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Lawrence Christiano Overview RecentDevelopmentsinMonetary p y - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
M A -L L I , O I P R D E W O M O - S , O P D W P AC CR RO IN NK KA AG GE ES IL L RI IC CE ES S A AN ND D EF FL LA AT TI IO ON N OR RK KS SH HO OP J A 6 9 9, , 20 00 09 9 J 6 2 AN NU UA AR
AN NU UA AR RY Y 6
2
LawrenceChristiano Northwestern University NorthwesternUniversity
fortheanalysisofmonetarypolicy.
– Consensusinfluencedheavilybyestimatedimpulseresponse functionsfromStructuralVectorAutoregression (SVARs)
– Christiano,EichenbaumandEvansJPE(2005) – Smets andWouters,AER(2007)
– Labormarket – Financialfrictions – Openeconomy
P li l i h t li i d t dl t ib t t
excessassetmarketvolatility.
d b h i i i
BlanchardQuah) Blanchard Quah)
– VARsserveasa‘Battleground’betweenalternativeeconomictheories – VARscanbeusedtoquantitativelyconstructaparticularmodel
‘How does the economy respond to a particular shock?’ – Howdoestheeconomyrespondtoaparticularshock? – Currentconsensusmodelheavilyguidedbyanswerstothisquestion
y q
– Identificationproblem – Needextraassumptions….StructuralVAR(SVAR).
Rule that relates Fed’s actions to state of the economy: – RulethatrelatesFed sactionstostateoftheeconomy:
Policy shock Fed information set
Rt =f(t)+et
R
f linear – f linear – et
R orthogonaltoFedinformation,t
– tcontainscurrentpricesandwages,aggregatequantities,
t
p g , gg g q , laggedstuff – et
R estimatedbyOLSregression
Regress X on e R e
R e R
– RegressXtonet
R,et1 R,et2 R ,…
Xt ZtFKt,Lt
Kt1 1 Kt VtIt
The data have been transformed to ensure stationarity Sample period: 1959Q1-2007Q1
– moneygrowthandinterestrateoverin1year,butothervariableskeep i going….
– Ithasbeenconjecturedthatexplainingthisisamajorchallengeforeconomics – ChariKehoeMcGrattan (Econometrica),Mankiw. – KillsmodelsinwhichmovementsinP arekeytomonetarytransmission h i (L i ti d l ti k d l) mechanism(Lucasmisperceptionmodel,purestickywagemodel) – Hasbeenattheheartoftherecentemphasisonstickyprices.
Output,consumption,investment,hoursworkedandcapacityutilization humpshaped
– Interest,moneygrowth,velocityresponsesnotpinneddown.
estimated.
interpretationoftheresponseofinflationtoamonetary shock?
Alternativepossibility:informationconfusionstories.
– AvariantofrecentworkbyRhysMendesthatbuildsonGuido Lorenzoni’s work.
Dark line: detrended actual GDP Thin line: what GDP would have been if there had only Thin line: what GDP would have been if there had only been one type of technology shock, the type that affects only the capital goods industry Th h k h ff t b t t t ibl i t t These shocks have some effect, but not terribly important
Type of technology shock that affects Type of technology shock that affects all industries This has very large impact on broad trends in the d t d ll i t b i l data, and a smaller impact on business cycles. Has big impact on trend in data, and 2000 boom-bust Monetary policy shocks have a big impact on 1980 ‘Volcker big impact on 1980 Volcker recession’ All three shocks together account for large part of business cycle
Variable BP(8,32) Output 86 Output
18
86 Money Growth
11
23 Inflation 33
17
Fed Funds
16
52 Capacity Util.
16
51
17
76 Real Wage
16
44 Consumption
21
89 Investment
16
69 Velocity 29 Velocity
16
29 Price of investment goods
16
11
d d (‘ ’) d l
– Modelfeatures. – EstimationofmodelusingimpulseresponsesfromSVAR’s.
betweenmicroandmacrodata.
– MacroEvidence:
pp gg
– MicroEvidence:
Bil Kl N k St i t id f f i
changeatmicrolevel:511months.
Firm Sector
Final Good, Competitive Fims
Intermediate Good Producer 1 Intermediate Good Producer 2 Intermediate Good Producer infinity … … … … .. Competitive M arket Competitive M arket for Homogeneous Labor For Homogeneous Capital Homogeneous Labor Input Household 1 Househo ld infinity Househo ld 2
Evidence from Midrigan, ‘Menu Costs, Multi-Product Firms, and Aggregate Fluctuations’ Lot’s of small changes Hi t f l (P /P ) diti l i dj t t f t d t t Histograms of log(Pt/Pt-1), conditional on price adjustment, for two data sets pooled across all goods/stores/months in sample.
Utilization.
at financial intermediary and cash to be used in consumption atfinancialintermediaryandcashtobeusedinconsumption transactions.
c t
1 Rt/t1
‘Standard’ Preferences
c c Data! t t
– RisingConsumption(problem) F lli Sl f C ti – FallingSlopeofConsumption
Habit parameter
– MarginalUtilityFunctionofSlope ofConsumption – HumpShapeConsumptionResponseNotaPuzzle
I t
I
– SetswagessubjecttoCalvo frictions. Given specified wage household must supply – Givenspecifiedwage,householdmustsupply whateverquantityoflaborisdemanded.
1 w dj
w 1
Firm Sector
Final Good, Competitive Fims
Intermediate Good Producer 1 Intermediate Good Producer 2 Intermediate Good Producer infinity … … … … .. Competitive M arket Competitive M arket for Homogeneous Labor For Homogeneous Capital Homogeneous Labor Input Household 1 Househo ld infinity Househo ld 2
L b l Nominal Labor supply Nominal wage, W Shock Firms use a lot of Labor because it’s ‘cheap’ cheap . Households must supply that labor Labor demand Quantity of labor
TABLE 2: ESTIMATED PARAMETER VALUES 1 Model f w
b S
0.17
1.35
0.06
.75
0.32
.32
0.18
0.06
0.04
0.80
2.15
4.85
0.27
0.77
reportedinJPE(2005)basedonstudyingonlymonetary policy shocks policyshocks
1
– Atpointestimates:
p 0.58, 1 1 p 2.38 quarters
wantstickywages!
TABLE 3 ESTIMATED PARAMETER VALUES TABLE 3: ESTIMATED PARAMETER VALUES 2 M M z z xz cz cz
p
c c
p
Benchmark Model
0.12
0.10
0.10
0.31
0.03
.91
0.02
0.05
0.22
0.36
1.55
3.68
1.22
2.49
0.52
0.24
0.06
0.17
0.07
0.91
0.57
0.10
0.65
0.63
troublesome
– roleofmonetarypolicyintransmissionoftechnology shocks shocks – Roleofmonetarypolicyinassetpricevolatility
– Gainpowertotestmodelbydevelopingitsmicro implications implications. – Whatarecrosssectionalimplicationsofmodelfor pricesandquantitiesatthefirmlevel?
Yt
1
itYit
1 f
f
di 1 iid i
Yit itKit
ztLit1
it~iid across i
– Modelhasnoimplicationsforunemployment, p p y , vacancies,hoursworked,peopleemployed, separations,etc. – Stickywagesinmodelsubjectto‘Barrocritiqueof stickywages’ y g
– Financialmarketsarenotasourceofshocksor propagation. C t k ‘ h t h ld t th it d i – Cannotask:‘whatshouldmonetaryauthoritydoin responsetoincreaseininterestratespreads?’
k f l h l d l k l
tobestronglyaffectedbydetailsofthetimingofwage setting.
M st disting ish bet een intensi e (ho rs) and e tensi e – Mustdistinguishbetweenintensive(hours)andextensive (employment)margin. Barro critique applies to idea that wage frictions matter in the – Barrocritiqueappliestoideathatwagefrictionsmatterinthe intensivemargin. – Does not apply to idea that wage frictions matter for extensive Doesnotapplytoideathatwagefrictionsmatterforextensive margin.
Firm Sector
Final Good, Competitive Fims
Intermediate Good Producer 1 Intermediate Good Producer 2 Intermediate Good Producer infinity … … … … .. Competitive M arket Competitive M arket for Homogeneous Labor For Homogeneous Capital Homogeneous Labor Input Household 1 Househo ld infinity Househo ld 2
Firms Employment agency Employment Labor Market Employment agency LaborMarket Undirected search Unemployment Employment agency Undirected search endogenous vacancies Households Unemployment g y Endogenous and exogenous separation
N b f l d
Number of employed workers in cohort i
Et
l
c logCtl bCtl1 tl h AL N1 i,tl1L
1 L Ltl
i
,
hours per worker in cohort i
l0 i0 L
hours per worker in cohort i
1 LtPt
cbuzt N1
Wt
iLt ii,t 1 t y
1 w
1 t
E h k i Stock of employees in each agency reduced by exogenous separations increased by new arrivals Each worker experiences idiosyncratic, iid productivity shock. Least efficient are cut: Agency employees Vacancies posted increased by new arrivals Shocks realized
surplus criterion Agency employees sent to work t t+1 t Wages set
Hours worked set according to an efficiency criterion: solve
max
wt V0wt UttJwt1t
y Marginal value of worker to agency = marginal cost of labor for worker
labor for worker
E h k i Each worker experiences idiosyncratic, iid productivity shock. Least efficient are cut:
Bargaining internalizes
surplus criterion
internalizes natureofthe job
t t+1 t Wages set
Hours worked set according to an efficiency criterion: solve
max
wt V0wt UttJwt1t
y Marginal value of worker to agency = marginal cost of labor for worker
labor for worker
StandardModel Firms
consumption Investment goods
Firms
Investment goods Supply labor Rent capital
Households
Backyardcapitalaccumulation:
Kt1 1 Kt GKt,It.
Saversandinvestorsarethesame:NOFRICTIONS!
u t Etu t 1 Rt1
k
Rt1
k
k 1Pk,t1
uc,t Etuc,t1 t1 Rt1
Pk,t
Money
Savers Have money, but Investors (‘entrepreneurs’) a e
no ideas Have ideas, but not enough money.
Money
Savers Have money, but Investors (‘entrepreneurs’) a e
no ideas Problem: ‘stuff’ happens.
Incentive of entrepreneurs to under-report earnings
Vt1 real earnings on capital (rent plus capital gains)t i l t f i t t nominal rate of interestt1 t real debt to bankst1 Net Wortht1 Vt1 Wt1
e 1 Wt1 e
Firms Labor L K Entrepreneurs Labor market Capital Producers C I Producers household
Firms Labor Entrepreneurs Labor market Capital Producers K ’ Producers household banks Loan s
iid i i t i ti t
t1
iid, univariate innovation to t
ut t
0 t1 1
...t8
8
ti
i
~iid, Eti
i 2 i 2
ti
i
~piece of ut observed at time t i
log
Nt1 Pt
t logper capita hourst l
per capita creditt
log
p p
t
Pt
logper capita GDPt log
Wt Pt
logper capita It Xt log
per capita M1t Pt
log
per capita M3t Pt
logper capita consumptiont E t l Fi P i , External Finance Premiumt Rt
long Rt e
Rt
e
logPI,t logreal oil price
logreal oil pricet log
per capita Bank Reserves t Pt
– importantsourceoffluctuations. – newsontheriskshockimportant
h h b fl h l h b l
propagation. M d d d h i f d i i id
– relativelyunimportantasasourceofshocks – modestcontributiontoforecastability
structure.
BVARandsimplermodels.
Actual data versus what actual data would have been if there were only risk Shocks: Note: (1) as suggested by the picture, risk shocks are relatively important at the lower frequencies (2) We find that they are the single most important source of low frequency (2) We find that they are the single most important source of low frequency fluctuation in the EA, and a close second (after permanent tech shocks) in the US
Table: Variance Decomposition, HP filtered data, EA x shock
consumption investment hours inflation labor productivity interest rate f 15.02 23.05 2.63 16.37 35.74 1.40 20.46 x b 0.59 1.29 0.02 0.44 0.52 1.44 0.24
0.01 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.04
Markup Banking tech Capital tech
0.01 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.04
0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 g 3.26 3.11 0.00 3.34 0.87 0.21 0.48 z
1.16 0.24 1.42 1.07 10.29 0.72
0 06 0 92 0 80 0 24 1 52 0 30
Capital tech Money demand Government Permanent tech Gamma shock
0.06 0.92 0.80 0.24 1.52 0.30
21.68 0.49 7.46 16.10 27.52 8.56 policy 6.22 11.27 1.01 4.14 5.40 0.10 33.15
0.19 5.11 6.57 0.88 13.17 1.08
1 81 38 09 15 96 9 22 38 24 9 80
Gamma shock Temporary tech Monetary policy Risk, contemp Si l i k
signal 20.09 1.81 38.09 15.96 9.22 38.24 9.80 and signal 22.96 2.00 43.20 22.53 10.09 51.41 10.88 c 11.68 32.75 0.15 12.20 11.26 0.83 10.15 i 24.57 1.72 51.14 30.69 10.17 5.22 11.56
Signals on risk Risk and signals Discount rate Marginal eff of I P i f il
0.42 1.39 0.03 0.24 2.21 0.04 1.32 long 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 measurement error 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.26 inflation target 0.24 0.43 0.05 0.16 6.23 0.01 0.87
Price of oil Long rate error
all shocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table: Variance Decomposition, HP filtered data, EA x shock
consumption investment hours inflation labor productivity interest rate f 15.02 23.05 2.63 16.37 35.74 1.40 20.46 x b 0.59 1.29 0.02 0.44 0.52 1.44 0.24
0.01 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.04
Markup Banking tech Capital tech
0.01 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.04
0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 g 3.26 3.11 0.00 3.34 0.87 0.21 0.48 z
1.16 0.24 1.42 1.07 10.29 0.72
0 06 0 92 0 80 0 24 1 52 0 30
Capital tech Money demand Government Permanent tech Gamma shock
0.06 0.92 0.80 0.24 1.52 0.30
21.68 0.49 7.46 16.10 27.52 8.56 policy 6.22 11.27 1.01 4.14 5.40 0.10 33.15
0.19 5.11 6.57 0.88 13.17 1.08
1 81 38 09 15 96 9 22 38 24 9 80
Gamma shock Temporary tech Monetary policy Risk, contemp Si l i k
signal 20.09 1.81 38.09 15.96 9.22 38.24 9.80 and signal 22.96 2.00 43.20 22.53 10.09 51.41 10.88 c 11.68 32.75 0.15 12.20 11.26 0.83 10.15 i 24.57 1.72 51.14 30.69 10.17 5.22 11.56
Signals on risk Risk and signals Discount rate Marginal eff of I P i f il
0.42 1.39 0.03 0.24 2.21 0.04 1.32 long 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 measurement error 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.26 inflation target 0.24 0.43 0.05 0.16 6.23 0.01 0.87
Price of oil Long rate error
all shocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Table: Variance Decomposition, HP filtered data, EA x shock
consumption investment hours inflation labor productivity interest rate f 15.02 23.05 2.63 16.37 35.74 1.40 20.46 x b 0.59 1.29 0.02 0.44 0.52 1.44 0.24
0.01 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.04
Markup Banking tech Capital tech
0.01 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.04
0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 g 3.26 3.11 0.00 3.34 0.87 0.21 0.48 z
1.16 0.24 1.42 1.07 10.29 0.72
0 06 0 92 0 80 0 24 1 52 0 30
Capital tech Money demand Government Permanent tech Gamma shock
0.06 0.92 0.80 0.24 1.52 0.30
21.68 0.49 7.46 16.10 27.52 8.56 policy 6.22 11.27 1.01 4.14 5.40 0.10 33.15
0.19 5.11 6.57 0.88 13.17 1.08
1 81 38 09 15 96 9 22 38 24 9 80
Gamma shock Temporary tech Monetary policy Risk, contemp Si l i k
signal 20.09 1.81 38.09 15.96 9.22 38.24 9.80 and signal 22.96 2.00 43.20 22.53 10.09 51.41 10.88 c 11.68 32.75 0.15 12.20 11.26 0.83 10.15 i 24.57 1.72 51.14 30.69 10.17 5.22 11.56
Signals on risk Risk and signals Discount rate Marginal eff of I P i f il
0.42 1.39 0.03 0.24 2.21 0.04 1.32 long 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 measurement error 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.26 inflation target 0.24 0.43 0.05 0.16 6.23 0.01 0.87
Price of oil Long rate error
all shocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Table: Variance Decomposition, HP filtered data, EA x shock
consumption investment hours inflation labor productivity interest rate f 15.02 23.05 2.63 16.37 35.74 1.40 20.46 x b 0.59 1.29 0.02 0.44 0.52 1.44 0.24
0.01 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.04
0.01 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.04
0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 g 3.26 3.11 0.00 3.34 0.87 0.21 0.48 z
1.16 0.24 1.42 1.07 10.29 0.72
0 06 0 92 0 80 0 24 1 52 0 30
0.06 0.92 0.80 0.24 1.52 0.30
21.68 0.49 7.46 16.10 27.52 8.56 policy 6.22 11.27 1.01 4.14 5.40 0.10 33.15
0.19 5.11 6.57 0.88 13.17 1.08
1 81 38 09 15 96 9 22 38 24 9 80
It’s the
signal 20.09 1.81 38.09 15.96 9.22 38.24 9.80 and signal 22.96 2.00 43.20 22.53 10.09 51.41 10.88 c 11.68 32.75 0.15 12.20 11.26 0.83 10.15 i 24.57 1.72 51.14 30.69 10.17 5.22 11.56
It s the signals!
0.42 1.39 0.03 0.24 2.21 0.04 1.32 long 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 measurement error 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.26 inflation target 0.24 0.43 0.05 0.16 6.23 0.01 0.87 all shocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table: Variance Decomposition, HP filtered data, EA x shock stock market credit spread term structure real M1 real M3 shock stock market credit spread term structure real M1 real M3 f 1.83 13.15 0.16 12.36 44.28 1.82 x b 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.10 5.04 42.39
0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02
Markup Banking tech Capital tech
0.00 0.00 0.00 13.17 22.63 g 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.44 0.02 z
0.07 0.05 0.14 0.42 1.29
25 82 1 86 0 33 0 13 0 15
Money demand Government Permanent tech Gamma shock
25.82 1.86 0.33 0.13 0.15
4.06 0.00 3.40 9.89 0.61 policy 4.89 1.81 0.99 25.76 13.15 1.58
5.07 20.58 0.97 1.39 0.76
Gamma shock Temporary tech Monetary policy Risk, contemp
signal 68.29 44.23 75.90 6.79 5.98 6.20 and signal 82.22 49.30 96.48 7.76 7.38 6.96 c 0.02 1.72 0.02 3.99 2.46 15.40 1 90 2 54 0 27 8 77 1 18 6 17
Signals on risk Risk and signals Discount rate Marginal eff of I
i 1.90 2.54 0.27 8.77 1.18 6.17
0.14 0.94 0.05 0.56 1.87 0.15 long 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.05 0.00 0.00 measurement error 2.89 0.19 0.02 0.32 0.21 0.02
Marginal eff of I Price of oil Error in long rate
inflation target 0.24 0.10 0.05 0.34 0.35 0.80 all shocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table: Variance Decomposition, HP filtered data, EA x shock stock market credit spread term structure real M1 real M3 shock stock market credit spread term structure real M1 real M3 f 1.83 13.15 0.16 12.36 44.28 1.82 x b 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.10 5.04 42.39
0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02
Markup Banking tech Capital tech
0.00 0.00 0.00 13.17 22.63 g 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.44 0.02 z
0.07 0.05 0.14 0.42 1.29
25 82 1 86 0 33 0 13 0 15
Money demand Government Permanent tech Gamma shock
25.82 1.86 0.33 0.13 0.15
4.06 0.00 3.40 9.89 0.61 policy 4.89 1.81 0.99 25.76 13.15 1.58
5.07 20.58 0.97 1.39 0.76
Gamma shock Temporary tech Monetary policy Risk, contemp
signal 68.29 44.23 75.90 6.79 5.98 6.20 and signal 82.22 49.30 96.48 7.76 7.38 6.96 c 0.02 1.72 0.02 3.99 2.46 15.40 1 90 2 54 0 27 8 77 1 18 6 17
Signals on risk Risk and signals Discount rate Marginal eff of I
i 1.90 2.54 0.27 8.77 1.18 6.17
0.14 0.94 0.05 0.56 1.87 0.15 long 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.05 0.00 0.00 measurement error 2.89 0.19 0.02 0.32 0.21 0.02
Marginal eff of I Price of oil Error in long rate Signal matters!
inflation target 0.24 0.10 0.05 0.34 0.35 0.80 all shocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
News Specification on Risk and Marginal Likelihood (EA data)
1 2 p
t1 t0 t1
1
t2
2
...tp
p
p log, marginal likelihood odds (exp(difference in log likelihood from baseline)) 8 (baseline) 4397.487 1 ( ) 6 4394.025 31 1 4325.584
Differencebetweentheyieldonthelowestratedcorporatebonds(Baa)andthehighestrated corporate bonds (Aaa) corporatebonds(Aaa)
Actual data Euro Area US Data under the assumption that only the monetary policy shock was
Table: Variance Decomposition, HP filtered data, EA x shock stock market credit spread term structure real M1 real M3 shock stock market credit spread term structure real M1 real M3 f 1.83 13.15 0.16 12.36 44.28 1.82 x b 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.10 5.04 42.39
0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02
Markup Banking tech Capital tech
0.00 0.00 0.00 13.17 22.63 g 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.44 0.02 z
0.07 0.05 0.14 0.42 1.29
25 82 1 86 0 33 0 13 0 15
Money demand Government Permanent tech Gamma shock
25.82 1.86 0.33 0.13 0.15
4.06 0.00 3.40 9.89 0.61 policy 4.89 1.81 0.99 25.76 13.15 1.58
5.07 20.58 0.97 1.39 0.76
Gamma shock Temporary tech Monetary policy Risk, contemp
signal 68.29 44.23 75.90 6.79 5.98 6.20 and signal 82.22 49.30 96.48 7.76 7.38 6.96 c 0.02 1.72 0.02 3.99 2.46 15.40 1 90 2 54 0 27 8 77 1 18 6 17
Signals on risk Risk and signals Discount rate Marginal eff of I
i 1.90 2.54 0.27 8.77 1.18 6.17
0.14 0.94 0.05 0.56 1.87 0.15 long 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.05 0.00 0.00 measurement error 2.89 0.19 0.02 0.32 0.21 0.02
Marginal eff of I Price of oil Error in long rate
inflation target 0.24 0.10 0.05 0.34 0.35 0.80 all shocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Baseline model with no Fisher Effect Baseline model Blue line: baseline model with no financial frictions
– riskshock. – Fisherdebtdeflation
When there is an increase in risk spreads how should – Whenthereisanincreaseinriskspreads,howshould monetarypolicyrespond? – Howshouldmonetarypolicyreacttocreditvariables y p y andthestockmarket?