Intrusion Detection Using Monitor Information Fusion
Student: Atul Bohara P.I.: William H. Sanders
Intrusion Detection Using Monitor Information Fusion Student: Atul - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Intrusion Detection Using Monitor Information Fusion Student: Atul Bohara P.I.: William H. Sanders Previous Work [1] Intrusion detection by combining and clustering diverse monitor data System Logs Firewall Logs Feature extraction Cluster
Student: Atul Bohara P.I.: William H. Sanders
Intrusion detection by combining and clustering diverse monitor data
Intrusion Detection in Enterprise Systems by Combining and Clustering Diverse Monitor Data. Atul Bohara, Uttam Thakore, William H. Sanders. In Proceedings of the 2016 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security (HotSoS '16)
System Logs Firewall Logs
Host-level and network-level context Feature extraction and selection Cluster analysis and prioritization
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1 3 4 5 6 Entry Point Host 1 Host 2 Host 3 Host 4 Host 5 Target Host
Lateral movement detection using distributed data fusion
C1 C2 C1 ▷ C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 2 C2 ▷ C3 C3 ▷ C4 C4 ▷ C5 C5 ▷ C6 Cluster1 ▷ C4 Cluster2 ▷ C6
Lateral Movement Detection Using Distributed Data Fusion. Ahmed Fawaz, Atul Bohara, Carmen Cheh, William H. Sanders. In Proceedings of 35th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2016).
Proactive detection of advanced attacks through fusion
attack, are correlated. By combining the evidences of different attack stages, we can increase the confidence in the detection of overall attack
a possible data exfiltration attack
Recon Initial Entry Establish C&C Lateral Movement Identify Targets Actions on Target
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Integrity Service Excellence
Chris Cai PI: Professor Roy Campbell
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CRONets: Cloud-Routed Overlay Networks
user expect to get from leveraging public cloud service to build overlay network, as opposed from other resource providers like ISPs.
corresponding to particular demands of different applications.
experimental studies, but in a realistic-cloud-setting?
problem?
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Measurement Testbed
IBM Softlayer as cloud provider to provide overlay nodes.
locations of overlay nodes.
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Contributions
to best leverage the available commercial cloud network resources to meet their specific network requirement.
tolerant transmission layer to help application surviving network failures.
datacenter transmission mechanism to be “CRONets-friendly”.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN | ENGINEERING AT ILLINOIS | INFORMATION TRUST INSTITUTE
Advisor: Professor Iyer, Professor Kalbarczyk
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN | ENGINEERING AT ILLINOIS | INFORMATION TRUST INSTITUTE
under limited observation on the environment as a signaling game, and studying the effectiveness of the optimized decisions
– That the signaling game can reason the decisions of the attacker – Worst case scenarios for the defender – Promising evaluation results compared to the common approach
– Comparison with more advanced mitigation methods or other attack models – Deployment to a real system w/ real monitors and responses
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN | ENGINEERING AT ILLINOIS | INFORMATION TRUST INSTITUTE
security of the ICS systems to attack a well hardened computing infrastructure that requires advanced environmental control
– Campus / Building / Cooling cabinet level – Interdependency between the systems
– Three failure scenarios with possibility of the attacker replaying through alteration in the monitoring / control system
– Formulation of the attack model – Mitigation methods (Bro IDS, etc.)
Lavin Devnani
PROJECT GOALS
▸ Extend QEMU (Quick Emulator) to emulate Intel VT-x instruction set ▸ Run a hypervisor + guest OS in emulated
▸ Support future security and reliability projects
Future Applications
▸ Taint analysis of VT-x ▸ Taint analysis + Symbolic execution ▸ Profiling existing hypervisors ▸ Prototyping new hypervisors ▸ Extension of VMX functionality
Carlo Di Giulio (cdigiul2@illinos.edu) Masooda Bashir (mn@illinois.edu)
09/21/2016
5/22/2016 2
January 4 The project starts April 13 ACC Seminar June 8 First paper submission
Goals:
Cloud Environments
vendors
3 Pillars:
policies
and third pillar
certifications and standards
5/22/2016
Evaluation of the impact and relevance of Privacy and Security certifications for Cloud Services Deeper understanding of vendors’ commitment in promoting information assurance Suggestion of improvements to current standards and guidelines
5/22/2016 4
ISO27001:2005 and 2013 FedRAMP Moderate and High baseline (DoD Lev 2-4) AICPA SOC2 (TSPC 2014 and 2016) BSI Cloud Computing Compliance Control Criteria (C5)
Konstantin Evchenko, Read Sprabery, Abhilash Raj*, Sibin Mohan, Rakesh Bobba*, Roy H. Campbell University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign *Oregon State University
environment
Flush+Reload)
(e.g. cryptographic keys)
infrastructures, both in a lab and real world environments
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3
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App 1 App 3 App 4 App 2 App 4 App 1 App 3 App 4 Core 1 Core 2 Cache Partition 1 (Shared) Cache Partition 2 (Protected) Core 3 App 1 App 2 App 4 App 3
Organization 1 App Organization 2 App Organization 3 App Organization 1 App Organization 2 App Organization 3 App LLC Flush
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App 1 App 3 App 4 App 2 App 2 App 3 App 4 Core 3 Core 4 Cache Partition 2 (Protected)
Organization 1 App Organization 2 App Organization 3 App LLC Flush
○ If no apps from the same org are available, schedule from other orgs ○ No flushing ○ Might leak some information, but not enough to enable the attack
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multiple layers of the stack including hardware, hypervisor, kernel, compiler and application layer. ○ Hardware supported isolation and sandboxes ○ Novel scheduling techniques for increased isolation and performance ○ Monitoring techniques to detect compromises and protect containers from both co-tenants and host
Presenter: Mainak Ghosh Collaborators: Le Xu, Thomas Kao, Xiaoyao Qian, Indranil Gupta
design replication, caching and load balancing strategies
large network overhead
segment popularity to define replication, caching and load balancing strategies.
improving throughput
while using our adaptive replication scheme
measure their effect
Kirill Mechitov, Atul Sandur, and Gul Agha
cloud spaces
provider, app developer, user
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security of mobile actor-based applications
identify malicious code
hybrid mobile-cloud spaces with security-aware priority management
deployment configurations
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Application Component Distribution
Elasticity Manager
Application actions Network parameters User context Application profiling Energy estimator
System Properties
Application Target Goal
Org/App/User Policy System Monitor Policy Manager
Target goal Profiled exec Profiled comm
Offloading Plan Decision Maker
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reconfiguration
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Imani Palmer Department of Computer Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Roy Campbell Department of Computer Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Cloud is composed of a large number of components vulnerable to attacks Systems generate an enormous amount of digital evidence Incident responders/examiners determine the cause of the intrusion Analysis of digital evidence remains highly subjective to the forensic practitioner
The digital forensic investigative process is marred by its lack of knowledge, accreditation, and human bias.
Google Search History Chat logs Email Photos Internet Activity Logs Executable Programs Internet Protocols Address Financial Asset Records Address Books Telephone Records Maps Movie Files Images Configuration Files
Analysis Toolkit
This actor took action X is supported by facts with strength and quantity Objective Analysis Provide quantitative assessments to detect user actions
Single-Session Sign On
Access Resource Authentication Challenge
B C
Username & Password
D
Hash Password
A E
Hash to Server
F
Server Checks Hash
G
Access Granted
H
Credential Theft Attacks
Access Resource Authentication Challenge
B C
Username & Password
D
Hash Password
A E
Hash to Server
F
Server Checks Hash
G
Access Granted
H
Evidence A Evidence B Evidence C Evidence D Evidence E Evidence F Evidence G Evidence H Action 1 Action 2 Action 3
Extract Events Define Relationships Construct Mappings Identify Actions
Implement Framework Run case study evaluations Provide a tool for digital forensic investigators
ASSURED CLOUD COMPUTING CENTER - INFORMATION TRUST INSTITUTE – UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
S tephen S keirik PI: José Meseguer
ASSURED CLOUD COMPUTING CENTER - INFORMATION TRUST INSTITUTE – UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Introduction
– Consistency – Latency – S ecurity requirements before being fully built saves time and money
techniques can both be used to verify distributed systems meet such requirements
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ASSURED CLOUD COMPUTING CENTER - INFORMATION TRUST INSTITUTE – UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Proj ect S tatus
explore the behavior of key-value stores, e.g. Cassandra
and verify models of key-value stores in reachability logic
concurrent systems with recursive behavior (as a generalization of both Hoare and S eparation logic)
verifying mutual exclusion algorithms
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ASSURED CLOUD COMPUTING CENTER - INFORMATION TRUST INSTITUTE – UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Future Outlook
– Modeling and verifying a selection of distributed key-value stores (e.g. Cassandra and G-DUR are potential targets) – Using the ACC case studies to improve the effectiveness
systems (esp. heuristics and techniques for handling undecidable theories)
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Student: Uttam Thakore P.I.: William H. Sanders
Deployment
detection goals and minimize monitoring cost
deployment based on intrusion detection goals and cost requirements
and Clustering Diverse Monitor Data
level security logs to identify potentially malicious behavior without administrator labeling
would promote earlier investigation and detection of incidents
alerts with temporal lag are likely useful for detection
strength of correlation and administrator security requirements
Contribution: Can be used to more effectively monitor clouds for security, reliability, and performance incidents
to classify and track behavior of hosts over time and identify likely malicious behavior in early stages
strongly separate behavior classes in heterogeneous logs
Contribution: Can be used to more effectively detect advanced intrusions in clouds