =

β β

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The Usual Logistic Growth

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Slammer’s Growth (2003)

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80% of Code Red 2 cleaned up due to

  • nset of Blaster

Code Red 2 re- released with Oct. 2003 die-off Code Red 1 and Nimda endemic Code Red 2 re-re- released Jan 2004 (and 2005; not since …?) Code Red 2 dies off again

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Code Red 2 re-re- released Jan 2004 (and 2005; not since …?) Feb 19 2013!

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2009 - 2010

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2015-2016

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Stuxnet: Slowly ramped up centrifuge speeds until they flew apart … … while feeding false readings to control system. Included 4 zero days for spreading

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Flame: General information stealer. Includes geolocation from local photos, taking screenshots, microphone access to capture local audio, recording Skype calls, download contacts from nearby BlueTooth devices. Exploited previously unknown MD5 hash collision vulnerability. Built-in autowipe “kill switch”.

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Gauss: Specifically targets banking transactions, mainly in Lebanon. Includes trapdoor looking for specific accounts, undeciphered to date.

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#!/usr/bin/perl while (<>) { chomp; if ( /^(get|post|options|head|...)(.*)/i ) { # Do not respond if it looks like an exploit last if length > 1000; my $date = gmtime; if ( $1 =~ /get|head/i ) print "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n"; elsif ( $1 =~ /search/i ) print "HTTP/1.1 411 Length Required\r\n"; elsif ( $1 =~ /options/i ) { print "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n"; print "DASL: \r\nDAV: 1, 2\r\n"; print "Public: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, DELETE, ...\r\n"; print "Allow: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, DELETE, ...\r\n"; } elsif ( $1 =~ /propfind/i ) print "HTTP/1.1 207 Multi-Status\r\n"; else print "HTTP/1.1 405 Method Not Allowed\r\n"; } print <<EOF; Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0 Date: $date GMT Content-Length: 0 Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDACBAABCQ=BHAMAEHAOAIHMOMGJCPFLBGO; path=/ Cache-control: private EOF last; } }

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Decryptor

Encrypted Glob of Bits

Key

Jmp

ê

Once running, worm uses an encryptor with a new key to propagate

Decryptor

Main Worm Code

Key

Encryptor

} Decryptor

Different Encrypted Glob of Bits

Key'

ê

Polymorphic Propagation

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When ready to propagate, worm invokes a randomized rewriter to construct new but semantically equivalent worm code (incl. rewriter) }

ê

Metamorphic Propagation

Main Worm Code

Rewriter

}

ê

(Main Worm Code)'

Rewriter'

(Main Worm Code)''

Rewriter''