Lehrstuhl für Netzarchitekturen und Netzdienste
Institut für Informatik Technische Universität München
ilab WLAN Wireless transmission problems Error rate is much higher - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Lehrstuhl fr Netzarchitekturen und Netzdienste Institut fr Informatik Technische Universitt Mnchen ilab WLAN Wireless transmission problems Error rate is much higher Interferences multipath propagation Receiving rate
Lehrstuhl für Netzarchitekturen und Netzdienste
Institut für Informatik Technische Universität München
Ilab - WLAN 2
Wireless transmission problems
Error rate is much higher
Collision detection is difficult
Aim: avoid collisions in the first place
Ilab - WLAN 3
Hidden-Terminals
Exposed-Terminals
C wants to send data to D
and waits
Hidden-Terminals and Exposed-Terminals
B A C B A C D
Ilab - WLAN 4
Infrastructure- vs. Ad-hoc-Network
Infrastructure network Ad-hoc-Netzwork
AP AP AP Wired network AP: Access Point
Ilab - WLAN 5
802.11 – Architecture of an Infrastructure network
Station (STA)
the medium
Basic Service Set (BSS)
frequency Access Point
wireless system Portal
Distribution System
ESS: group of multiple BSS
Distribution System Portal 802.x LAN Access Point 802.11 LAN BSS2 802.11 LAN BSS1 Access Point STA1 STA2 STA3 ESS
Ilab - WLAN 6
802.11 – Layers
PMD - Physical Medium Dependent
PLCP - Physical Layer Convergence
Protocol
PMD PLCP MAC LLC MAC Management PHY Management
MAC
fragmentation, encryption
MAC Management
Management PHY DLC Station Management Layer 2 Layer 1
Ilab - WLAN 7
WLAN packets
Layer 1 Header Layer 2 Header
Ilab - WLAN 8
Example Infrastructure
STA 1 AP 1
LAN 1
STA 2 STA 3 STA 4 AP 2 STA 5 STA 6 STA 7
LAN 2
Ilab - WLAN 9
Layer 2 addresses
Frame Control field Addresses
To DS From DS Address 1 Address 2 Address 3 Address 4
RA = DA TA = SA BSSID N/A 1 RA = DA TA = BSSID SA N/A 1 RA = BSSID TA = SA DA N/A 1 1 RA TA DA SA
DA: Destination Address RA: Receiver Address SA: Source Address TA: Transmitter Address
To/From DS values Meaning To DS = 0, From DS = 0 A data frame direct from one STA to another STA within the same IBSS, as well as all management and control type frames -> Ad Hoc Mode To DS = 0, From DS = 1 Data frame exiting the DS To DS = 1, From DS = 0 Data frame destined for the DS. To DS = 1, From DS = 1 Wireless distribution system (WDS) frame being distributed from one AP to another AP.
Ilab - WLAN 10
Example
STA 1 AP 1
LAN 1
STA 2 STA 3 STA 4 AP 2 STA 5 STA 6 STA 7
LAN 2
STA3 to STA4 to DS: 1 from DS: 0 Addr1: AP1 Addr2: STA3 Addr3: STA4 STA3 to STA4 to DS: 0 from DS: 1 Addr1: STA4 Addr2: AP1 Addr3: STA3 STA1 to STA6 to DS: 1 from DS: 1 Addr1: AP2 Addr2: AP1 Addr3: STA6 Addr4: STA1 STA1 to STA6 Addr1: STA1 Addr2: STA6 STA1 to STA6 Addr1: STA1 Addr2: STA6
Ilab - WLAN 11
802.11 – Physical Layer
3 variants: 2x radio (2.4 GHz Band), 1x IR
Infrarot – standardized but not implemented FHSS (Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum) – outdated
DSSS (Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum)
Ilab - WLAN 12
802.11 – Physical Layer
New: OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing)
Very new: OFDM + MIMO
Frequency range
Ilab - WLAN 13
802.11 – MAC-Layer - DFWMAC
Access control mechanisms
Function
New: 802.11e
Ilab - WLAN 14
802.11 – MAC-Layer
Priorities
t medium busy SIFS PIFS DIFS DIFS next frame contention direct access if medium is free ≥ DIFS 802.11b DSSS: SIFS: 10 µs Slot Time: 20 µs
Ilab - WLAN 15
t medium busy DIFS DIFS next frame contention window (randomized back-off mechanism)
802.11 – Access via CSMA/CA I
is free (carrier sense)
begins to send
has been free for a whole DIFS. Then the station waits an additional random back-off-time (collision avoidance)
timer is stopped and we continue at (*)
slot time direct access if medium is free ≥ DIFS
Ilab - WLAN 16
802.11 – Access via CSMA/CA II
Transmission of unicast packets
successfully (CRC check passed)
t SIFS DIFS data ACK waiting time
stations receiver sender data DIFS contention
Ilab - WLAN 17
802.11 – multiple stations - simplyfied
t busy boe station1 station2 station3 station4 station5 packet arrival at MAC DIFS boe boe boe busy elapsed backoff time bor residual backoff time busy medium not idle (frame, ack etc.) bor bor DIFS boe boe boe bor DIFS busy busy DIFS boe busy boe boe bor bor
Ilab - WLAN 18
Extension: RTS and CTS
Ready to Send (RTS) and Clear to Send (CTS) frames RTS is sent before every transmission
Receiver has to confirm via a CTS
the specified duration
Solves the hidden terminal problem
B A C
Ilab - WLAN 19
Synchronization via beacon (Infrastructure)
beacon interval t medium access point busy B busy busy busy B B B value of the timestamp B beacon frame
Synchronization needed for
Beacon also contains BSS-ID
Ilab - WLAN 20
Synchronization via Beacon (Ad-hoc)
t medium station1 busy B1 beacon interval busy busy busy B1 value of the timestamp B beacon frame station2 B2 B2 random delay
Ilab - WLAN 21
Ilab - WLAN 22
WEP – Wired Equivalent Privacy
Encryption of the IEEE 802.11-Standards Authentication
Open System (= no authentication)
Shared Key
Confidentiality
Stream chipher RC4 Integrity
CRC32
Ilab - WLAN 23
Drawbacks of WEP
Integrity
RC4 and CRC32 are linear, manipulation possible
Confidentiality
Key length only 40 Bit (political reasons, export restrictions)
Key stream is often reused
In 2001, Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin und Adi Shamir showed how to
break WEP in a short period of time
Today: WEP keys can be broken within a few minutes
Ilab - WLAN 24
WPA
IEEE 802.11i to become the new security standard WPA was released as a subset of 802.11i WPA uses RC4
Security of WPA depends (as always) on the key (password)
Brute force attacks are always possible
Recommended: use of WPA2
Ilab - WLAN 25
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
WPA-Authentication:
(special protocol for AAA = Authorization, Authentication, and Accounting) servers through the use of pre-shared keys. This mode is called WPA-PSK.
authentication servers.
Confidentiality (Encryption):
encryption.
Integrity:
plaintext message to ensure messages are not being spoofed or altered.
Authentication Code) for the simple reason that MAC is reserved for „Medium Access Control“.
Ilab - WLAN 26
WEP vs. WPA
WEP WPA Encryption
Flawed, cracked by scientists and hackers Fixes WEP flaws Key Length 40-bit keys 128-bit keys Key Management
used by everyone in the network.
distribution of keys - hand typed into each device
keys, Per user, per session, per packet keys
distribution of keys
Authentication
Flawed, used WEP key itself for authentication User authentication using 802.1X and EAP
Ilab - WLAN 27
Protection of a WLAN
WPA instead of WEP
Corporate networks should always be seperated by a firewall Only trust authenticated hosts If no WLAN encryption is available, encryption on higher layer should
be used (e.h. IPSec, TLS…)