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Legislative Council Select Committee on Train Services Ian McCallum - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Legislative Council Select Committee on Train Services Ian McCallum - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Legislative Council Select Committee on Train Services Ian McCallum Chief Investigator Transport and Marine Safety Investigations Statutory position established 1 August 2006 Principal Function To investigate public transport and
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How we decide what to investigate: Potential for system safety improvement (safety value) that may be gained by investigating Fatal/serious injury to passengers or other people Extent of property damage Public profile of event Significance of failure of safety system Environmental impact of incident Part of a identifiable trend
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Rail investigation undertaken involving metro
and V/Line trains since August 2006
Complete Melbourne V/Line train collision in Spencer St Yard 16 Nov 2007 Complete Somerville Connex (loco) level crossing collision 22 Aug 2007 Complete Kerang V/Line train level crossing collision 5 Jun 2007 Complete Seymour V/Line derailment 4 Jun 2007 Complete Oakleigh Connex train derailment 3 May 2007 Complete Springvale Connex Siemens platform overrun 18 Feb 2007 Complete Winchelsea V/Line level crossing collision 12 Nov 2006 Complete Traralgon V/Line train derailment 12 Oct 2006 Status Location Event Date
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Rail investigation undertaken involving metro
and V/Line trains since August 2006 cont…
Under Investigation Melbourne Central Connex train drags passenger along platform 20 Oct 2009 Under Investigation Stonyford V/Line derailed after collision with a tree 12 Sep 2009 Under Investigation Edithvale Connex train level crossing collision 15 Jul 2009 Under Investigation ABB Siding Dandenong PN train derailed on Connex line 1 Jun 2009 Under Investigation Various Connex Siemens train overruns at Noble Park, Ormond, Yarraman, Murrumbeena, Feb-Mar 2009 Complete Cranbourne Connex train overrun platform 9 Jan 2009 Complete Springvale V/Line train struck pedestrian at station 27 Sep 2008 Complete Ardeer V/Line pedestrian level crossing collision 6 Mar 2008 Complete Sandringham Connex train overrun baulks at end of line 22 Feb 2008 Status Location Event Date
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Oaks Day 6 November 2008
What happened:
Infrastructure failures result is passengers detrain onto
- perating rail lines
Main Findings
Several critical infrastructure failures occurred causing the stoppage and delay of trains The stopping of a train at a signal resulted in the ‘burn- through’ of the overhead wire and loss of power to portions
- f the Craigieburn corridor
Several of the infrastructure faults that occurred on Oaks Day were known to have occurred previously Connex staff did not declare an emergency Some train control processes, including communications, were inadequate
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Contributing factors - Summary
Position of the ‘air gap’ relative to Home signal № 23 The failure of some on-train Public Announcement systems and a lack of staff at some key locations left the passengers The ‘group call’ from Metrol to trains to lower pantographs was not specific enough as to whom it was directed The degraded condition of some impedance bonds The content and execution of Connex contingency planning for a disruptive event or emergency was inadequate Some signalbox activity and processes at Kensington were deficient Authorised Officers were unable to be effectively mobilised and deployed to assist passengers as the event developed
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Safety Actions taken since the event
Review of open ‘air gap’ locations – 8 locations had ‘section insulators’ installed Connex reviewed use of portable radios for staff at large crowd events Connex has undertaken to review the Customer Service Department Business Plan Connex has undertaken to review radio resources and channel availability
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Recommended Safety Actions - Summary
- Franchisee
Review ERP, specifically in the area of significant event handling Review process in Metrol; specifically emergency & disruption indentification, responsibilities for incident direction, management of authorised officers Review instruction around advising train drivers to lower pantographs Ensure that there are effective methods for informing and evacuating passengers Review impedance bonds throughout the network to determine the extent of the problem and take appropriate remedial action Considers altering crowd management on Platform 1 at Flemington Station Review processes at Kensington Signalbox
- Department of Transport
Advance the proposed study to replace mechanical interlocking on the metro network
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