Inflation and the Theory of the Phillips Curve Thomas I. Palley - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

inflation and the theory of the phillips curve
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Inflation and the Theory of the Phillips Curve Thomas I. Palley - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Inflation and the Theory of the Phillips Curve Thomas I. Palley New America Foundation Washington DC E-mail:mail@thomaspalley.com Figure 1. Taxonomy of different types of inflation. Inflation Normal Pathological Demand-pull Conflict


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Inflation and the Theory of the Phillips Curve

Thomas I. Palley New America Foundation Washington DC E-mail:mail@thomaspalley.com

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Figure 1. Taxonomy of different types of inflation.

Inflation Demand-pull inflation Conflict inflation Structuralist imported and bottleneck inflation Hyper- inflation Normal Pathological

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Formation of inflation expectations vs. incorporation of inflation expectations

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Lipsey PC

  • (1.1) w = f(u – u*) f(0) = 0, f’ < 0, f”< 0
  • w = nominal wage inflation;
  • u = actual unemployment rate;
  • u*= rate of unemployment (frictional and

structural) associated with full employment.

  • (1.2) ω = f(u – u*) f(0) = 0, f’ < 0, f” < 0
  • ω = real wage inflation.
  • (1.3) ω = w – π
  • π = rate of price inflation
  • (1.4) w = f(u – u*) + π
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Friedman – Phelps PC

  • Introduce inflation expectations
  • (2.1) w = f(u – u*) + πe
  • πe = expected inflation.
  • (2.2) π = w
  • (2.3) π = f(u – u*) + πe
  • Implications:
  • A) No LR trade-off
  • B) Vertical LRPC that crossed by family of

SRPCs.

  • C) Can keep u < u* if accelerate inflation.
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Figure 2. The Friedman – Phelps Phillips Curve (π2 >π1> 0).

SRPC(πe = 0) SRPC(πe = π1) SRPC(πe = π2) Unemployment (%) π = 0 Inflation (%) LRPC u* π = π1 π = π2

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Lucas PC

  • Replaced AE with RE.
  • Implications:
  • (1) LRPC vertical but no family of SRPCs
  • (2) Cannot keep u < u* by accelerating inflation.
  • Friedman-Phelps-Lucas transformed macro:
  • (1) End of Keynesian discourse about full-emp.
  • (2) Shifted research attention to implications of

expectations for policy.

  • (3) Changed welfare interpretation of lowering

unemp “fooling” workers vs original Keynesian interpretation of reducing involuntary unemployment.

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Tobin PC

  • (3.1) w = f(u – u*) + λπe

0 < λ < 1, f’ < 0, f” < 0

  • (3.2) π = w
  • (3.3) π = f(u – u*) + λπe
  • LR equilibrium condition (πe = π):
  • (3.4) π = f(u – u*)/[1 – λ]
  • Slope = dπ/du = f’/[1 – λ] < 0 if λ < 1.
  • Implications
  • (1) Family of negative sloped SRPCs & LRPC.
  • (2) If have RE just have single LRPC.
  • (3) If have RE LRPC still negatively sloped

shows critical factor = incorporation of inflation expectations , NOT formation of expectations.

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Figure 3. The Tobin neo-Keynesian Phillips Curve (π2 >π1> 0).

SRPC(πe = 0) SRPC(πe = π1) SRPC(πe = π2) Unemployment (%) π = 0 Inflation (%) LRPC u* π = π1 π = π2

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Multi-Sector PC

  • Two challenges to developing PC
  • (1) Why does inflation help improve economic
  • utcomes & welfare?
  • (2) Why is coeff of inflation expectations < 1?
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Figure 4. The problem of demand shocks in a multi- sector economy (sectors A, B)

PriceA PriceB OutputA SA SB OutputB

DA2 DA1 DB1 DB2

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Figure 5. The effect of steady aggregate nominal demand growth multi-sector economy (sectors A, B)

PriceA PriceB OutputA SA SB OutputB

DA2 DA1 DB1 DB2 DA3 DB3

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Multi-Sector PC - 2

  • f(ui – u*) + λπe

ui > u*, 0 < λ < 1,

  • (4.1) wi =
  • f(ui – u*) + πe

ui < u*

  • where i = 1,…, N.
  • (4.2) πe = π
  • (4.3) πi = wi
  • (4.4) w = Σwi/N
  • (4.5) π = Σπi/N
  • (4.6) u = Σui/N
  • (4.7) s = s(u) 0 < s < 1, s’ > 0
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Multi-Sector PC - 3

  • (4.8) w = F(u – u*) + [1 – s(u) + s(u)λ]πe Fu < 0
  • (4.9) π = F(u – u*)/s(u)[1 – λ]
  • dπ/du = {[1 - λ ]F’ + F(u – u*)su}/[1 - λ ]s(u)2 < 0
  • (4.10) Λ = 1 – s(u) + s(u)λ < 1 Λu < 0
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Backward bending PC & near rational expectations

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Backward bending PC & Near Rational Expectations - 1

  • f(u – u*) + πe

R

i = R

  • (5.1) wi =
  • f(u – u*) + πe

NR

i = NR

  • (5.2) πe

R = π

  • = p(π) < π π < πC p’ > 0
  • (5.3) πe

NR

  • = π π > πC
  • (5.4) πi = wi
  • (5.5) w = swNR + [1 – s]wR
  • (5.6) π = sπNR + [1 – s]πR
  • (5.7) s = s(π) 0 < s < 1, s’ < 0
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Backward bending PC & Near Rational Expectations - 2

  • (5.8) πe = s(π)πe

NR + [1 – s(π)]πe R

  • (5.9) π = F(u – u*) + s(π)πe

NR + [1 – s(π)]πe R

  • High inflation regime (π > πC) = all rational
  • (5.10.a) π = F(u – u*) + πe
  • (5.10.b) πe = π
  • Lower inflation regime (π<πC)= some non-rational
  • (5.11) π = F(u – u*) + s(π)p(π) + [1 – s(π)]π
  • dπ/du = F’/[ s(π) + πs’ – s’p(π) – p’s(π)] >

< 0

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Figure 6. The backward bending Phillips curve.

MUR MURI

Inflation (%) Unemployment rate u* π = 0

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Backward bending PC in a multi-sector economy with incomplete incorporation of expectations

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Backward bending PC, multi-sector economy with incomplete incorporation of expectations - 1

  • λ(πe) < 1 πe < πC, λ’ > 0
  • (6.1) λ =
  • 1 πe > πC
  • High inflation regime: πe > πC
  • (6.2) π = F(u – u*) + πe

Fu < 0, πe > πC

  • (6.3) πe = π
  • Lower inflation regime: πe < πC
  • (6.4) π = F(u – u*) + [1 – s(u)]πe + s(u)λ(πe)πe
  • (6.5) πe = π
  • dπ/du = {F’ + s’π[λ(π) – 1]}/s(u){[1 - λ(π)] - πλ’} >

< 0

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Figure 47 The backward bending Phillips curve (LRPC) with adaptive expectations (π2 >π1>π0).

MUR MURI

Inflation (%) Unemployment rate u* π = 0 SRPC(πe = π2) SRPC(πe = π1) SRPC(πe = π0) LRPC

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Near rational expectations vs. Incomplete incorporation of expectations

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Worker militancy, conflict and the Phillips curve

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Worker militancy, conflict and the Phillips curve

  • f(ui – u*) + λπe

ui > u*, 0 < λ < 1,

  • (7.1) wi =
  • f(ui – u*) + πe

ui < u*

  • (7.2) π = πe
  • (7.3) u* = u(ψ) uψ > 0
  • λ(πe, ψ) < 1 πe < πC, λπe > 0, λψ > 0
  • (7.4) λ =
  • 1 πe > πC
  • where ψ = labor militancy variable.
  • = F(u – u*(ψ)) + [1 – s(u) + s(u)λ(πe, ψ)]πe πe < πC
  • (7.5) w
  • = F(u – u*(ψ)) + πe

πe > πC

  • (7.6) π = F(u – u*(ψ))/s(u)[1 – λ(πe, ψ)] πe < πC
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Figure 8. Increased worker militancy shifts the backward bending Phillips curve to the right and lowers the MURI. Unemployment Inflation

MUR1 MUR2 MURI1 MURI2

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Conclusions