Measuring Risk Ron Gula NSA Pen Tester Cloud Security Network IDS - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Measuring Risk Ron Gula NSA Pen Tester Cloud Security Network IDS - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Measuring Risk Ron Gula NSA Pen Tester Cloud Security Network IDS Who is Ron Gula??? Vuln Management Cyber Companies THREAT X VULNERABILITY = RISK THREAT X VULNERABILITY = RISK Out of date browser on server One
Who is Ron Gula???
- NSA Pen Tester
- Cloud Security
- Network IDS
- Vuln Management
- Cyber Companies
THREAT X VULNERABILITY = RISK
THREAT X VULNERABILITY = RISK
- Out of date browser on server
- One server with 10 vulns versus Ten
servers with 1 vulns
- “Low” and “Medium” vulns
- Severity
- Asset
- Age
- Exploit
- Malware
- Patch Rollups
EVEN IF WE PATCHED 100% WE STILL HAVE ZERO DAYS
- Patch Management
- Vuln Scanners
- System Hardening
- Network Monitors
- EDR & Forensics
- Web Proxy
- GRC & Compliance
- SIEM & Logs
- Authentication
- Asset Management
- IT Provisioning
- NAC and Firewall
- Procurement
If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.
If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.
- Complex OSes
- BYOD and Mobile
- On-Prem Apps
- Cloud Apps
- All Users
- User Access
If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.
- Complex OSes
- BYOD and Mobile
- On-Prem Apps
- Cloud Apps
- All Users
- User Access
- Vulnerabilities
- Activity Logging
- System Configurations
- Network Monitoring
- Change Detection
- Privileged Access
Access Control and Authentication Can you build a map of all ACLs and enclaves?
Can you build a list
- f all
enclaves and access control lists on them?
Can you build a list
- f all users
and their authorized apps?
MONITORING AUDIT
DATA & APPS DATA & APPS DATA & APPS DATA & APPS DATA & APPS DATA & APPS
TELEMETRY
Logs, Packets, Flows, Cloud APIs, Auth, Files, .etc
LOOK FOR BADNESS
NIDS, AV, BOTs, UBA, NBAD, APT, .etc
AUDIT FOR GOODNESS
Apps, Users, Transactions, Normal
WHY CAN’T WE MODEL RISK?
- Periodic & Imperfect Assessments
- Imperfect Threat Model
- Collection of Data
- Lack of standards on “risk”
RISK MEASURING ENABLES
- Better Security Policy
- Better Security Budgets
- Fact based Security
WHAT IS THE #1 THING?
FRAMEWORKS
- Vendor Neutral
- Cross-Organizational
- Prescriptive
- Written by Pen Tests & I.R.
Conclusions
CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions
CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions
CONCLUSIONS
Questions and Contact Information