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Historical cryptography 2 CSCI 470: Web Science Keith Vertanen Overview Historical cryptography WWI Zimmerman telegram WWII Rise of the cipher machines Engima Allied encryption 2 WWI: Zimmermann Telegram 1915,


  1. Historical cryptography 2 CSCI 470: Web Science • Keith Vertanen

  2. Overview • Historical cryptography – WWI • Zimmerman telegram – WWII • Rise of the cipher machines • Engima • Allied encryption 2

  3. WWI: Zimmermann Telegram • 1915, U-boat sinks Lusitania – 1,198 drown including 128 US – Germany agrees to surface 1st • 1916, new Foreign Minister – Arthur Zimmermann • 1917, unrestricted submarine warfare – Zimmermann hatches plan • Keep American busy at home • Persuade Mexico to: invade US and invite Japan to attack US as well Arthur Zimmermann 3

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  5. Mechanization of secret writing • Pencil and paper – Security limited by what humans can do quickly and accurately in the heat of battle • Enter the machine Thomas Jefferson's wheel cipher Captain Midnight's Code-o-Graph 5

  6. Enigma machine • Enigma cipher machine – 1918, patented by German engineer Arthur Scherbius Arthur Scherbius – A electrical/mechanical implementation of a polyalphabetic substitution cipher 6

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  8. Enigma rotors • Rotor (wheel, drum) – Monoalphabetic substitution cipher implemented via complex wiring pattern – One of 26 initial positions – Geared: rotates after each letter • Rotor set – 3 rotors in 3!=6 possible orders • Eventually increased to 3 out of 5 • Navy used even more – Possible keys: • 3! * 26 3 = 6 * 17,576 = 105,456 8

  9. Enigma plugboard • Plugboard – Operator inserts cables to swap letters – Initially 6 cables • Swaps 6 pairs of letters • Leaves 14 letters unswapped – Possible configurations: • 100,391,791,500 • Total keys: – 17,576 * 6 * 100,391,791,500 ≈ 10,000,000,000,000,000 9

  10. Enigma • Enigma machine – Sales initially slow – 1923, Germans find out about failures of communication security in WWI – 1925, Scherbius starts mass production – German military eventually buys 30,000 Enigma machines – 1929, Scherbius dies in carriage accident Arthur Scherbius 10

  11. Cracking the Enigma • Step 1: Espionage – Disgruntled Schmidt meets with French agent – Sells Enigma user manuals • Allows replica to be constructed • Also codebook and daily key scheme – French give intelligence to Poles "It is assumed in judging the security of the Hans-Thilo Schmidt cryptosystem that the enemy has at his disposition the machine." -German memorandum 11

  12. Cracking the Enigma • Step 2: Poles identify weakness: – German's had day code specifying: • Configuration of rotors (3! orders) • Settings of rotors (26 3 settings) • Settings of plugboard (6 letter swaps) – Unique key per message: • Send 3 letters, encrypted with day key Marian Rejewski • Letters specify new setting of rotors • New rotor setting then used for remainder of message • Repeat the 3 initial letters Repetition is the enemy of security! 12

  13. Cracking the Enigma • Find patterns in first 6 letters – 1 st & 4 th , 2 rd & 5 th , 3 rd & 6 th ciphers of same letter Message 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 1 L O K R G M 2 M V T X Z E 3 J K T M P E 4 D V Y P Z X 1 st A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 4 th P M R X 13

  14. Cracking the Enigma • Given enough messages: – Fill in full table of relations between 3 pairs Message 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 1 L O K R G M 2 M V T X Z E 3 J K T M P E 4 D V Y P Z X 1 st A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 4 th F Q H P L W O G B M V R X U Y C Z I T N J E A S D K 14

  15. Fingerprinting a day key • Find chains – Chains change each day depending on day key 1 st A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 4 th F Q H P L W O G B M V R X U Y C Z I T N J E A S D K A → F → W → A 3 links B → Q → Z → K → V → E → L → R → I → B 9 links C → H → G → O → Y → D → P → C 7 links J → M → X → S → T → N → U → J 7 links – Also for 2 nd & 5 th and 3 rd & 6 th letter pairs – # of chains and length, independent of plugboard – Catalog 105,456 rotors settings using replica 15

  16. WWII • 1938, Germany increases Enigma security – Add two additional rotors, C(5, 3) = 60 – 10 plugboard cables instead of 6 – Poles couldn't build big enough bombes – Poles give research + replicas to Britain & France Bletchley Park bombe US Navy bombe 16

  17. Bletchley Park • Government Code and Cypher School – Height of WWII, 9000 people – Battled against improvements to Enigma – May 1, 1940 Germans stop repeating day key • Turing had already developed technique + machine to crack using a crib instead of repetition of key Alan Turing 17

  18. Cribs • Cribs – Some plaintext you suspect is in ciphertext • Ideally also its location • e.g. Germans usually broadcast weather at 6 am – "wetter" somewhere at start of message – German Navy had strongest crypto: • 3 rotors out of 8, reflector with 26 orientations • Avoided stereotypical messages – Allies: • Mine area to generate traffic – Grid reference as crib • Also, stole code books 18

  19. Allied encryption • Typex – British army and air force – 5 rotors • ECM Mark II (SIGABA) – United States – 15 rotors – No known cryptanalysis • But big, expensive, fragile • M-209 – Portable mechanical device – For tactical use 19

  20. Navy Department , Office of Chief of Naval Operations , Washington, D.C. CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL Date: 27 Dec 1943 CARELESS COMMUNICATIONS COST LIVES The following is a list of some of common violations of security principles: DRAFTING: Unnecessary word repetition Unnecessary or improper punctuation Plain language reply to encrypted dispatch Classification too high Operation of the cipher Precedence too high machine is as important Cancellation in plain language of an encrypted dispatch as the cipher itself! ENCRYPTION: "XYX" or "X"'s for nulls "XX" & "KK" to separate padding from text Same letters at both ends to separate padding from text Continuity of padding Seasonal and stereotyped padding Repetition of generatrices (Ed. Note: CSP-845) Systematic selection of generatrices (Ed. Note: CSP-845) Using plain text column for encryption (Ed. Note: CSP-845) Proper strips not eliminated as prescribed by internal indicator (Ed. Note: CSP- 845) Improper set-up according to date Using system not held by all addressees Failing to use system of narrowest distribution CALLS: Enciphering indefinite call sign Enciphering call signs of shore activities CODRESS might have been used 20

  21. Code talkers • Machine based encryption – Heavy equipment – Slow to perform • Code talking – Use Native American languages – Started in WWI with Choctaw – Improvise phrases for out-of-vocabulary words • "big gun" = artillery • "little gun shoot fast" = machine gun 21

  22. Code talkers • Navajo code talkers – WW II – Few outsiders knew the unwritten language – 3 line message: 20 seconds vs. machine: 30 min – Lexicon of 274 words + phonetic alphabet http://library.thinkquest.org/28005/flashed/timemachine/courseofhistory/navajo-dic.shtml 22

  23. Summary • History of cryptography – WW I • Zimmerman telegraph – WW II • Enigma • Allied encryption • Code talkers 23

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