Identifying Security Iss es in the Retail Issues in the Retail Payment System Federal Reserve Bank Chicago Chicago
Ellen Richey Chief Enterprise Risk Officer Visa Inc. J 5 2008 June 5, 2008
Visa Public
Identifying Security Iss es in the Retail Issues in the Retail - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Identifying Security Iss es in the Retail Issues in the Retail Payment System Federal Reserve Bank Chicago Chicago Ellen Richey Chief Enterprise Risk Officer Visa Inc. J June 5, 2008 5 2008 Visa Public Agenda 1. The Data Security
Visa Public
Chicago Federal Reserve Visa Public
Direct Mail POS Aggregator/ Direct Marketers >1,000 Loyalty Vendors <100 Chargeback Vendors <100 Call Center Vendors >1,000 Other Vendors 1,000’s Archiving Vendors >100 Fulfillment Vendors 100’s Mail/ Couriers >100 Telecom POS Risk Reporting Vendors <50 Direct Marketers >1,000 D t E t Direct Mail Marketers >100 Data Entry Vendors >100 POS Hardware Vendors <50 Aggregator/ Master Merchants 100’s Telecom Infrastructure Vendors 100’s POS Software Vendors ~ 1000 Gateway Provider >1,000 Risk Scoring Vendors <100 Other Other Bill Data Entry >100 Reporting Vendors <50 Collections Vendors Call Center Vendors >1,000 Financial Relationships 1,000’s Other Networks <50 Payment 1,000’s Chargeback Vendors Call Center Vendors <50 Loyalty 1,000’s ISO >1,000 Issuer Processors <25 Card Embossers <50 Statement Vendors
Merchant >5 million Visa Cards >400 million
<25 Loyalty Vendors <100 Vendors <50 Loyalty Vendors <100 Archiving Vendors >100 Visa Vendors 100’s Acquirer P Other Vendors Archiving Vendors >100 Gateway Providers Fraud Monitoring Vendors 100 s Processor <50 Mail / Couriers >100 Other Vendors Fraud Monitoring V d
Acquirer 250+ Issuer 13,000+
Chicago Federal Reserve Visa Public
Vendors <100 <50 <50 <100 Vendors <50
Visa Inc. and Visa Europe
Numbers illustrative, US Market only
Account number and CVV2 Classic track data Gold/Plat/Corp track data
No Plastic
No Plastic
No Plastic
Semi-finished blank plastic Complete counterfeit Gold plastic Track data and PIN
White-Plastic
Finished Finished
*Source: The United States Secret Service **Typically track data and PIN not for sale; profit share
Chicago Federal Reserve Visa Public
**Typically track data and PIN not for sale; profit share arrangement amongst criminals; estimated criminal profit per card
43% That your card may be used to make a That you may become a victim of identity theft 14% 15% 16% That your personal information may be stored by the merchant You may be accumulating too much debt That your card may be used to make a fraudulent transaction 2% 3% The store doesn’t accept your card brand You might be charged a transaction fee by the merchant 3% 3% 1% Don’t Know/Refused None of these Your card may be declined
Chicago Federal Reserve Visa Public
Source: Security and Fraud: National Survey of Cardholders, Fabrizio, McLaughlin & Assoc., Dec 2007
3%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Don t Know/Refused
L t d St l i th d li
Chicago Federal Reserve Visa Public
Presentation Identifier.7 Information Classification as Needed
Chicago Federal Reserve Visa Public
PCI DSS; PCI PA-DSS, PCI PED, PIN Security Requirements Delete stored data; prevent future storage; replace vulnerable software
vulnerable software
PCI DSS, PCI PA-DSS Establish policies, procedures and processes for maintaining and updating systems that handle sensitive
maintaining and updating systems that handle sensitive data
PCI DSS Execute disciplined firewall policy management and network
Execute disciplined firewall policy management and network security; conduct routine penetration tests of all systems
PCI DSS Utili t ti t t t i l i t
Utilize strong encryption to protect wireless environments
PCI DSS Conduct regular testing of susceptibility to SQL injection
Chicago Federal Reserve Visa Public 8
utilizing automated tools or manual techniques
Chicago Federal Reserve Visa Public
Chicago Federal Reserve Visa Public