Imagination-based Conditional Belief Christopher Badura R uhr -U niversity B ochum Workshop Doxastic Agency & Epistemic Logic 16th Dec. 2017
Introduction Suppose you’re packing for your vacation and you’re imagining yourself at the beach. Moreover, you imagine that the sun is shining and you’re wearing sun glasses, and you feel the sun burning on your skin. In the real world, you go to the wardrobe, pick your sunglasses and sunscreen and put them in your suit case. Why did you act this way?
Introduction Suppose you’re packing for your vacation and you’re imagining yourself at the beach. Moreover, you imagine that the sun is shining and you’re wearing sun glasses, and you feel the sun burning on your skin. In the real world, you go to the wardrobe, pick your sunglasses and sunscreen and put them in your suit case. Why did you act this way? Natural (?) Explanation, Assumptions ◮ You had an intention to pack your sunglasses ◮ The intention led to the action of packing your sunglasses ◮ Some beliefs have formed this intention
Questions and (claimed) answers Questions 1. Where did the beliefs come from, or how are they justified? 2. What kind of beliefs? My claims 1. The beliefs came from/are justified by imagining 2. The beliefs are conditional beliefs Disclaimers 1. WiP 2. Scope: “reality oriented” imagination [Williamson, 2016] for somewhat idealized agents. 3. Philosophy part is short
Outline Imagination Imagination justifies conditional belief Towards a Formal Semantics Issues and Further Research
Imagination and Agency Many [Dorsch, 2007], [Kind, 2013] [Langland-Hassan, 2016], [van Leeuwen, 2016], [Williamson, 2016] agree that imagination is an instance of agency b/c it has a purpose, it’s voluntary, it’s sometimes intentional action, etc.
Structure of imaginative project ◮ Motivational states generate purpose to represent a certain content
Structure of imaginative project ◮ Motivational states generate purpose to represent a certain content ◮ Initialize: Set out to represent some of the content. Active, Voluntary/direct, Purposeful, can be intentional
Structure of imaginative project ◮ Motivational states generate purpose to represent a certain content ◮ Initialize: Set out to represent some of the content. Active, Voluntary/direct, Purposeful, can be intentional ◮ Unfold: Using mechanisms to enrich the previous content (inference, association). Active (for still purpose-directed), mostly involuntary /indirect, Purposeful, new initializations can happen in this step
Structure of imaginative project ◮ Motivational states generate purpose to represent a certain content ◮ Initialize: Set out to represent some of the content. Active, Voluntary/direct, Purposeful, can be intentional ◮ Unfold: Using mechanisms to enrich the previous content (inference, association). Active (for still purpose-directed), mostly involuntary /indirect, Purposeful, new initializations can happen in this step ◮ Possible Termination: fulfill purpose + represent the desired content successfully/rich enough
Imagination and Epistemic Projects While unfolding (maybe passively) use reliable mechanisms (deductive inference, or other inference) to generate new mental representations. Still imaginative project for overall purpose is to represent certain contents. The subproject can be non-imaginative and purely epistemic, for the representations are not directly determined
Imagination justifies conditional belief Inspired by example and explanation in [Williamson, 2016] 1. a entertains imaginative project with the purpose to represent some content C . The initial episode is A , epistemic unfolding mechanisms, “consequence” B .
Imagination justifies conditional belief Inspired by example and explanation in [Williamson, 2016] 1. a entertains imaginative project with the purpose to represent some content C . The initial episode is A , epistemic unfolding mechanisms, “consequence” B . 2. Then a (implicitly) believes that a entertains that imaginative project
Imagination justifies conditional belief Inspired by example and explanation in [Williamson, 2016] 1. a entertains imaginative project with the purpose to represent some content C . The initial episode is A , epistemic unfolding mechanisms, “consequence” B . 2. Then a (implicitly) believes that a entertains that imaginative project 3. a believes that a imagines A
Imagination justifies conditional belief Inspired by example and explanation in [Williamson, 2016] 1. a entertains imaginative project with the purpose to represent some content C . The initial episode is A , epistemic unfolding mechanisms, “consequence” B . 2. Then a (implicitly) believes that a entertains that imaginative project 3. a believes that a imagines A 4. a believes that the unfolding mechanism is usually reliable
Imagination justifies conditional belief Inspired by example and explanation in [Williamson, 2016] 1. a entertains imaginative project with the purpose to represent some content C . The initial episode is A , epistemic unfolding mechanisms, “consequence” B . 2. Then a (implicitly) believes that a entertains that imaginative project 3. a believes that a imagines A 4. a believes that the unfolding mechanism is usually reliable 5. a believes that a imagines B
Imagination justifies conditional belief Inspired by example and explanation in [Williamson, 2016] 1. a entertains imaginative project with the purpose to represent some content C . The initial episode is A , epistemic unfolding mechanisms, “consequence” B . 2. Then a (implicitly) believes that a entertains that imaginative project 3. a believes that a imagines A 4. a believes that the unfolding mechanism is usually reliable 5. a believes that a imagines B 6. a believes that from A through reliable unfolding, it comes to imagine B
Imagination justifies conditional belief Inspired by example and explanation in [Williamson, 2016] 1. a entertains imaginative project with the purpose to represent some content C . The initial episode is A , epistemic unfolding mechanisms, “consequence” B . 2. Then a (implicitly) believes that a entertains that imaginative project 3. a believes that a imagines A 4. a believes that the unfolding mechanism is usually reliable 5. a believes that a imagines B 6. a believes that from A through reliable unfolding, it comes to imagine B 7. Given the unfolding is a reliable mechanism, a has justification for B , given A .
Imagination justifies conditional belief Inspired by example and explanation in [Williamson, 2016] 1. a entertains imaginative project with the purpose to represent some content C . The initial episode is A , epistemic unfolding mechanisms, “consequence” B . 2. Then a (implicitly) believes that a entertains that imaginative project 3. a believes that a imagines A 4. a believes that the unfolding mechanism is usually reliable 5. a believes that a imagines B 6. a believes that from A through reliable unfolding, it comes to imagine B 7. Given the unfolding is a reliable mechanism, a has justification for B , given A . 8. So, a is justified in believing B , or at least ⋄ B , given A
Back to example ◮ Motivational states: you intend to go to a sunny beach vacation and pack your bag for that ◮ Purpose: Represent the vacation with all the stuff you should bring.
Back to example ◮ Motivational states: you intend to go to a sunny beach vacation and pack your bag for that ◮ Purpose: Represent the vacation with all the stuff you should bring. ◮ Initialize: you imagine yourself on a sunny beach vacation
Back to example ◮ Motivational states: you intend to go to a sunny beach vacation and pack your bag for that ◮ Purpose: Represent the vacation with all the stuff you should bring. ◮ Initialize: you imagine yourself on a sunny beach vacation ◮ Unfold: You imagine (propositionally that) Usually, when it’s sunny on the beach, you wear sunglasses. So you imagine (objectual) yourself wearing sunglasses.
Back to example ◮ Motivational states: you intend to go to a sunny beach vacation and pack your bag for that ◮ Purpose: Represent the vacation with all the stuff you should bring. ◮ Initialize: you imagine yourself on a sunny beach vacation ◮ Unfold: You imagine (propositionally that) Usually, when it’s sunny on the beach, you wear sunglasses. So you imagine (objectual) yourself wearing sunglasses. ◮ Unfold: You imagine (propositionally that) Usually, when it’s sunny on the beach, you wear sunscreen. So you imagine (objectual) yourself wearing sunscreen.
Back to example ◮ Motivational states: you intend to go to a sunny beach vacation and pack your bag for that ◮ Purpose: Represent the vacation with all the stuff you should bring. ◮ Initialize: you imagine yourself on a sunny beach vacation ◮ Unfold: You imagine (propositionally that) Usually, when it’s sunny on the beach, you wear sunglasses. So you imagine (objectual) yourself wearing sunglasses. ◮ Unfold: You imagine (propositionally that) Usually, when it’s sunny on the beach, you wear sunscreen. So you imagine (objectual) yourself wearing sunscreen. ◮ Unfold: You imagine (propositionally that) Given you’re on a sunny beach vacation, usually, you wear sunglasses and sunscreen
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