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INCLUSIVE FITNESS
HOW NOT TO IMPORT IDEAS FROM CULTURAL EVOLUTION
Hannah Rubin University of Groningen / University of Notre Dame
West et al. (2011)
INCLUSIVE FITNESS HOW NOT TO IMPORT IDEAS FROM CULTURAL EVOLUTION - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
INCLUSIVE FITNESS HOW NOT TO IMPORT IDEAS FROM CULTURAL EVOLUTION - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
INCLUSIVE FITNESS HOW NOT TO IMPORT IDEAS FROM CULTURAL EVOLUTION Hannah Rubin University of Groningen / University of Notre Dame West et al. (2011) EXAMPLE Inclusive fitness: HAMILTONS RULE > 0
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EXAMPLE
- Inclusive fitness:
π π β π
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HAMILTONβS RULE
π π β π > 0
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RELATEDNESS
- Relatedness is a measure of correlation:
π = π π΅ π΅ β π π΅ π
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RELATEDNESS
- Relatedness is a measure of correlation:
π = π π΅ π΅ β π π΅ π
- Intuitively, captures how much an organism values its
social partnerβs reproductive success
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OUTLINE
- 1. Heuristic calculations of inclusive fitness
Joint work with Justin Bruner
- 2. The indispensability of inclusive fitness
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THE HEURISTIC
βInclusive fitness and the problem of honest communicationβ with Justin Bruner
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THE HEURISTIC
- Simple-weighted sum: offspring + partnerβs offspring Γ π
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THE HEURISTIC
- Simple-weighted sum: offspring + partnerβs offspring Γ π
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PROBLEMS
- Double counting ο wrong equilibrium predictions
(Grafen 1979, Skryms 2002, etc.)
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PROBLEMS
- Double counting ο wrong equilibrium predictions
(Grafen 1979, Skryms 2002, etc.)
- Response: gives necessary, but not sufficient conditions to be
an equilibrium (Hines and Maynard Smith 1979)
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PROBLEMS
- Double counting ο wrong equilibrium predictions
(Grafen 1979, Skryms 2002, etc.)
- Response: gives necessary, but not sufficient conditions to be
an equilibrium (Hines and Maynard Smith 1979)
- Does not account for correlations ο wrong likelihood of
- utcomes
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THE HEURISTIC
βRelatedness might, beyond inclusive fitness, introduce additional correlationβ (Zollman 2013, p. 131)
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SIR PHILIP SIDNEY
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SIR PHILIP SIDNEY
- Cost to signal
- Cost to donate
- Probability of being needy
- Benefit to needy > benefit to healthy
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SIR PHILIP SIDNEY
- Cost to signal
- Cost to donate
- Probability of being needy
- Benefit to needy > benefit to healthy
- Model using the heuristic (Huttegger and Zollman 2010)
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- Evolution with
clones
- The heuristic:
signaling unlikely
- Personal fitness:
signaling is the
- nly outcome
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- Evolution with
clones
- The heuristic:
signaling unlikely
- Personal fitness:
signaling is the
- nly outcome
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INDISPENSABILITY
βDoes inclusive fitness save the connection between rational choice and evolution?β
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INDISPENSABILITY
ββ¦it allows social behaviour, even when it is individually costly, to be understood from the perspective of an individual organism βtryingβ to achieve a goal, thus preserving Darwin's insight that selection will lead to the appearance of design in nature.β (Okasha et al. 2014, p. 28)
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MAXIMIZING AGENTS
- Personal fitness cannot do this (Skyrms 1994, Sober 1998, etc.)
- Evolution takes correlations into account
- Rational actors should not (in general) take correlations into
account
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INDISPENSABILITY
βThe individual does not, in general, have full control of its [personal] fitness, as parts of this are mediated by the actions of her social partners. However, the individual does have full control of inclusive fitness, as this is explicitly defined in terms of the fitness consequences for itself and
- thers that arise out of its actionsβ (West and Gardner, 2013,
R579-R580)
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WHAT IS THE DECISION PROBLEM?
- Keeping its social environment fixed:
1. Fixed social neighborhood 2. Fixed relatedness
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FIXED NEIGHBORHOOD
parent social partner
(sibling)
you
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FIXED NEIGHBORHOOD
?
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FIXED NEIGHBORHOOD
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FIXED NEIGHBORHOOD
π π΅ π΅ =
3 10
π π π΅ =
7 10
π π΅ π =
3 10
π π π =
7 10
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FIXED NEIGHBORHOOD
Inclusive Fitness: π π β π
π π΅ π΅ =
3 10
π π π΅ =
7 10
π π΅ π =
3 10
π π π =
7 10
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FIXED RELATEDNESS
- Kith selection: an organismβs trait influences their social
partnerβs trait
you social partner
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FIXED RELATEDNESS
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
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FIXED RELATEDNESS
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FIXED RELATEDNESS
π π΅ π΅ =
8 10
π π π΅ =
2 10
π π΅ π =
2 10
π π π =
8 10
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INDISPENSABILITY?
- We can explain social behavior as adaptive using
inclusive fitness iff we can do so using personal fitness
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SUMMARY
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THANKS!
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SELECTED REFERENCES
- Bruner, J.P. and H. Rubin (forthcoming) Inclusive fitness and the problem of honest communication.
BJPS
- Grafen, A. (1979) The hawk-dove game played between relatives. Animal behaviour, 27:905-907.
- Hines, W. G. S. and J. Maynard Smith (1979) Games between relatives. Journal of Theoretical Biology,
79(1):19-30.
- Huttegger, S. and K. Zollman (2010). Dynamic stability and basins of attraction in the Sir Philip Sidney
- game. Proc. R. Soc. B 277, 1915-1922.
- Okasha, S., J. A. Weymark, and W. Bossert (2014). Inclusive fitness maximization: An axiomatic
- approach. Journal of theoretical biology, 350, 24-31.
- Skyrms, B. (1994). Darwin meets the logic of decision: Correlation in evolutionary game
- theory. Philosophy of Science, 61(4), 503-528.
- Skyrms, B. (2002) Altruism, inclusive fitness, and the logic of decision. Philosophy of Science, 69:S104-
111.
- Sober, E. (1998). Three differences between deliberation and evolution. Modeling rationality,
morality, and evolution (7), 408-22.
- West, S. A., C. El Mouden, and A. Gardner (2011). Sixteen common misconceptions about the
evolution of cooperation in humans. Evolution and Human Behavior 32 (4), 231-262.
- West, S. A. and A. Gardner (2013). Adaptation and inclusive fitness. Current Biology 23 (13), R577-
R584.
- Zollman, K (2013). Finding alternatives to the handicap principle. Biological Theory 8,127-132.