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The Economics of Climate Change C 175 Market Failure Market Failure Public Goods & Externalities Spring 09 UC Berkeley Traeger 2 Efficiency 26 The Economics of Climate Change C 175 Climate change as a market failure


  1. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Market Failure Market Failure Public Goods & Externalities Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 26

  2. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Climate change as a market failure  Environmental economics is for a large part about market failures : goods (or bads!) for which one or more of these assumptions does not hold not hold  2007 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (political report by Sir Nicholas Stern (and co ‐ authors) to British government): “ Climate change is the biggest market failure the world has ever seen .”  GHG emissions are due to an externality Low level of international co operation is due to emission Low level of international co ‐ operation is due to emission   reductions being a (global) public good Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 27

  3. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Public goods I Characteristics of goods:  Excludability in consumption or production: A good is excludable if it is feasible and practical to selectively allow consumers to consume the good, a bad is excludable if it is feasible to allow consumers to avoid the consumption p of the bad. In short: agents can be prevented from using the good/service  Rivalry : A bad (good) is rival if one person’s consumption of a unit of the bad (good) diminishes the amount of the bad (good) available for others to consume, i.e. there is a negative (positive) social opportunity cost to others , g (p ) pp y associated with consumption. In short: one agent’s use is at the expense of another’s Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 28

  4. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Public goods I Characteristics of private and public goods: Excludable Non ‐ excludable Rival Pure private good Open ‐ access resource Ice cream Ice cream Ocean fishery Ocean fishery Non ‐ rival Congestible resource Pure public good Wilderness area • Rivalry: one agent’s use is at the expense of another’s y g p • Excludability: agents can be prevented from using the good/service Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 29

  5. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Problems with the provision of public goods  Non ‐ Excludability: Excludability is needed to ‘price ‐ tag’ a good We have to be able to deny the consumption if price is not paid We have to be able to deny the consumption if price is not paid  Non ‐ Rivalry: An additional consumer can enjoy the good at no extra cost of provision. Efficient equilibrium will no longer be where individual marginal rate of substitution=price ratio=marginal rate of transformation or marginal willingness to pay=price=marginal costs We get back to this in a moment… Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 30

  6. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Excursion: Aggregate supply, demand, and efficiency  Supply and demand curves can be obtained from utility and profit maximization.  Demand corresponds to marginal willingness ‐ to ‐ pay . Aggregate demand given by horizontal aggregation of individual demand curves.  Supply corresponds to marginal cost curve . Aggregate supply given by pp y p g gg g pp y g y horizontal aggregation of individual supply curves.  (Net) Consumer surplus: area between demand curve and horizontal line through the market price. Measure for (money metric) utility of consumers.  (Net) Producers surplus: area between supply curve and horizontal line through the price. Measure for profit (revenue minus costs)  In a competitive market equilibrium the sum of consumers and producers  In a competitive market equilibrium, the sum of consumers and producers surplus is maximized. Equilibrium given where marginal costs equal marginal benefits Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 31

  7. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Demand for private good  Assume a consumer i with willingness to pay V i (x i ) for consuming quantity x i  Consumer faces price p of the good  Utility maximization: max V i (x i ) ‐ p x i leads to p= V i ‘(x i ) Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 32

  8. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Demand for private good  Assume consumer i with willingness to pay V i (x i ) for consuming quantity x i  Consumer faces price p at which one can buy the good  Utility maximization: l max V i (x i ) ‐ p x i ( ) (“b (“benefits – costs”) f ”) leads to p= V i ‘(x i )  Remark : Formally the setting corresponds to a money metric quasi ‐ linear utility function U i (x i ,M i )= V i (x i )+M i which is linear in money and e.g. concave in x i Then the marginal willingness to pay MWTP is the negative of the MRS  between money and good x U i    $ MU X        X i ( ( ) ) MWTP MRS V X     i i i i U U X X MU MU i $  M i p We know that in efficient equilibrium     X MRS p p X p $ p $ yielding also p = V i ‘(x i ) i ldi l V ‘( ) Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 33

  9. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Demand for private good  Assume consumer i with willingness to pay V i (x i ) for consuming quantity x i  Consumer faces price p at which one can buy the good  Utility maximization: max V i (x i ) ‐ p x i leads to p= V i ‘(x i ) = MWTP  Demand corresponds to marginal willingness to pay curve .  If V i (x i ) is concave then by definition V i ‘(x i ) is falling . Example: V 1 (x 1 ) = x 1 (100 ‐ x 1 ) f ( ) h b d f ‘( ) f ll l ( ) ( )  Gross consumer surplus is the area under the demand curve. Net consumer surplus is area between demand curve and horizontal line through the market price is area between demand curve and horizontal line through the market price.  Aggregate demand given by horizontal aggregation of individual demand curves. Example: V (x ) = x (100 ‐ x ) Example: V 1 (x 1 ) x 1 (100 x 1 ) V (x ) =x (100 ‐ 0.5x ) V 2 (x 2 ) x 2 (100 0.5x 2 ) Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 34

  10. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Supply of private goods  We can break down profit maximization into Minimizing costs for a given output by optimizing inputs 1. ‐ > cost curve C(x) > cost curve C(x) Maximizing profits by choosing optimal output level 2.  Assume producer j with cost C j (x j ) for supplying quantity x j  Producer faces price p at which he can sell the good  Profit maximization: max p x j ‐ C j (x j ) leads to leads to p= C j ‘(x j )  Supply corresponds to marginal cost curve . Increasing if C j (x j ) convex .  Aggregate supply given by horizontal aggregation of individual supply curves  Aggregate supply given by horizontal aggregation of individual supply curves. 2 ,  Example: C 1 (x 1 ) = 8 + x 1 2 C 2 (x 2 ) =0.5 x 2 Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 35

  11. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Supply of public goods  Assuming that the public good G j is priced, everything as before. ssu g t at t e pub c good G j s p ced, eve yt g as be o e.  Profit maximization: max p G max p G j ‐ C j (G j ) C (G ) leads to p= C j ‘(G j )  Supply corresponds to marginal cost curve .  Aggregate supply given by horizontal aggregation of individual supply curves. Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 36

  12. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Demand for public good  Assume consumer i with willingness to pay V i (G) for consuming quantity G  Note that G no longer carries an index . Every consumer consumes all of the G ote t at G no longe ca ies an index . ve y co su e co su es a o t e G as the good is non ‐ rival  Consumer faces price p at which one can buy the good  Utility maximization:  Utility maximization: max V i (G) ‐ p G leads to p= V i ‘(G)  Individual demand corresponds again to marginal willingness to pay curve .  Social demand given by vertical aggregation of individual demand curves, because all consumers are willing to pay for the same public unit of G because all consumers are willing to pay for the same public unit of G.  Example: V 1 (G) = G(100 ‐ 0.5G) V 2 (G) =2G(100 ‐ 0.5G) Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 37

  13. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Optimal provision of public good  Aggregate marginal willingness ‐ to ‐ pay should equal marginal costs of providing the public good:  C    V (G) ( ) j G i j i for all producers j. The produced quantities G j sum to the total amount of j  j  public good provided G : G G j  Or more general for the marginal rate of substitution between private and public goods is has to hold    _ private good MRS i    MRT  MRS with   public _ public good good i  This relation is known as the Samuelson ‐ condition Sa ue so co d t o Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 38

  14. The Economics of Climate Change – C 175 Optimal provision of public goods € MRS A + MRS B = MWTP A + MWTP B MC = MRT MRS B MRS B = MWTP B  MRS A = MWTP A X X* Spring 09 – UC Berkeley – Traeger 2 Efficiency 39

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