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Malicious Code and Access Control in SDN SPRING14 , 31.7. 1.8.2014 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Malicious Code and Access Control in SDN SPRING14 , 31.7. 1.8.2014 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Malicious Code and Access Control in SDN SPRING14 , 31.7. 1.8.2014 Hans Christian Rpke Chair for System Security 1 Introduction 2 Malicious Code in SDN 3 Access Control in SDN 4 Conclusions Software-Defined Networks|Horst Grtz
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Computer Market Evolution
Specialized Hardware Specialized Operation Systems Specialized Applications Appl. Open Interface Open Interface
- Closed, proprietary
- Slow innovation
- Small industry
- Open interfaces
- Rapid innovation
- Huge industry
∗McKeown et al., ONS’11 Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 3/19
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Networks Today
Specialized Hardware Specialized Control Systems Specialized Features Open Interface
- Closed, proprietary
- Slow innovation
- Open interfaces
∗McKeown et al., ONS’11 Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 4/19
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Network Market Evolution
Appl. Open Interface Open Interface
?
Specialized Hardware Specialized Control Systems Specialized Features
- Closed, proprietary
- Slow innovation
- Open interfaces
- Rapid innovation (?)
∗McKeown et al., ONS’11 Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 5/19
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What is Software-Defined Networking? Definition
SDN := Decoupling network control features from forwarding hardware.
- Spec. HW
- Spec. Control
Systems Spec. Features
- Spec. HW
- Spec. Control
Systems Spec. Features
- Spec. HW
- Spec. Control
Systems Spec. Features Network OS Appl. Appl. Appl. Appl. Appl. Southbound API Northbound API Open Interface Open Interface Open Interface
Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 6/19
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SDN @ Google
Backbone performance Operation costs Fault tolerance
∗Hölzle, ONS’12 Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 7/19
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Example
SDN controller Appl.
packet
Flow table
?
Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 8/19
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Example
SDN controller Appl.
packet
Flow table
?
Flow rule
packet
Flow rule
packet
Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 9/19
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SDN Layers
SDN controller Appl.
packet
Flow table
?
Flow rule
packet
Flow rule
packet
Network intelligence Global network view Complexity hiding Switch programming Packet forwarding
Application Layer Control Layer Switch Infrastructure
Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 10/19
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Most Common Implementation
SDN Controller Process Standard PC Hardware Common OS SDN Appl. OpenFlow-enabled Switch Network Other Processes SDN Appl. SDN Appl. SDN Appl. Standard PC HW Common OS
SDN Appl. SDN Appl.
Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 11/19
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Module vs. REST Applications
SDN Controller Process Standard PC Hardware Common OS SDN Appl. OpenFlow-enabled Switch Network Other Processes SDN Appl. SDN Appl. SDN Appl. Standard PC HW Common OS
SDN Appl. SDN Appl.
Module Applications REST Applications
Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 12/19
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Network-level vs. System-level
- Network-level
- Main purpose
- Forwarding decisions
- Flow rules
- System-level
- Rather a side effect
- Negligible for SDN
- But significant with respect to security
∗Canini et al., NSDI’13 Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 13/19
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Malicious SDN Applications
SDN Controller Process Standard PC Hardware Common OS OpenFlow-enabled Switch Network Other Processes SDN Appl. SDN Appl.
- Module applications
- Consequences on system-level
Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 14/19
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Experiments
- Malicious SDN module application samples
- Denial-of-service attack
- Arbitrary code execution
- Remote control / backdoor
- Examined SDN controllers (popular & state-of-the-art)
- Beacon
- Floodlight
- OpenDaylight
- HP VAN
- Results
- SDN controller shutdown
- Malware execution
- Remote control of SDN controllers (→ of entire networks)
Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 15/19
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Security Tool
- Idea
- Put SDN module applications into a sandbox
- Control access to sensitive operations
- Design
SDN Appl. Access Control
Sensitive
- perations
Non-sensitive
- perations
Security rule set Code Execution
?
Default rules SDN appl. A rule set SDN appl. B rule set
- Contribution: Effective attack prevention
Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 16/19
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Access Control in SDN
- Security tool limitations
- Unknown sensitive operations in use
- Manual configuration
- Idea: Access control framework
- Enable developers to define permissions
- Enable network operators to review permission requests
- Enforce network operations to decide on permission requests
(before the start of a certain SDN application)
- Activate security rules automatically according to decisions
- Support network operators in case of unavailable permission requests
- Contributions
- Provide access control mechanism for SDN controllers
- Protect SDN controller on system-level
Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 17/19
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Conclusions
- SDN may change the network market drastically
- SDN promises rapid innovation through third-party software
- Third-party software must not be malicious-free
- Malicious SDN applications harm entire networks
- SDN security is essential for the SDN success
- We provide building blocks for system-level SDN security
- Security analysis
- Security tool
- Access control mechanism
Software-Defined Networks|Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security|SPRING’14|31.7. – 1.8.2014 18/19
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