SLIDE 1 Intuitive Generosity and Error Prone Inference from Response Time
María P. Recalde1 Arno Riedl2 Lise Vesterlund1
1University of Pittsburgh 2Maastricht University
October 18, 2013
SLIDE 2
Motivation
When called upon to help others, is our instinctive, fast, gut reaction to help or to be selfish?
◮ Are we as individuals tempted to do good?
Existing work is consistent with temptation motives for giving
◮ DellaVigna, List, Malmendier (2012) ◮ Andreoni, Rao, Trachtman (2012)
Unclear how we can identify the intuitive response
◮ Rand, Greene, Nowak (2012) use decision time
SLIDE 3
Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)
4-person linear VCM, $0.40 endowment, mpcr=0.5, AMT Replicated by Lotito et al (2012) and Nielsen et al (2012)
SLIDE 4
The linear VCM
Can confound error with other-regarding preferences
◮ Location of the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium ◮ Location of efficiency maximizing strategy
Problematic if error correlates with response time
◮ Kocher & Sutter (2006) ◮ Rubinstein (2007), Agranov, Caplin, Tergiman (2012)
SLIDE 5 Our study
Research questions:
- 1. Is the correlation between generosity and decision time robust
to changes in the strategic environment?
- 2. Could decision error be playing a role?
Experiment:
◮ 4 person piece-wise linear VCM
unique interior Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies unique interior efficiency maximizing outcome
◮ between-subject design with two treatments
vary the location of the interior Nash equilibrium
SLIDE 6
Experimental design
Treatment Equilibrium contribution Low $3.00 out of $10.00 High $7.00 out of $10.00
Constant in both treatments:
◮ Individual endowment ($10.00), group size (4) ◮ Efficiency maximizing contribution ($9.00) ◮ Equilibrium payoffs ◮ Payoffs of contributing $0.00 and $10.00 ◮ Unit cost of deviation between giving $3.00 and $7.00
SLIDE 7
Implementation
◮ Neutral instructions without payoff information ◮ Tutorial on how to read a payoff table ◮ Actual payoff table presented on decision screen ◮ Response time measured since decision screen is displayed ◮ Two parts in a session
Part 1: one-time contribution decision Part 2: 10 repeated decisions with random rematching Same payoff table, one part randomly chosen for payment
SLIDE 8 Results - Part 1
Histogram of contribution decisions by treatment
.1 .2 .3 .4 share per treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 contribution
Low High
SLIDE 9 Do we replicate Rand, Greene, and Nowak’s findings?
OLS regression of contribution on response time
Low response time
(0.016) Constant 6.024*** (0.000) N 80
Note: P-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
- Dep. Var.: Contribution to group account
SLIDE 10 Scatter plot of contribution and response time
50 100 150 200 250 300 2 4 6 8 10
Low
response time (seconds) contirbution
50 100 150 200 250 300
SLIDE 11 Does the correlation change with treatment?
OLS regression of contribution on response time and treatment
Low High All response time
0.016**
(0.016) (0.013) (0.010) High
(0.732) High x response time 0.035*** (0.001) Constant 6.024*** 5.819*** 6.024*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Total effect decision time: High 0.016** (0.018) N 80 80 160
Note: P-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
- Dep. Var.: Contribution to group account
Treatments
determinants of response time
SLIDE 12 Scatter plot of contribution and response time
50 100 150 200 250 300 2 4 6 8 10
Low
response time (seconds) contirbution
50 100 150 200 250 300 2 4 6 8 10
High
contribution
SLIDE 13
Contributions made by fast and slow decision makers
SLIDE 14
Contributions made by fast and slow decision makers
SLIDE 15 Contributions made by fast and slow decision makers
.1 .2 .3 share of treatment
Low High
Mistakes
fast slow
.1 .2 .3 share of treatment
Low High
Nash equilibrium
fast slow
.1 .2 .3 share of treatment
Low High
Midpoint of strategy space
fast slow
.1 .2 .3 share of treatment
Low High
Efficiency maximizing contribution
fast slow
SLIDE 16 Results - Part 2
Frequency of equilibrium play by period and treatment
.2 .4 .6 .8
percent frequency
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
period
Low High
SLIDE 17 Contributions - Part 2
Mean and median contribution by period and treatment
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 contribution 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 period
mean, Low C.I. mean, Low median, Low mean, High C.I. mean, High median, High
SLIDE 18 Response time - Part 2
Median response time by period and treatment
10 20 30 40 response time (seconds) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 period
Low High
SLIDE 19 Correlation between contribution and response time
OLS regression of contribution on response time
decision time 0.014 0.022 0.014 (0.340) (0.278) (0.261) period
0.047*
(0.047) (0.052) (0.010) High NE 2.143*** (0.003) High NE X decision time 0.009 (0.668) High NE X period 0.115*** (0.002) Constant 4.082*** 6.225*** 4.082*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) Total effect decision time: High NE 0.022 (0.196) Total effect period: High NE 0.047** (0.012) R-squared 0.041 0.025 0.506 N 800 800 1600 Low NE High NE All Treatment
determinants of decision time
SLIDE 20 Contributions made by fast and slow decision makers
Mean contribution by response time in part 1
3 4 5 6 7 contribution
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
period fast in part 1, Low slow in part 1, Low fast in part 1, High slow in part 1, High
SLIDE 21 Response time of fast and slow decision makers
Median response time
20 40 60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Low High
fast in part 1 slow in part 1 fast in part 1 slow in part 1
response time (seconds)
period
SLIDE 22
Conclusion
◮ The correlation between choices and response time changes
with features of the decision environment
◮ Error negatively correlates with response time ◮ Potential explanation for mixed evidence in the literature
Piovesan and Wengstrom (2008), Fiedler et al (2013) Tinghog et al (2013), Rand et al (2013) Matthey and Regner (2010)
◮ Caution warranted when making inferences about preferences
from response time
SLIDE 23
Thank you
SLIDE 24 Payoff table - Low treatment
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SLIDE 25 Payoff table - High treatment
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SLIDE 26 Screen shot - Tutorial
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SLIDE 27 Determinants of response time, part 1
Low High All % tutorial correct 22.121 30.526 22.121 (0.328) (0.165) (0.331) experiments
(0.125) (0.148) (0.126) econ courses 1.175 5.763*** 1.175 (0.396) (0.004) (0.398) High
(0.779) High x % tutorial correct 8.404 (0.789) High x experiments
(0.883) High x econ courses 4.588* (0.055) Constant
(0.972) (0.667) (0.972) Age and gender controls Yes Yes Yes N 80 80 160
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SLIDE 28 Determinants of response time, part 2
Low High All period
- 1.564***
- 1.249**
- 1.573***
(0.004) (0.021) (0.000) % past equilibrium play 1.422 3.377* 1.835** (0.213) (0.075) (0.020) mean contribution others
0.353
(0.843) (0.215) (0.816) experiments
(0.031) (0.045) (0.005) High
(0.599) High x period 0.322 (0.338) High x % past equilibrium play 1.142 (0.330) High x mean contribution others 0.484 (0.439) High x experiments 0.142 (0.114) Constant 15.762 9.532 15.639 (0.178) (0.394) (0.100) Age and gender controls Yes Yes Yes Econ training and tutorial controls Yes Yes Yes N 800 800 1600
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