Market environments, stability and equlibria Gordan Zitkovi c - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Market environments, stability and equlibria Gordan Zitkovi c - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Market environments, stability and equlibria Gordan Zitkovi c Department of Mathematics University of Texas at Austin Linz, October 22, 2008 A Toy Model The Information Flow two states of the world: = { 1 , 2 } one


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SLIDE 1

Market environments, stability and equlibria

Gordan ˇ Zitkovi´ c

Department of Mathematics University of Texas at Austin

Linz, October 22, 2008

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SLIDE 2

A Toy Model

The Information Flow

  • two states of the world: Ω = {ω1, ω2}
  • one period t ∈ {0, 1}
  • nothing is known at t = 0, everything is known at t = 1:

F0 = {∅, Ω}, F1 = 2Ω.

agents

two economic agents characterized by

  • random endowments (stochastic income)

E1 = 3 1 ff , E2 = 1 4 ff

  • utility functions

U1( x1 x2 ff ) = 1

2 log(x1) + 1 2 log(x2)

U2( x1 x2 ff ) = 1

7x1/3 1

+ 6

7x1/3 2

slide-3
SLIDE 3

A Toy Model

The Information Flow

  • two states of the world: Ω = {ω1, ω2}
  • one period t ∈ {0, 1}
  • nothing is known at t = 0, everything is known at t = 1:

F0 = {∅, Ω}, F1 = 2Ω.

agents

two economic agents characterized by

  • random endowments (stochastic income)

E1 = 3 1 ff , E2 = 1 4 ff

  • utility functions

U1( x1 x2 ff ) = 1

2 log(x1) + 1 2 log(x2)

U2( x1 x2 ff ) = 1

7x1/3 1

+ 6

7x1/3 2

slide-4
SLIDE 4

A toy example

the financial instrument

S0 = p, S1 = 1 ff , B0 = B1 = 1:

p 1

Market clearing

  • The demand functions:

∆i(p) = argmax

q

Ui(Ei+q(S1−p))

  • Equilibrium conditions:

∆1(p) + ∆2(p) = 0

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 5 5 10

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SLIDE 5

A toy example

the financial instrument

S0 = p, S1 = 1 ff , B0 = B1 = 1:

p 1

Market clearing

  • The demand functions:

∆i(p) = argmax

q

Ui(Ei+q(S1−p))

  • Equilibrium conditions:

∆1(p) + ∆2(p) = 0

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 5 5 10

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SLIDE 6

What happens when markets are incomplete and trading is dynamic?

p0 p1 S11 S12 p2 S21 S22 S23 p3 S31 S32 S33

  • Instead of one price p∗, we need

to determine the whole price process (p0, (p1, p2, p3)).

  • C

IC 1p * * mp * +

  • In the IC&mp case, the

equilibrium conditions determine both prices and the geometry (degree of incompleteness) of the market.

  • Another complication : no

representative-agent analysis. The First Welfare Theorem does not hold anymore.

slide-7
SLIDE 7

What happens when markets are incomplete and trading is dynamic?

p0 p1 S11 S12 p2 S21 S22 S23 p3 S31 S32 S33

  • Instead of one price p∗, we need

to determine the whole price process (p0, (p1, p2, p3)).

  • C

IC 1p * * mp * +

  • In the IC&mp case, the

equilibrium conditions determine both prices and the geometry (degree of incompleteness) of the market.

  • Another complication : no

representative-agent analysis. The First Welfare Theorem does not hold anymore.

slide-8
SLIDE 8

What happens when markets are incomplete and trading is dynamic?

p0 p1 S11 S12 p2 S21 S22 S23 p3 S31 S32 S33

  • Instead of one price p∗, we need

to determine the whole price process (p0, (p1, p2, p3)).

  • C

IC 1p * * mp * +

  • In the IC&mp case, the

equilibrium conditions determine both prices and the geometry (degree of incompleteness) of the market.

  • Another complication : no

representative-agent analysis. The First Welfare Theorem does not hold anymore.

slide-9
SLIDE 9

What happens when markets are incomplete and trading is dynamic?

p0 p1 S11 S12 p2 S21 S22 S23 p3 S31 S32 S33

  • Instead of one price p∗, we need

to determine the whole price process (p0, (p1, p2, p3)).

  • C

IC 1p * * mp * +

  • In the IC&mp case, the

equilibrium conditions determine both prices and the geometry (degree of incompleteness) of the market.

  • Another complication : no

representative-agent analysis. The First Welfare Theorem does not hold anymore.

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SLIDE 10

Financial frameworks

Information

A filtered probability space (Ω, F, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P), where P is used only to determine the null-sets.

Agents

A number I (finite or infinite) of economic agents, each of which is characterized by

  • a random endowment Ei ∈ FT ,
  • a utility function U : Dom(U) → R,
  • a subjective probability measure Pi ∼ P.

Completeness constraints

A set S of (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales (possibly several-dimensional) - the allowed asset-price dynamics.

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SLIDE 11

Financial frameworks

Information

A filtered probability space (Ω, F, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P), where P is used only to determine the null-sets.

Agents

A number I (finite or infinite) of economic agents, each of which is characterized by

  • a random endowment Ei ∈ FT ,
  • a utility function U : Dom(U) → R,
  • a subjective probability measure Pi ∼ P.

Completeness constraints

A set S of (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales (possibly several-dimensional) - the allowed asset-price dynamics.

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SLIDE 12

Financial frameworks

Information

A filtered probability space (Ω, F, (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P), where P is used only to determine the null-sets.

Agents

A number I (finite or infinite) of economic agents, each of which is characterized by

  • a random endowment Ei ∈ FT ,
  • a utility function U : Dom(U) → R,
  • a subjective probability measure Pi ∼ P.

Completeness constraints

A set S of (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales (possibly several-dimensional) - the allowed asset-price dynamics.

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SLIDE 13

The equilibrium problem

Problem

Does there exist S ∈ S such that X

i∈I

ˆ πi

t(S) = 0, for all t ∈ [0, T], a.s,

where ˆ πi(S) = argmax

π

EPi[U i(Ei + Z T πu dSu)] denotes the optimal trading strategy for the agent i when the market dynamics is given by S.

Problem

If such an S exists, is it unique?

Problem

If such an S exists, can we characterize it analytically or numerically?

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SLIDE 14

The equilibrium problem

Problem

Does there exist S ∈ S such that X

i∈I

ˆ πi

t(S) = 0, for all t ∈ [0, T], a.s,

where ˆ πi(S) = argmax

π

EPi[U i(Ei + Z T πu dSu)] denotes the optimal trading strategy for the agent i when the market dynamics is given by S.

Problem

If such an S exists, is it unique?

Problem

If such an S exists, can we characterize it analytically or numerically?

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SLIDE 15

The equilibrium problem

Problem

Does there exist S ∈ S such that X

i∈I

ˆ πi

t(S) = 0, for all t ∈ [0, T], a.s,

where ˆ πi(S) = argmax

π

EPi[U i(Ei + Z T πu dSu)] denotes the optimal trading strategy for the agent i when the market dynamics is given by S.

Problem

If such an S exists, is it unique?

Problem

If such an S exists, can we characterize it analytically or numerically?

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SLIDE 16

Examples of Completeness Constraints

  • Complete markets. S contains all (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales. (If an

equilibrium exists, a complete one will exist).

  • Constraints on the number of assets. S is the set of all

d-dimensional (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales. If d < n, where n is the spanning number of the filtration, no complete markets are allowed.

  • Information-constrained markets. Let (Gt)t∈[0,T ] be a

sub-filtration of (Ft)t∈[0,T ], and let S be the class of all (Gt)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales.

  • Partial-equilibrium models. Let (S0

t )t∈[0,T ] be a d-dimensional

  • semimartingale. S is the collection of all m-dimensional

(Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales such that its first d < m components coincide with S0.

  • “Marketed-Set Constrained” markets Let V be a subspace of

L∞(FT ), satisfying an appropriate set of regularity conditions. Let S be the collection of all finite dimensional semimartingales (St)t∈[0,T ] such that {x + Z T πt dSt : x ∈ R, π ∈ A} ∩ L∞(FT ) = V,

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SLIDE 17

Examples of Completeness Constraints

  • Complete markets. S contains all (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales. (If an

equilibrium exists, a complete one will exist).

  • Constraints on the number of assets. S is the set of all

d-dimensional (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales. If d < n, where n is the spanning number of the filtration, no complete markets are allowed.

  • Information-constrained markets. Let (Gt)t∈[0,T ] be a

sub-filtration of (Ft)t∈[0,T ], and let S be the class of all (Gt)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales.

  • Partial-equilibrium models. Let (S0

t )t∈[0,T ] be a d-dimensional

  • semimartingale. S is the collection of all m-dimensional

(Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales such that its first d < m components coincide with S0.

  • “Marketed-Set Constrained” markets Let V be a subspace of

L∞(FT ), satisfying an appropriate set of regularity conditions. Let S be the collection of all finite dimensional semimartingales (St)t∈[0,T ] such that {x + Z T πt dSt : x ∈ R, π ∈ A} ∩ L∞(FT ) = V,

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Examples of Completeness Constraints

  • Complete markets. S contains all (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales. (If an

equilibrium exists, a complete one will exist).

  • Constraints on the number of assets. S is the set of all

d-dimensional (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales. If d < n, where n is the spanning number of the filtration, no complete markets are allowed.

  • Information-constrained markets. Let (Gt)t∈[0,T ] be a

sub-filtration of (Ft)t∈[0,T ], and let S be the class of all (Gt)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales.

  • Partial-equilibrium models. Let (S0

t )t∈[0,T ] be a d-dimensional

  • semimartingale. S is the collection of all m-dimensional

(Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales such that its first d < m components coincide with S0.

  • “Marketed-Set Constrained” markets Let V be a subspace of

L∞(FT ), satisfying an appropriate set of regularity conditions. Let S be the collection of all finite dimensional semimartingales (St)t∈[0,T ] such that {x + Z T πt dSt : x ∈ R, π ∈ A} ∩ L∞(FT ) = V,

slide-19
SLIDE 19

Examples of Completeness Constraints

  • Complete markets. S contains all (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales. (If an

equilibrium exists, a complete one will exist).

  • Constraints on the number of assets. S is the set of all

d-dimensional (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales. If d < n, where n is the spanning number of the filtration, no complete markets are allowed.

  • Information-constrained markets. Let (Gt)t∈[0,T ] be a

sub-filtration of (Ft)t∈[0,T ], and let S be the class of all (Gt)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales.

  • Partial-equilibrium models. Let (S0

t )t∈[0,T ] be a d-dimensional

  • semimartingale. S is the collection of all m-dimensional

(Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales such that its first d < m components coincide with S0.

  • “Marketed-Set Constrained” markets Let V be a subspace of

L∞(FT ), satisfying an appropriate set of regularity conditions. Let S be the collection of all finite dimensional semimartingales (St)t∈[0,T ] such that {x + Z T πt dSt : x ∈ R, π ∈ A} ∩ L∞(FT ) = V,

slide-20
SLIDE 20

Examples of Completeness Constraints

  • Complete markets. S contains all (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales. (If an

equilibrium exists, a complete one will exist).

  • Constraints on the number of assets. S is the set of all

d-dimensional (Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales. If d < n, where n is the spanning number of the filtration, no complete markets are allowed.

  • Information-constrained markets. Let (Gt)t∈[0,T ] be a

sub-filtration of (Ft)t∈[0,T ], and let S be the class of all (Gt)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales.

  • Partial-equilibrium models. Let (S0

t )t∈[0,T ] be a d-dimensional

  • semimartingale. S is the collection of all m-dimensional

(Ft)t∈[0,T ]-semimartingales such that its first d < m components coincide with S0.

  • “Marketed-Set Constrained” markets Let V be a subspace of

L∞(FT ), satisfying an appropriate set of regularity conditions. Let S be the collection of all finite dimensional semimartingales (St)t∈[0,T ] such that {x + Z T πt dSt : x ∈ R, π ∈ A} ∩ L∞(FT ) = V,

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SLIDE 21

Examples of Completenes Constraints

  • Markets with “fast-and-slow” information. Let (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be

generated by two orthogonal martingales M 1 and M 2, and let S be the collection of all processes of the form St = Dt + M 1

t ,

where D is any predictable process of finite variation. For example, M 1 = B (Brownian motion), M 2 = Nt − t (compensated Poisson process) so that a “typical” element of S is given by St = Z λ(u, Bu, Nu) du + dBu. The information in B is “fast”, and that in N is “slow”. Another interesting situation: M 1 = B, M 2 = W, where B and W independent Brownian motions.

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SLIDE 22

Analysis

Two paths to existence

  • Representative agents. Uses the fact that equilibrium allocations

are Pareto optimal; works (essentially) only for complete markets. Literature in continuous time:

  • Complete markets: Bank, Dana, Duffie, Huang, Karatzas, Lakner,

Lehoczky, Riedel, Shreve, ˇ Z., etc.

  • Incomplete markets: Basak and Cuoco ’98 (incompleteness from

restrictions in stock-market participation, logarithmic utility)

  • Excess-demand approach. Introduced by Walras (1874):
  • 1. Establish good topological/convexity properties of the excess demand

ˆ π(S), and then

  • 2. use a suitable fixed-point-type theorem to show existence (Brouwer,

KKM, degree-based, etc.)

Literature in continuous time: none, really!

slide-23
SLIDE 23

Analysis

Two paths to existence

  • Representative agents. Uses the fact that equilibrium allocations

are Pareto optimal; works (essentially) only for complete markets. Literature in continuous time:

  • Complete markets: Bank, Dana, Duffie, Huang, Karatzas, Lakner,

Lehoczky, Riedel, Shreve, ˇ Z., etc.

  • Incomplete markets: Basak and Cuoco ’98 (incompleteness from

restrictions in stock-market participation, logarithmic utility)

  • Excess-demand approach. Introduced by Walras (1874):
  • 1. Establish good topological/convexity properties of the excess demand

ˆ π(S), and then

  • 2. use a suitable fixed-point-type theorem to show existence (Brouwer,

KKM, degree-based, etc.)

Literature in continuous time: none, really!

slide-24
SLIDE 24

Analysis

Two paths to existence

  • Representative agents. Uses the fact that equilibrium allocations

are Pareto optimal; works (essentially) only for complete markets. Literature in continuous time:

  • Complete markets: Bank, Dana, Duffie, Huang, Karatzas, Lakner,

Lehoczky, Riedel, Shreve, ˇ Z., etc.

  • Incomplete markets: Basak and Cuoco ’98 (incompleteness from

restrictions in stock-market participation, logarithmic utility)

  • Excess-demand approach. Introduced by Walras (1874):
  • 1. Establish good topological/convexity properties of the excess demand

ˆ π(S), and then

  • 2. use a suitable fixed-point-type theorem to show existence (Brouwer,

KKM, degree-based, etc.)

Literature in continuous time: none, really!

slide-25
SLIDE 25

Analysis

Two paths to existence

  • Representative agents. Uses the fact that equilibrium allocations

are Pareto optimal; works (essentially) only for complete markets. Literature in continuous time:

  • Complete markets: Bank, Dana, Duffie, Huang, Karatzas, Lakner,

Lehoczky, Riedel, Shreve, ˇ Z., etc.

  • Incomplete markets: Basak and Cuoco ’98 (incompleteness from

restrictions in stock-market participation, logarithmic utility)

  • Excess-demand approach. Introduced by Walras (1874):
  • 1. Establish good topological/convexity properties of the excess demand

ˆ π(S), and then

  • 2. use a suitable fixed-point-type theorem to show existence (Brouwer,

KKM, degree-based, etc.)

Literature in continuous time: none, really!

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SLIDE 26

A convex-analytic (sub)approach

A first step towards a solution

Work with random variables instead of processes; for example in the fast-and-slow model with dSλ

u = λu du + dBu,

we perform the following transformations π → Xλ,π

T

= Z T πu dSλ

u, λ → Zλ T = E(−λ · M),

and consider a more tractable version ∆i of the demand function ∆i(Zλ

T ) = Xλ,ˆ πi(Sλ) T

, so that ∆i : EM ⊆ L0

+ → L0 + − L∞ + .

The problem now becomes simple to state:

Can we solve the equation ∆(Z) = 0, a.s. on EM?

slide-27
SLIDE 27

A convex-analytic (sub)approach

A first step towards a solution

Work with random variables instead of processes; for example in the fast-and-slow model with dSλ

u = λu du + dBu,

we perform the following transformations π → Xλ,π

T

= Z T πu dSλ

u, λ → Zλ T = E(−λ · M),

and consider a more tractable version ∆i of the demand function ∆i(Zλ

T ) = Xλ,ˆ πi(Sλ) T

, so that ∆i : EM ⊆ L0

+ → L0 + − L∞ + .

The problem now becomes simple to state:

Can we solve the equation ∆(Z) = 0, a.s. on EM?

slide-28
SLIDE 28

A convex-analytic (sub)approach

A first step towards a solution

Work with random variables instead of processes; for example in the fast-and-slow model with dSλ

u = λu du + dBu,

we perform the following transformations π → Xλ,π

T

= Z T πu dSλ

u, λ → Zλ T = E(−λ · M),

and consider a more tractable version ∆i of the demand function ∆i(Zλ

T ) = Xλ,ˆ πi(Sλ) T

, so that ∆i : EM ⊆ L0

+ → L0 + − L∞ + .

The problem now becomes simple to state:

Can we solve the equation ∆(Z) = 0, a.s. on EM?

slide-29
SLIDE 29

Stability of utility maximization in incomplete markets

(Note: fix an agent and drop the index i.)

Theorem (Larsen and ˇ

  • Z. (2006), to appear in SPA)

Suppose that E ≡ 0. Let {λn}n∈N ⊆ Λ be a sequence such that

  • Zλn is a martingale for each n,
  • the collection {V +(Zλn

T ) : n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable, and

  • Zλn

T

→ Zλ

T in probability.

Then, for xn → x > 0 we have uλn(xn) → uλ(x), and ˆ Xλn,xn

T

→ ˆ Xλ,x

T

in probability. Here, V is the convex conjugate of the utility function U, i.e., V (y) = supx>0(U(x) − xy), and ˆ Xx,λ

T

is the optimal terminal wealth in the market Sλ with initial wealth x.

Remarks:

  • The uniform-integrability condition is practically necessary.
  • Completes the Hadamard-style analysis of the utility maximization problem -

repercussions for estimation.

  • Further generalized to the general semimartingale case - under a different

perturbation family - including general E ∈ L∞ (Kardaras and ˇ

  • Z. (2007)).
  • Therefore, (under suitable conditions) ∆ is (L0, L0)-continuous.
slide-30
SLIDE 30

Stability of utility maximization in incomplete markets

(Note: fix an agent and drop the index i.)

Theorem (Larsen and ˇ

  • Z. (2006), to appear in SPA)

Suppose that E ≡ 0. Let {λn}n∈N ⊆ Λ be a sequence such that

  • Zλn is a martingale for each n,
  • the collection {V +(Zλn

T ) : n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable, and

  • Zλn

T

→ Zλ

T in probability.

Then, for xn → x > 0 we have uλn(xn) → uλ(x), and ˆ Xλn,xn

T

→ ˆ Xλ,x

T

in probability. Here, V is the convex conjugate of the utility function U, i.e., V (y) = supx>0(U(x) − xy), and ˆ Xx,λ

T

is the optimal terminal wealth in the market Sλ with initial wealth x.

Remarks:

  • The uniform-integrability condition is practically necessary.
  • Completes the Hadamard-style analysis of the utility maximization problem -

repercussions for estimation.

  • Further generalized to the general semimartingale case - under a different

perturbation family - including general E ∈ L∞ (Kardaras and ˇ

  • Z. (2007)).
  • Therefore, (under suitable conditions) ∆ is (L0, L0)-continuous.
slide-31
SLIDE 31

Stability of utility maximization in incomplete markets

(Note: fix an agent and drop the index i.)

Theorem (Larsen and ˇ

  • Z. (2006), to appear in SPA)

Suppose that E ≡ 0. Let {λn}n∈N ⊆ Λ be a sequence such that

  • Zλn is a martingale for each n,
  • the collection {V +(Zλn

T ) : n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable, and

  • Zλn

T

→ Zλ

T in probability.

Then, for xn → x > 0 we have uλn(xn) → uλ(x), and ˆ Xλn,xn

T

→ ˆ Xλ,x

T

in probability. Here, V is the convex conjugate of the utility function U, i.e., V (y) = supx>0(U(x) − xy), and ˆ Xx,λ

T

is the optimal terminal wealth in the market Sλ with initial wealth x.

Remarks:

  • The uniform-integrability condition is practically necessary.
  • Completes the Hadamard-style analysis of the utility maximization problem -

repercussions for estimation.

  • Further generalized to the general semimartingale case - under a different

perturbation family - including general E ∈ L∞ (Kardaras and ˇ

  • Z. (2007)).
  • Therefore, (under suitable conditions) ∆ is (L0, L0)-continuous.
slide-32
SLIDE 32

Stability of utility maximization in incomplete markets

(Note: fix an agent and drop the index i.)

Theorem (Larsen and ˇ

  • Z. (2006), to appear in SPA)

Suppose that E ≡ 0. Let {λn}n∈N ⊆ Λ be a sequence such that

  • Zλn is a martingale for each n,
  • the collection {V +(Zλn

T ) : n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable, and

  • Zλn

T

→ Zλ

T in probability.

Then, for xn → x > 0 we have uλn(xn) → uλ(x), and ˆ Xλn,xn

T

→ ˆ Xλ,x

T

in probability. Here, V is the convex conjugate of the utility function U, i.e., V (y) = supx>0(U(x) − xy), and ˆ Xx,λ

T

is the optimal terminal wealth in the market Sλ with initial wealth x.

Remarks:

  • The uniform-integrability condition is practically necessary.
  • Completes the Hadamard-style analysis of the utility maximization problem -

repercussions for estimation.

  • Further generalized to the general semimartingale case - under a different

perturbation family - including general E ∈ L∞ (Kardaras and ˇ

  • Z. (2007)).
  • Therefore, (under suitable conditions) ∆ is (L0, L0)-continuous.
slide-33
SLIDE 33

Stability of utility maximization in incomplete markets

(Note: fix an agent and drop the index i.)

Theorem (Larsen and ˇ

  • Z. (2006), to appear in SPA)

Suppose that E ≡ 0. Let {λn}n∈N ⊆ Λ be a sequence such that

  • Zλn is a martingale for each n,
  • the collection {V +(Zλn

T ) : n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable, and

  • Zλn

T

→ Zλ

T in probability.

Then, for xn → x > 0 we have uλn(xn) → uλ(x), and ˆ Xλn,xn

T

→ ˆ Xλ,x

T

in probability. Here, V is the convex conjugate of the utility function U, i.e., V (y) = supx>0(U(x) − xy), and ˆ Xx,λ

T

is the optimal terminal wealth in the market Sλ with initial wealth x.

Remarks:

  • The uniform-integrability condition is practically necessary.
  • Completes the Hadamard-style analysis of the utility maximization problem -

repercussions for estimation.

  • Further generalized to the general semimartingale case - under a different

perturbation family - including general E ∈ L∞ (Kardaras and ˇ

  • Z. (2007)).
  • Therefore, (under suitable conditions) ∆ is (L0, L0)-continuous.
slide-34
SLIDE 34

Stability of utility maximization in incomplete markets

(Note: fix an agent and drop the index i.)

Theorem (Larsen and ˇ

  • Z. (2006), to appear in SPA)

Suppose that E ≡ 0. Let {λn}n∈N ⊆ Λ be a sequence such that

  • Zλn is a martingale for each n,
  • the collection {V +(Zλn

T ) : n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable, and

  • Zλn

T

→ Zλ

T in probability.

Then, for xn → x > 0 we have uλn(xn) → uλ(x), and ˆ Xλn,xn

T

→ ˆ Xλ,x

T

in probability. Here, V is the convex conjugate of the utility function U, i.e., V (y) = supx>0(U(x) − xy), and ˆ Xx,λ

T

is the optimal terminal wealth in the market Sλ with initial wealth x.

Remarks:

  • The uniform-integrability condition is practically necessary.
  • Completes the Hadamard-style analysis of the utility maximization problem -

repercussions for estimation.

  • Further generalized to the general semimartingale case - under a different

perturbation family - including general E ∈ L∞ (Kardaras and ˇ

  • Z. (2007)).
  • Therefore, (under suitable conditions) ∆ is (L0, L0)-continuous.
slide-35
SLIDE 35

Stability of utility maximization in incomplete markets

(Note: fix an agent and drop the index i.)

Theorem (Larsen and ˇ

  • Z. (2006), to appear in SPA)

Suppose that E ≡ 0. Let {λn}n∈N ⊆ Λ be a sequence such that

  • Zλn is a martingale for each n,
  • the collection {V +(Zλn

T ) : n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable, and

  • Zλn

T

→ Zλ

T in probability.

Then, for xn → x > 0 we have uλn(xn) → uλ(x), and ˆ Xλn,xn

T

→ ˆ Xλ,x

T

in probability. Here, V is the convex conjugate of the utility function U, i.e., V (y) = supx>0(U(x) − xy), and ˆ Xx,λ

T

is the optimal terminal wealth in the market Sλ with initial wealth x.

Remarks:

  • The uniform-integrability condition is practically necessary.
  • Completes the Hadamard-style analysis of the utility maximization problem -

repercussions for estimation.

  • Further generalized to the general semimartingale case - under a different

perturbation family - including general E ∈ L∞ (Kardaras and ˇ

  • Z. (2007)).
  • Therefore, (under suitable conditions) ∆ is (L0, L0)-continuous.
slide-36
SLIDE 36

Stability of utility maximization in incomplete markets

(Note: fix an agent and drop the index i.)

Theorem (Larsen and ˇ

  • Z. (2006), to appear in SPA)

Suppose that E ≡ 0. Let {λn}n∈N ⊆ Λ be a sequence such that

  • Zλn is a martingale for each n,
  • the collection {V +(Zλn

T ) : n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable, and

  • Zλn

T

→ Zλ

T in probability.

Then, for xn → x > 0 we have uλn(xn) → uλ(x), and ˆ Xλn,xn

T

→ ˆ Xλ,x

T

in probability. Here, V is the convex conjugate of the utility function U, i.e., V (y) = supx>0(U(x) − xy), and ˆ Xx,λ

T

is the optimal terminal wealth in the market Sλ with initial wealth x.

Remarks:

  • The uniform-integrability condition is practically necessary.
  • Completes the Hadamard-style analysis of the utility maximization problem -

repercussions for estimation.

  • Further generalized to the general semimartingale case - under a different

perturbation family - including general E ∈ L∞ (Kardaras and ˇ

  • Z. (2007)).
  • Therefore, (under suitable conditions) ∆ is (L0, L0)-continuous.
slide-37
SLIDE 37

Stability of utility maximization in incomplete markets

(Note: fix an agent and drop the index i.)

Theorem (Larsen and ˇ

  • Z. (2006), to appear in SPA)

Suppose that E ≡ 0. Let {λn}n∈N ⊆ Λ be a sequence such that

  • Zλn is a martingale for each n,
  • the collection {V +(Zλn

T ) : n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable, and

  • Zλn

T

→ Zλ

T in probability.

Then, for xn → x > 0 we have uλn(xn) → uλ(x), and ˆ Xλn,xn

T

→ ˆ Xλ,x

T

in probability. Here, V is the convex conjugate of the utility function U, i.e., V (y) = supx>0(U(x) − xy), and ˆ Xx,λ

T

is the optimal terminal wealth in the market Sλ with initial wealth x.

Remarks:

  • The uniform-integrability condition is practically necessary.
  • Completes the Hadamard-style analysis of the utility maximization problem -

repercussions for estimation.

  • Further generalized to the general semimartingale case - under a different

perturbation family - including general E ∈ L∞ (Kardaras and ˇ

  • Z. (2007)).
  • Therefore, (under suitable conditions) ∆ is (L0, L0)-continuous.
slide-38
SLIDE 38

Some fixed-point theory

The KKM-theorem

Theorem (Knaster, Kuratowski and Mazurkiewicz, 1929) Let S be the unit simplex in Rm, and let V = {e1, . . . , em} be the set of its vertices. A mapping F : V → 2Rm is said to be a KKM-map if conv(ei, i ∈ J) ⊆ ∪i∈JF(ei), ∀ J ⊆ {1, . . . , m}. If F(ei) is a closed subset of Rm for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, then ∩i∈{1,...,n}F(ei) = ∅.

slide-39
SLIDE 39

Convex compactness

The KKM-Theorem can easily be extended to infinite-dimensional vector-spaces as long as mild topological properties are imposed and local convexity is required (Kakutani, Fan, Browder, etc.) How about L0 - the prime example of a non-locally-convex space? Yes, if

  • ne can fake compactness there:

Convex-compactness

(Nikiˇ sin, Buhvalov, Lozanovskii, Delbaen, Schahermayer, etc.) A subset B of a topological vector space is said to be convex-compact if any family (Fα)α∈A of closed and convex subsets of B has the finite-intersection property, i.e. ∀ D ⊆fin A \

α∈D

Fα = 0 ! ⇒ \

α∈A

Fα = ∅.

slide-40
SLIDE 40

Convex compactness

The KKM-Theorem can easily be extended to infinite-dimensional vector-spaces as long as mild topological properties are imposed and local convexity is required (Kakutani, Fan, Browder, etc.) How about L0 - the prime example of a non-locally-convex space? Yes, if

  • ne can fake compactness there:

Convex-compactness

(Nikiˇ sin, Buhvalov, Lozanovskii, Delbaen, Schahermayer, etc.) A subset B of a topological vector space is said to be convex-compact if any family (Fα)α∈A of closed and convex subsets of B has the finite-intersection property, i.e. ∀ D ⊆fin A \

α∈D

Fα = 0 ! ⇒ \

α∈A

Fα = ∅.

slide-41
SLIDE 41

Convex compactness

The KKM-Theorem can easily be extended to infinite-dimensional vector-spaces as long as mild topological properties are imposed and local convexity is required (Kakutani, Fan, Browder, etc.) How about L0 - the prime example of a non-locally-convex space? Yes, if

  • ne can fake compactness there:

Convex-compactness

(Nikiˇ sin, Buhvalov, Lozanovskii, Delbaen, Schahermayer, etc.) A subset B of a topological vector space is said to be convex-compact if any family (Fα)α∈A of closed and convex subsets of B has the finite-intersection property, i.e. ∀ D ⊆fin A \

α∈D

Fα = 0 ! ⇒ \

α∈A

Fα = ∅.

slide-42
SLIDE 42

Convex compactness

The KKM-Theorem can easily be extended to infinite-dimensional vector-spaces as long as mild topological properties are imposed and local convexity is required (Kakutani, Fan, Browder, etc.) How about L0 - the prime example of a non-locally-convex space? Yes, if

  • ne can fake compactness there:

Convex-compactness

(Nikiˇ sin, Buhvalov, Lozanovskii, Delbaen, Schahermayer, etc.) A subset B of a topological vector space is said to be convex-compact if any family (Fα)α∈A of closed and convex subsets of B has the finite-intersection property, i.e. ∀ D ⊆fin A \

α∈D

Fα = 0 ! ⇒ \

α∈A

Fα = ∅.

slide-43
SLIDE 43

A characterization

  • Proposition. A closed and convex subset C of a topological vector space

X is convex-compact if and only if for any net (xα)α∈A in C there exists a subnet (yβ)β∈B of convex combinations of (xα)α∈A such that yβ → y for some y ∈ C.

(A net (yβ)β∈B is said to be a subnet of convex combinations of (xα)α∈A if there exists a mapping D : B → Fin(A) such that

  • yβ ∈ conv{xα : α ∈ D(β)} for each β ∈ B, and
  • for each α ∈ A there exists β ∈ B such that α′ α for each α′ ∈ S

β′β D(β′).)

Examples.

  • Any convex and compact subset of a TVS is convex-compact.
  • A closed and convex subset of a unit ball in a dual X∗ of a normed

vector space X is convex-compact under any compatible topology (essentially Mazur),

  • Any convex, closed and bounded-in-probability subset of L0

+ is

convex-compact (essentially Koml´

  • s).
slide-44
SLIDE 44

A characterization

  • Proposition. A closed and convex subset C of a topological vector space

X is convex-compact if and only if for any net (xα)α∈A in C there exists a subnet (yβ)β∈B of convex combinations of (xα)α∈A such that yβ → y for some y ∈ C.

(A net (yβ)β∈B is said to be a subnet of convex combinations of (xα)α∈A if there exists a mapping D : B → Fin(A) such that

  • yβ ∈ conv{xα : α ∈ D(β)} for each β ∈ B, and
  • for each α ∈ A there exists β ∈ B such that α′ α for each α′ ∈ S

β′β D(β′).)

Examples.

  • Any convex and compact subset of a TVS is convex-compact.
  • A closed and convex subset of a unit ball in a dual X∗ of a normed

vector space X is convex-compact under any compatible topology (essentially Mazur),

  • Any convex, closed and bounded-in-probability subset of L0

+ is

convex-compact (essentially Koml´

  • s).
slide-45
SLIDE 45

A characterization

  • Proposition. A closed and convex subset C of a topological vector space

X is convex-compact if and only if for any net (xα)α∈A in C there exists a subnet (yβ)β∈B of convex combinations of (xα)α∈A such that yβ → y for some y ∈ C.

(A net (yβ)β∈B is said to be a subnet of convex combinations of (xα)α∈A if there exists a mapping D : B → Fin(A) such that

  • yβ ∈ conv{xα : α ∈ D(β)} for each β ∈ B, and
  • for each α ∈ A there exists β ∈ B such that α′ α for each α′ ∈ S

β′β D(β′).)

Examples.

  • Any convex and compact subset of a TVS is convex-compact.
  • A closed and convex subset of a unit ball in a dual X∗ of a normed

vector space X is convex-compact under any compatible topology (essentially Mazur),

  • Any convex, closed and bounded-in-probability subset of L0

+ is

convex-compact (essentially Koml´

  • s).
slide-46
SLIDE 46

A characterization

  • Proposition. A closed and convex subset C of a topological vector space

X is convex-compact if and only if for any net (xα)α∈A in C there exists a subnet (yβ)β∈B of convex combinations of (xα)α∈A such that yβ → y for some y ∈ C.

(A net (yβ)β∈B is said to be a subnet of convex combinations of (xα)α∈A if there exists a mapping D : B → Fin(A) such that

  • yβ ∈ conv{xα : α ∈ D(β)} for each β ∈ B, and
  • for each α ∈ A there exists β ∈ B such that α′ α for each α′ ∈ S

β′β D(β′).)

Examples.

  • Any convex and compact subset of a TVS is convex-compact.
  • A closed and convex subset of a unit ball in a dual X∗ of a normed

vector space X is convex-compact under any compatible topology (essentially Mazur),

  • Any convex, closed and bounded-in-probability subset of L0

+ is

convex-compact (essentially Koml´

  • s).
slide-47
SLIDE 47

Attainment of minima

  • Theorem. Let A be a convex-compact subset of X, and let f : A → R be a

convex lower-semicontinuous function. Then f attains its minimum on A.

A minimax-type theorem

  • Theorem. Let A, B be a convex-compact subsets of TVS X and Y ,
  • respectively. Let f : A × B → R be a function with the following properties:
  • x → f(x, y) is usc and (quasi)-concave for each y ∈ B,
  • y → f(x, y) is lsc and (quasi)-convex for each x ∈ A.

Then max

x

min

y

f(x, y) = min

y

max

x

f(x, y).

slide-48
SLIDE 48

Attainment of minima

  • Theorem. Let A be a convex-compact subset of X, and let f : A → R be a

convex lower-semicontinuous function. Then f attains its minimum on A.

A minimax-type theorem

  • Theorem. Let A, B be a convex-compact subsets of TVS X and Y ,
  • respectively. Let f : A × B → R be a function with the following properties:
  • x → f(x, y) is usc and (quasi)-concave for each y ∈ B,
  • y → f(x, y) is lsc and (quasi)-convex for each x ∈ A.

Then max

x

min

y

f(x, y) = min

y

max

x

f(x, y).

slide-49
SLIDE 49

Generalized KKM theorem

  • Theorem. Let A be convex-compact subset of a TVS X. Let {F(x)}x∈A

be a family of closed and convex subsets of A such that conv(x1, . . . , xn) ⊆ ∪n

i=1F(xi), ∀ n ∈ N, ∀ x1, . . . , xn ∈ A.

Then ∩x∈AF(x) = ∅.

The state of affairs

Using the generalized KKM theorem, we can show existence of equilibria in many cases of some interest (it works for an infinity of agents, too). The requirement of (quasi)-convexity it places on the excess-demand function is a serious one. We are trying to sort the situation out (work in progress with Malamud, Anthropelos) . . . Kardaras (’08) uses convex-compactness to give a general abstract framework for existence of num´ eraire portfolios.

slide-50
SLIDE 50

The direct (sub)approach

Let us consider the fast-and-slow model with Let (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be generated by a Brownian motion B and a one-jump-Poisson process N with intensity µ > 0. We let S be the collection of all processes of the form St = Z t λ(u, Bu, Nu) du + dBt, where λ : [0, T] × R × {0, 1} → R ranges through bounded measurable functions.

  • There is a finite number I of agents,
  • each agent has the exponential utility U i(x) = − exp(−γix),
  • the random endowments are of the form Ei = gi(BT , NT ).
  • Theorem. Under the assumption that gi ∈ C2+δ(R), i ∈ I, δ ∈ (0, 1), there

exists T0 > 0 such that an equilibrium market, unique in the class C2+δ,1+δ/2([0, T] × R), exists whenever T ≤ T0. Theorem* The restriction T < T0 is superfluous.

slide-51
SLIDE 51

The direct (sub)approach

Let us consider the fast-and-slow model with Let (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be generated by a Brownian motion B and a one-jump-Poisson process N with intensity µ > 0. We let S be the collection of all processes of the form St = Z t λ(u, Bu, Nu) du + dBt, where λ : [0, T] × R × {0, 1} → R ranges through bounded measurable functions.

  • There is a finite number I of agents,
  • each agent has the exponential utility U i(x) = − exp(−γix),
  • the random endowments are of the form Ei = gi(BT , NT ).
  • Theorem. Under the assumption that gi ∈ C2+δ(R), i ∈ I, δ ∈ (0, 1), there

exists T0 > 0 such that an equilibrium market, unique in the class C2+δ,1+δ/2([0, T] × R), exists whenever T ≤ T0. Theorem* The restriction T < T0 is superfluous.

slide-52
SLIDE 52

The direct (sub)approach

Let us consider the fast-and-slow model with Let (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be generated by a Brownian motion B and a one-jump-Poisson process N with intensity µ > 0. We let S be the collection of all processes of the form St = Z t λ(u, Bu, Nu) du + dBt, where λ : [0, T] × R × {0, 1} → R ranges through bounded measurable functions.

  • There is a finite number I of agents,
  • each agent has the exponential utility U i(x) = − exp(−γix),
  • the random endowments are of the form Ei = gi(BT , NT ).
  • Theorem. Under the assumption that gi ∈ C2+δ(R), i ∈ I, δ ∈ (0, 1), there

exists T0 > 0 such that an equilibrium market, unique in the class C2+δ,1+δ/2([0, T] × R), exists whenever T ≤ T0. Theorem* The restriction T < T0 is superfluous.

slide-53
SLIDE 53

The direct (sub)approach

Let us consider the fast-and-slow model with Let (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be generated by a Brownian motion B and a one-jump-Poisson process N with intensity µ > 0. We let S be the collection of all processes of the form St = Z t λ(u, Bu, Nu) du + dBt, where λ : [0, T] × R × {0, 1} → R ranges through bounded measurable functions.

  • There is a finite number I of agents,
  • each agent has the exponential utility U i(x) = − exp(−γix),
  • the random endowments are of the form Ei = gi(BT , NT ).
  • Theorem. Under the assumption that gi ∈ C2+δ(R), i ∈ I, δ ∈ (0, 1), there

exists T0 > 0 such that an equilibrium market, unique in the class C2+δ,1+δ/2([0, T] × R), exists whenever T ≤ T0. Theorem* The restriction T < T0 is superfluous.

slide-54
SLIDE 54

Sketch of the proof

  • Express the optimal portfolio in the form

πi

t = 1 γi λ(t, BT , Nt) − ui b(t, Bt, Nt),

where solves the semi-linear system of two interacting PDEs ( 0 = ui

t + 1 2ui bb − λui b + 1 2γi λ2 − µ γ (exp(−γui n) − 1)

ui(T, ·, ·) = gi. where ui

n(t, b, 0) = ui(t, b, 1) − ui(t, b, 0), ui n(t, b, 1) = 0.

  • Write the market-clearing condition

0 =

I

X

i=1

ˆ πi

t(λ) = 1 ¯ γ λ − I

X

i=1

ui

b(λ),

in the form F(λ) =

I

X

i=1

¯ γui

b(λ) = λ.

where 1

¯ γ = PI i=1 1 γi .

slide-55
SLIDE 55

Sketch of the proof

  • Express the optimal portfolio in the form

πi

t = 1 γi λ(t, BT , Nt) − ui b(t, Bt, Nt),

where solves the semi-linear system of two interacting PDEs ( 0 = ui

t + 1 2ui bb − λui b + 1 2γi λ2 − µ γ (exp(−γui n) − 1)

ui(T, ·, ·) = gi. where ui

n(t, b, 0) = ui(t, b, 1) − ui(t, b, 0), ui n(t, b, 1) = 0.

  • Write the market-clearing condition

0 =

I

X

i=1

ˆ πi

t(λ) = 1 ¯ γ λ − I

X

i=1

ui

b(λ),

in the form F(λ) =

I

X

i=1

¯ γui

b(λ) = λ.

where 1

¯ γ = PI i=1 1 γi .

slide-56
SLIDE 56

Sketch of the proof

  • Show that the mapping

λ → ui

b(λ)

is Lipschitz with a small Lipschitz coefficient in a well-chosen function

  • space. The right one turns out to be the weighted H¨
  • lder space

C(β);1+δ([0, T] × R).

  • Apply the Banach fixed-point theorem to the function F.
slide-57
SLIDE 57

Sketch of the proof

  • Show that the mapping

λ → ui

b(λ)

is Lipschitz with a small Lipschitz coefficient in a well-chosen function

  • space. The right one turns out to be the weighted H¨
  • lder space

C(β);1+δ([0, T] × R).

  • Apply the Banach fixed-point theorem to the function F.
slide-58
SLIDE 58

What next

Some research directions:

  • (Aumann models) let the number of agents → ∞, and study the

limiting behavior (mean-field-type ideas)

  • (Alternative sources of incompleteness) jumps, transactions

costs, default, etc.

  • (Numerical methods) forward-backward SDEs, iterative approaches
  • (Partial equilibria) with application to “pricing” in incomplete

markets

  • (Statistical issues) calibration, etc.
  • (Dynamics) issues related to uniqueness
  • (Simplification) the most pressing issue!
slide-59
SLIDE 59

What next

Some research directions:

  • (Aumann models) let the number of agents → ∞, and study the

limiting behavior (mean-field-type ideas)

  • (Alternative sources of incompleteness) jumps, transactions

costs, default, etc.

  • (Numerical methods) forward-backward SDEs, iterative approaches
  • (Partial equilibria) with application to “pricing” in incomplete

markets

  • (Statistical issues) calibration, etc.
  • (Dynamics) issues related to uniqueness
  • (Simplification) the most pressing issue!
slide-60
SLIDE 60

What next

Some research directions:

  • (Aumann models) let the number of agents → ∞, and study the

limiting behavior (mean-field-type ideas)

  • (Alternative sources of incompleteness) jumps, transactions

costs, default, etc.

  • (Numerical methods) forward-backward SDEs, iterative approaches
  • (Partial equilibria) with application to “pricing” in incomplete

markets

  • (Statistical issues) calibration, etc.
  • (Dynamics) issues related to uniqueness
  • (Simplification) the most pressing issue!
slide-61
SLIDE 61

What next

Some research directions:

  • (Aumann models) let the number of agents → ∞, and study the

limiting behavior (mean-field-type ideas)

  • (Alternative sources of incompleteness) jumps, transactions

costs, default, etc.

  • (Numerical methods) forward-backward SDEs, iterative approaches
  • (Partial equilibria) with application to “pricing” in incomplete

markets

  • (Statistical issues) calibration, etc.
  • (Dynamics) issues related to uniqueness
  • (Simplification) the most pressing issue!
slide-62
SLIDE 62

What next

Some research directions:

  • (Aumann models) let the number of agents → ∞, and study the

limiting behavior (mean-field-type ideas)

  • (Alternative sources of incompleteness) jumps, transactions

costs, default, etc.

  • (Numerical methods) forward-backward SDEs, iterative approaches
  • (Partial equilibria) with application to “pricing” in incomplete

markets

  • (Statistical issues) calibration, etc.
  • (Dynamics) issues related to uniqueness
  • (Simplification) the most pressing issue!
slide-63
SLIDE 63

What next

Some research directions:

  • (Aumann models) let the number of agents → ∞, and study the

limiting behavior (mean-field-type ideas)

  • (Alternative sources of incompleteness) jumps, transactions

costs, default, etc.

  • (Numerical methods) forward-backward SDEs, iterative approaches
  • (Partial equilibria) with application to “pricing” in incomplete

markets

  • (Statistical issues) calibration, etc.
  • (Dynamics) issues related to uniqueness
  • (Simplification) the most pressing issue!
slide-64
SLIDE 64

What next

Some research directions:

  • (Aumann models) let the number of agents → ∞, and study the

limiting behavior (mean-field-type ideas)

  • (Alternative sources of incompleteness) jumps, transactions

costs, default, etc.

  • (Numerical methods) forward-backward SDEs, iterative approaches
  • (Partial equilibria) with application to “pricing” in incomplete

markets

  • (Statistical issues) calibration, etc.
  • (Dynamics) issues related to uniqueness
  • (Simplification) the most pressing issue!