HOW TO AGGREGATE THE CL SIGNATURE SCHEME
Dominique Schroeder* University of Maryland, USA
*Partly supported by a DAAD postdoctoral fellowship
HOW TO AGGREGATE THE CL SIGNATURE SCHEME Dominique Schroeder* - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
HOW TO AGGREGATE THE CL SIGNATURE SCHEME Dominique Schroeder* University of Maryland, USA *Partly supported by a DAAD postdoctoral fellowship AGGREGATE SIGNATURES (Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham) sk 1 , m 1 sk i , m i sk n , m n . . . . .
Dominique Schroeder* University of Maryland, USA
*Partly supported by a DAAD postdoctoral fellowship
Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
(Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham)
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
(Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham)
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
Applications Security model Related Work Bilinear Maps Our Construction
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
Secure Routing Compression of Certificate Chains Compression of Authenticated Data
(Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham)
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
(Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham)
(pk1,m1,σ) (pk1, pk2, m1, m2, σ) (pk1, pk2,...,m1, m2,,...,σ) Sequential aggregate signature Key size??
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
(m1, pk1), . . . , (mi, pki), . . . , (mn, pkn), σ
(Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham)
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
sk m σ
(Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham)
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
Aggregate and Verifiably Encrypted Signatures from Bilinear Maps BGLS (ROM, non sequential, EUROCRYPT 2003) Sequential Aggregate Signatures from Trapdoor Permutations LMRS (ROM, sequential, EUROCRYPT 2004) Aggregate Signatures and Multisignatures Without Random Oracles LOSSW (sequential, large keys!, EUROCRYPT 2006) Efficient Sequential Aggregate Signed Data Neven (ROM, EUROCRYPT 2008)
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
G, GT e: G x G -> GT g generator of G, e(g,g) generator of GT Non degenerate e(g,g)≠1 e(ga,gb) = e(g,g)ab
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
secure under the interactive LRSW assumption
Kg: x,y <- Zp X := gx , Y := gy Sign: r <- Zp, a := gr , b := gry, c := gr(x+Mxy) Vf: e(a,Y) = e(g,b) , e(X,a)*e(X,b)M =e(g,c) e(a,Y) = e(gr,gy) = e(g,g)ry = e(g,gry) = e(g,b) e(X,a)*e(X,b)M = e(gx,gr)*e(gx, gry)M
= e(g,g)xr*e(g, g)xryM
= e(g,g)xr+xryM = e(g,g)r(x+xyM) = e(g,gr(x+xyM)) = e(g,c)
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
Randomized signature: a := gr , b := gry, c := gr(x+Mxy) Use ‘a’ from the previous signer re-randomize the signature afterwards. Cross-Terms public keys ga, gb and signatures Sa and Sb with Vf: e(ga, Sa) e(gagb, Sa Sb) = e(ga, Sa Sb) e(gb, Sa Sb) = e(ga, Sa) e(gb, Sa) e(ga, Sb) e(gb, Sb)
Challenges
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
sk=(x’,y’), pk=(X’,Y’) Randomized signature: a := gr , b := gry, c := gr(x+Mxy) a’ := a b’ := ay‘ = gry‘ c’:= ax’+Mx’y’ =gr(x’+Mx’y’) Re-randomizing: pick r’ a’r’ := grr’ b’r’ := ay‘r’ = grr’y‘ c’r’:= a r’(x’+Mx’y’)=gr r’(x’+Mx’y’)
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
Aggregate Extension Technique
public keys ga, gb and signatures Sa and Sb with Vf: e(ga, Sa) e(gagb, Sa Sb) = e(ga, Sa Sb) e(gb, Sa Sb) = e(ga, Sa) e(gb, Sb) e(gb, Sa) e(ga, Sb)
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Extend the aggregate Signer a sends ga, Sa Compute gb, Sb Extend the aggregate by D:=Sag-b (Sb)-1ga e(gagb, Sa Sb) e(D,g) = e(ga, Sa Sb) e(gb, Sa Sb) e(g,Sag-b (Sb)-1ga)
Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
a := gr , b := gry, c := gr(x+Mxy) a := gr , b’ := gry’, c’ := gr(x’+M’x’y’) Aggregate A:= a , B := bb’= gr(y+y’), C:=cc’ Verification: Π e(Xi,A)e(Xi,B)Mi = e(g,C) Π e(Xi,B) Mi = e(X,B)M e(X’,B)M‘ = e(g,B)xM e(g,B)x’M‘ = e(g,Ay+y’)xM+x’M‘ = e(g,gr)xyM+x’y’M‘+xy’M+x’yM‘
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Extend D := Xy’MYx’M‘ = gx’yM‘+xy’M
Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
Structure of the aggregate A = gr , B = Πgryi , C = Πgr(xi+Mixiyi) , D = Πi≠j gMixiyj Key Generation X:=gx and Y:=gy Sequential Signing σ=(A,B,C,D) a:= A , b := BAy , c = CAx+Mxy , d = DΠi XjxMj YxM pick r’: A := ar’ ; B := br‘ ; C := cr’ ; D := d
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
CL Vf: e(a,Y) = e(g,b) , e(X,a)*e(X,b)M =e(g,c) Verification: e(A,Πi Yi) = e(g,B) Πi (e(Xi,A) e(Xi,B)Mi ) = e(g,C) e(A,D)-1 Πi e(Xi,Yj)Mi=e(g,D)
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Dominique Schröder ESORICS 2011
Non-sequential aggregate signature in the standard model Scheme with short keys based on a non-interactive assumption Construction secure outside the KOSK Construction with short keys outside the KOSK
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