Holger Hermanns dependable systems and software Saarland University - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Holger Hermanns dependable systems and software Saarland University - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Holger Hermanns dependable systems and software Saarland University Saarbrcken, Germany Safety? Safety by design? Make sure hazardous situations are unreachable! Safety by design? Make sure hazardous situations are unreachable! Safety by


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SLIDE 1

Holger Hermanns

dependable systems and software Saarland University Saarbrücken, Germany

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SLIDE 2

Safety?

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SLIDE 3

Safety by design?

Make sure hazardous situations are unreachable!

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SLIDE 4

Safety by design?

Make sure hazardous situations are unreachable!

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SLIDE 5

Safety by design? Why bother?

Enforced by various standards: DO-178C/ED-12C for airborne systems relates to ARP4761 Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) System Safety Assessment (SSA) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Failure Modes and Effects Summary (FMES) Common Cause Analysis (CCA) ISO 26262 for automotive systems ... Higher/highest safety levels recommend formal methods

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SLIDE 6

Prelude

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SLIDE 7

Fault Trees

5x10-3 8x10-3 5x10-3 8x10-3 9x10-4

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SLIDE 8

5x10-3 8x10-3 5x10-3 8x10-3 9x10-4

How to obtain the numbers?

1) Time-independent failure Average number of starts before failure: 200  Failure probability 0.005

Fault Trees

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SLIDE 9

5x10-3 8x10-3 5x10-3 8x10-3 9x10-4

How to obtain the numbers?

1) Time-independent failure Average number of starts before failure: 200  Failure probability 0.005 2) Time-dependent failure: On average once 0.00021 per Mission time: 24h Probability to fail in 24 hours:

⋅.

... and from further models

Fault Trees

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SLIDE 10

Fault Trees – Analysis Basics

9x10-4

Calculate probability

  • f top-level event

… or overapproximation thereof

5x10-3 8x10-3 5x10-3 8x10-3

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SLIDE 11
  • are often very large
  • are very costly to maintain
  • are very important
  • are stateless
  • give imprecise results
  • too pessimistic due to stateless view

+ minimal cutset abstraction

  • too optimistic if dependencies

Fault Trees

licensed at > 55% of nuclear power plants worldwide

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SLIDE 12

All models are wrong, but some are useful.

Models for Safety

George E. P. Box

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SLIDE 13

finite automata

dark light

x==50 off!

  • n? x:=0;
  • n? x:=0;

dark light

Useful Models

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SLIDE 14

finite automata with clocks

dark light

x==50 off!

  • n? x:=0;
  • n? x:=0;

dark light

all running at the same speed Timed Automata

Useful Models

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SLIDE 15

finite automata with clocks and with costs

dark light

x==50 off!

  • n? x:=0;
  • n? x:=0;

dark light

Priced Timed Automata incurred as time advances

Useful Models

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SLIDE 16

finite automata with clocks and with costs modular: composition of automata

someone

y>d

  • n!

y:=0; d:=U[5,55];

dark light

x==50 off!

  • n? x:=0;
  • n? x:=0;

dark light

Automata Networks

Useful Models

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SLIDE 17

finite automata with clocks and with costs modular: composition of automata with probability distributions

someone

y>d

  • n!

y:=0; d:=U[5,55];

dark light

x==50 off!

  • n? x:=0;
  • n? x:=0;

Pr(“on!” >t)

dark light

Stochastic Timed Automata

Useful Models

0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60

U[5,55] Pr(“on!” >t)

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SLIDE 18

finite automata with clocks and with costs modular: composition of automata with probability distributions

someone

y>d

  • n!

y:=0; d:= Exp[5];

dark light

x==50 off!

  • n? x:=0;
  • n? x:=0;

dark light

Pr(“on!” >t) Exp[5]

Stochastic Timed Automata

Useful Models

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SLIDE 19

finite automata with clocks memoryless time and with costs modular: composition of automata with probability distributions

someone

y>d

  • n!

dark light

x==50 off!

  • n? x:=0;
  • n? x:=0;

dark light

Pr(“on!” >t)

Markov Automata

Useful Models

Exp[5]

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SLIDE 20

finite automata with clocks and with costs modular: composition of automata with probability distributions

someone

y>d

  • n!

y:=0; d:= Exp[5];

dark light

x==50 off!

  • n? x:=0;
  • n? x:=0;

dark light

Pr(“on!” >t) Exp[5]

Stochastic Timed Automata

Useful Models

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SLIDE 21

finite automata with clocks and with costs modular: composition of automata with probability distributions

someone

y>d

  • n!

y:=0; d:= Exp[5];

2% 98%

dark light

T>85 && x==50 off!

  • n? x:=0;
  • n? x:=0;

dark light

Pr(“on!” >t) Exp[5]

Useful Models

Stochastic Timed Automata

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SLIDE 22

finite automata with clocks and with costs modular: composition of automata with probability distributions and continuous dynamics

someone

y>d

  • n!

y:=0; d:= Exp[5];

2% 98%

dark light

T>85 && x==50 off!

  • n? x:=0;
  • n? x:=0;

dark light

Pr(“on!” >t) Exp[5]

Useful Models

Stochastic Hybrid Automata

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SLIDE 23
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SLIDE 24

Model Analysis System Model

possible behaviour

Analysis Focus

Model based … Analysis

Results

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SLIDE 25

... ... Model Analysis System Model

possible behaviour

Analysis Focus

Model based … Analysis

Maintenance Failure Architecture Nominal Diagnostics Fault Trees FMEA Results Characteristics Objectives Requirements

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SLIDE 26

... ... System Model

possible behaviour

Analysis Focus

Model based … Analysis

Maintenance Failure Architecture Nominal Diagnostics Fault Trees FMEA Results Characteristics Objectives Requirements Model Analysis

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SLIDE 27

... ... System Model

possible behaviour

Analysis Focus

Model based … Analysis

Maintenance Failure Architecture Nominal Diagnostics Fault Trees FMEA Results Characteristics Objectives Requirements

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SLIDE 28

Magic … ... Iteration Abstraction ... Model Analysis System Model

possible behaviour

Analysis Focus

Model based … Analysis

Maintenance Failure Architecture Nominal Diagnostics Fault Trees FMEA Results Characteristics Objectives Requirements

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SLIDE 29

Model Analysis System Model

possible behaviour

Analysis Focus

Model based … Analysis

Results

A concrete, mission-critical case

modestchecker.org

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SLIDE 30

Embedded in Space

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SLIDE 31

GOMX-1

  • 2U CubeSat (2 liter)
  • Launched in November 2013
  • Payloads:
  • software defined receiver for aircraft signals
  • color camera for earth observation
  • Telemetry transmitted on amateur radio frequency
  • Massive amounts of data collected
  • battery voltage, temperature,

solar infeed, …

Runs our calibration experiments.

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SLIDE 32

Battery Kinetics

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SLIDE 33

Battery Kinetics

0 % 100 %

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SLIDE 34

A B

Battery Kinetics

Kinetic Battery Model

  • can represent ‘rate-capacity effect’
  • can represent ‘recovery effect’
  • a faithful abstraction of modern battery chemistry
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SLIDE 35

Battery Kinetics

A B

Kinetic Battery Model

  • can represent ‘rate-capacity effect’
  • can represent ‘recovery effect’
  • a faithful abstraction of modern battery chemistry
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SLIDE 36

A B

Battery Kinetics

B A

full empty

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SLIDE 37

A B

Battery Kinetics

B A

full empty

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SLIDE 38

A B

Battery Kinetics

B A

full empty

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SLIDE 39

A B

Battery Kinetics

B A

full empty

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SLIDE 40

A B

Battery Kinetics

B A

full empty

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SLIDE 41

A B

Battery Kinetics

B A

full empty

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SLIDE 42

A B

Battery Kinetics

B A

full empty

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SLIDE 43

A B

Battery Kinetics

B A

full empty

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SLIDE 44

A B

Battery Kinetics

B A

full empty

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SLIDE 45

A B

Battery Kinetics

B A

full empty

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SLIDE 46

A B

Battery Kinetics

B A

full empty

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SLIDE 47

Concretely.

Will the battery survive a

  • ne-year

mission?

with 5000 mAh

  • 62
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SLIDE 48

Concretely.

Will the battery survive a

  • ne-year

mission?

With half the capacity? 2500 mAh

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SLIDE 49

Concretely.

Will the battery survive a

  • ne-year

mission?

With a quarter of the capacity? 1250 mAh

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SLIDE 50

Concretely.

Will the battery survive a

  • ne-year

mission?

With an eighth of the capacity ?

625 mAh

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SLIDE 51

Concretely.

Will the battery survive a

  • ne-year

mission?

With a sixteenth of the capacity ? 312.5 mAh

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SLIDE 52

GOMX-2

  • 2U CubeSat (2 liter)
  • Shipped in October 2014

with Cygnus CRS-3 towards ISS

  • Payloads:
  • Optical communication experiments from NUS
  • Highspeed UHF and SDR receiver
  • Shipping failed after liftoff
  • Satellite was recovered

from wreckage and returned to GomSpace

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SLIDE 53

GOMX-3

  • 3U CubeSat (3 liter)
  • Launched from ISS in October 2015
  • Payloads:
  • L-band communication to geostationary satellit
  • X-band transmitter for CNES
  • Highspeed UHF and SDR receiver
  • Can (and must) rotate in 3 dimensions
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SLIDE 54

GOMX-4

  • Two 6U CubeSats (6 liter)
  • Launch expected in 2016
  • Initial design in the making
  • Focus on support for flexible payload model
  • Needs strong support for dynamic load scheduling
  • Battery states are critical
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SLIDE 55

GOMX-3 mission details

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GOMX-3 mission planning

  • Very tight power budget
  • Needs dynamic and battery aware scheduling
  • What we do:
  • Priced Timed Automata modelling
  • Generate optimal schedules for 1 week or day horizon
  • Evaluate schedules on random KiBaM for robustness
  • Send to orbit, observe behaviour, update model
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SLIDE 57

GOMX-3 mission planning

  • Very tight power budget
  • Needs dynamic and battery aware scheduling
  • What we do:
  • Priced TA modelling with linear battery model
  • Generate optimal schedules for 1 week horizon
  • Evaluate schedules on random KiBaM for robustness
  • Prepare for updates of model state based on orbit data
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SLIDE 58

A one-day schedule (for yesterday) and its depletion risk

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SLIDE 59

Meeting Reality, safely

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SLIDE 60

Model Analysis System Model

possible behaviour

Analysis Focus

You saw: Model based … Analysis

Results

  • n a concrete, mission-critical case

modestchecker.org

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SLIDE 61

Magic … ... Iteration Abstraction ... Model Analysis System Model

possible behaviour

Analysis Focus

You see now: Model based … Analysis

Maintenance Failure Architecture Nominal Diagnostics Fault Trees FMEA Results Characteristics Objectives Requirements

in various flavours

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SLIDE 62

Safety by Design?

Some incidents you cannot avoid. For everything else there are … formal methods!