Governance Challenges at the Intersection of Space and Cyber - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Governance Challenges at the Intersection of Space and Cyber Security

18th Asian Security Conference Securing Cyberspace: Asian and International Perspectives New Delhi, 10 February 2016 Jana Robinson Space Security Program Director Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI)

Presentation Overview

1. Introduction 2. Interaction of Space and Cyber Domains 3. Cyber as Counterspace Tool 4. Governance Aspects 5. Crisis Management Considerations 6. Conclusion

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• 1. Introduction
• Increasing number of space-dependent governments
• Integrity, availability and security of space assets essential
• Growth of space vulnerabilities commensurate with terrestrial dependency on

space-based capabilities

• Cyber-related vulnerabilities of space assets a major concern
• TCBMs of key importance to managing militarily-sensitive space situations, but

sound crisis management mechanisms also required

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• 2. Interaction of Space and Cyber Domains
• Today’s space operations entirely cyberspace dependent
• Critical portion of cyberspace can only be provided by space operations
• Interconnectedness of space and cyberspace not only a military concern

Examples:

• commercial software can be used to affect a country’s critical infrastructure
• Attack on location and timing information from a GNSS as a result of the cyber exploitation
• f the satellite system
• Dual-use technologies employed in both domains
• Intensified public-private sector partnership to address cyber threats to space
• perations desirable
• Behavior, not only technologies, needs to be addressed in establishing sound

governance

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• 3. Cyber as a Counterspace Tool
• Dependence on space and cyberspace introduces asymmetric risks of disruption
• Cyber attack on space assets has many advantages over a kinetic attack (e.g.

plausible deniability, making offensive attack seem as defensive, etc.)

• Configuring adequate defenses for both military and civilian operators

challenging due to continuous innovation and transformation of IT

• Threats include: damage or destruction of spacecraft executed via access to

satellite’s controls; denial, degradation, or other manipulation with the satellite’s transmission; revealing satellite’s capabilities or information (e.g. imagery); spying, or compromising, space-based networks

• Challenge is how to consolidate command of space and cyberspace domains

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• 4. Governance Aspects
• Overarching architecture for space and cyberspace governance has to:
• Cover both commercial and military activities
• Account for their global, strategic, and dual-use nature and dependence on the EM spectrum and IT

infrastructure

• Russia and China at the forefront of promoting arms control in space domain (PAROS initiatives;

Chinese-Russian draft “Treaty on Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT); Russia’s “no first placement of weapons in outer space” initiative)

• PAROS, PPWT and “no first placement” initiatives fail to address space reality
• Russia and China took a different approach concerning cyber (draft International Code of

Conduct for Information Security) which uses certain terminology not acceptable to the U.S. and European countries

• Reveals differing views on security concepts
• EU proposed a different kind of Code of Conduct for Space, one that promotes behavioral norms

and TCBMs

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• 4. Governance Aspects - continued
• TCBMs promoted both in the context of space and cyberspace security

(e.g. UNCOPUOS STSC Working Group on Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities; a consensus 2013 report by GGE on TCBMs for Outer Space Activities; GGE report on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications; the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, etc.)

• TCBMs for both domains only politically, not legally, binding – i.e. depend on

good will and voluntarism of states – but represent a good foundation for configuring what is permissible

• TCBMs a useful, preventive tool and barometer of political/diplomatic relations
• Reliable situational awareness in both domains required not only for effective
• perations, but also to safeguard these domains and respond to contingencies

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• 5. Crisis Management Considerations
• Intersection of space and cyberspace needs to be an integral component of

broader security and foreign policy considerations in every space-dependent country

• Crisis management related to this intersection must track the ever-changing

nature of operational capabilities and ensure effective organizational structures empowered to address various contingencies

• Internationally, not only norms of responsible behavior are required, but also

agreement on clear procedures to deal with escalatory spirals and other unexpected eventualities

• While multilateral agreement on universal governance rules may prove elusive

in a crisis scenario, it is important that all parties understand potentially substantial penalties for misconduct

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• 5. Crisis Management Considerations - continued

National Considerations:

• Establishment of a mechanism to acquire common 24/7 situational awareness;
• Education of space operators concerning cyberspace-related threats;
• Building collaborative arrangements between the space and cyberspace operators;
• Building a dossier of possible space vulnerabilities stemming from cyberspace, and possible consequences

(including potential for escalation);

• Understanding strategic-level implications of different contingencies;
• Configuration of smooth interaction among the relevant government authorities, and commercial and other

actors, to enable rapid reaction to unexpected events and shaping proper defenses and damage control;

• Ensuring political level preparedness through the establishment of a link between the operationally

responsible entities/authorities and government authorities relevant to space security;

• Practicing national table top exercises that involve government, commercial, and NGO representatives to

test how a common operating picture, incorporating possible political, economic, and social impacts, can be quickly configured in the event of “incidents”;

• Understanding the benefits and challenges of establishing a separate “cyber command” within existing military

and intelligence structures.

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• 5. Crisis Management Considerations - continued

International Considerations:

• Discussion of possible modalities for the inclusion of a cyber operating picture in the

current efforts to construct shared space situational awareness;

• Engaging in joint table-top exercises with key space partners that address

electromagnetic spectrum threats;

• Organizing exchanges among, and between, government and commercial entities

concerning various approaches to crisis management related to cyber threats (including detection, classification and risk assessment) for space operators;

• Determining how to mutually reinforce efforts in various international organizations,

including the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the OECD.

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• 6. Conclusion
• Due to world’s heavy – and increasing – dependence on space and cyberspace,

security of these domains stands equal with other key national and international security considerations

• Priority international attention to safeguarding these domains creates
• pportunity to formulate realistic foundational governance concepts
• A step in this direction would be to marry norms of responsible behavior/TCBMs

(as a practical tools for collaboration) and mature crisis management (as a necessary contingency if identified “rules of the road” should be violated)

• Political-level collaboration would enable the development of a common critical

path to manage militarily-sensitive space situations

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