I) Introduction The Institutional Framework Functions and - - PDF document

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I) Introduction The Institutional Framework Functions and - - PDF document

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  • Sebastian Buckup

Workshop on Apprenticeship in the West African Region 3 - 4 May 2007 International Labour Organization EMP/SKILLS Department Geneva, Switzerland

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  • Apprenticeship Systems in the West African Region: Institutional Framework

I) Introduction

The Institutional Framework – Functions and Outcomes

II) Governing the Apprenticeship System

Mechanisms to Enforce the Rules of Apprenticeship in West Africa

III) Challenges to the Apprenticeship System

Challenges to the Informal System

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  • The Institutional Framework –

Functions and Outcomes

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  • I) Introduction

Provide incentives for master craftsperson and apprentice to participate in apprenticeship Functional

  • utcome
  • Relevance / quality of skills?
  • Equity of Access?
  • Employability of apprentices?
  • Productivity and compe-

titiveness of enterprises? Development

  • utcome

Institutional Framework (rules + enforcement)

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  • I) Introduction

Informal institutions are behavioral regularities based on socially-shared rules that are created communicated and enforced outside the officially-sanctioned channels Apprenticeship in the informal economies of the West African Region is embedded in an informal institutional framework:

  • Governments
  • Trade unions
  • Employers organizations

Institutional Framework enforced by… enforced by…

  • social networks
  • Informal associations
  • clans

formal informal

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  • Mechanisms to Enforce the

Rules of Apprenticeship in West Africa

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!

II) Governing the Apprenticeship System allowances skilled labor

Apprentice

Master Trainer

recovery period

training & allowances unskilled labor

Apprentice

Master Trainer

investment period

Master only invests in training if apprentice makes a credible commitment to stay in the recovery period

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"#$

II) Governing the Apprenticeship System

  • The apprentice is able to credibly commit if breaking

the agreement is more costly than cooperating.

  • Sanctioning or Enforcement mechanisms

increase the costs of breaking the agreement

  • Requirements for effective sanctioning are:
  • Monitoring mechanism
  • Threat of sanctioning is credible
  • Impact of the punishment is sufficiently high
  • Social networks important to create these conditions
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%&

II) Governing the Apprenticeship System

  • ILO Study (1991)

Lomé: 24% directly related, 47% previously acquainted

Apprenticeship often carried out in social networks

  • ILO/IUED Study (1980)

Bamako: 71.1%,Yaoundé: 64.1%

  • Ghana RPED Study(1992)

85% through friends and relatives

Recruitment among friends and family:

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%'(

II) Governing the Apprenticeship System

  • Affection / Emotional Ties

apprenticeship in social networks avoids opportunistic behaviour

  • Moral Rules / Religious Beliefs

apprenticeship in social networks changes preferences SNs:

  • Shaping individual learning process

SNs:

  • Channeling common knowledge
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%'(

II) Governing the Apprenticeship System

  • Reciprocity

repeated social/economic interaction creates opportunities for retaliation

  • Reputation

present behaviour shapes expectations of actors on future behaviour

  • Communal Sanctions

members of the community punish deviators

SNs:

  • creating interdependence

SNs:

  • disseminating (credible) information

SNs:

  • overcoming collective action problems

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&)*#$

II) Governing the Apprenticeship System

Social networks may improve outcomes by…

  • disseminating credible information
  • creating interdependence
  • shaping learning processes
  • solving collective action problems

… they also may corrupt outcomes by…

  • creating a mechanism of exclusion
  • impeding competition
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  • Hostages / Trade Secrets

hiding a crucial skill from the apprentice creates incentive to obey

  • Payment Structure of Apprenticeship Fees

delaying the payment of fees creates incentive for master to train III) Governing the Apprenticeship System

%#

Basis: - private arrangement Basis: - private arrangement

  • Market Failure

lack of capital requires apprentice to stay with master to amass savings for self employment

Basis: - economic structure

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III) Governing the Apprenticeship System

)

  • Social networks contribute to the functional outcomes
  • f apprenticeship institutions by providing effective

enforcement mechanisms

  • Social networks empirically relevant for the recruitment
  • f master / apprentice
  • Yet, there are also important weaknesses of social networks

(e.g. quality, exclusion)

  • Enforcement mechanisms beyond social networks gain

importance and deserve further studying

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Challenges to the System and Possible Responses

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)'(

III) Challenges to the Apprenticeship System

Do the benefits still justify the costs of the training?

  • Technological change

how will apprenticeship systems deal with complex knowledge?

  • Emergence of new professions

is the traditional training system able to embrace new professions?

  • Globalization

does training for occupational competence fit the needs of new production organizations and value chains?

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)'(

III) Challenges to the Apprenticeship System

… and what about the enforcement mechanisms?

  • Urbanization and Population growth

how does this change the effectiveness of social networks?

  • Health Threats

how do pandemics affect incentives to train?

  • State Neglect

how does the lack of strategic support affect the system?

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