Geo-indistinguishability: A Principled Approach to Location Privacy - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Geo-indistinguishability: A Principled Approach to Location Privacy - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Geo-indistinguishability: A Principled Approach to Location Privacy Kostas Chatzikokolakis CNRS, INRIA, LIX Ecole Polytechnique joint work with Miguel Andr es, Nicol as Bordenabe, Catuscia Palamidessi, Marco Stronati PRINCESS QIF Day,


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SLIDE 1

Geo-indistinguishability: A Principled Approach to Location Privacy

Kostas Chatzikokolakis

CNRS, INRIA, LIX Ecole Polytechnique

joint work with Miguel Andr´ es, Nicol´ as Bordenabe, Catuscia Palamidessi, Marco Stronati PRINCESS QIF Day, Dec 16, 2014

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Location-Based Systems

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  • Retrieval of Points of Interest (POIs).
  • Mapping Applications.
  • Deals and discounts applications.
  • Location-Aware Social Networks.

A location-based system is a system that uses geographical information in order to provide a service.

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SLIDE 3

Location-Based Systems

  • Location information is sensitive. (it can be linked to

home, work, religion, political views, etc).

  • Ideally: we want to hide our true location.
  • Reality: we need to disclose some information.

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Example

  • Find restaurants within 300 meters.

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  • Hide location, not

identity.

  • Provide approximate

location.

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Obfuscation

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area of interest

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SLIDE 6

Obfuscation

7

reported position area of interest

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SLIDE 7

Obfuscation

7

area of retrieval area of interest

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SLIDE 8

Obfuscation

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area of retrieval area of interest

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SLIDE 9

Obfuscation

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area of interest

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The Goals

  • We want an obfuscation mechanism.
  • Formal privacy definition, independent from prior information.
  • Easy to compute, independently of the number of locations.
  • No need of a trusted third-party.

9

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SLIDE 11

Towards a Definition

  • Secrets are locations.
  • Attacker’s goal: distinguish

location x from x’.

  • The closer two locations are,

the more indistinguishable they should be.

14

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SLIDE 12

Towards a Definition

  • Secrets are locations.
  • Attacker’s goal: distinguish

location x from x’.

  • The closer two locations are,

the more indistinguishable they should be.

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indistinguishable

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SLIDE 13

Towards a Definition

  • Secrets are locations.
  • Attacker’s goal: distinguish

location x from x’.

  • The closer two locations are,

the more indistinguishable they should be.

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distinguishable

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SLIDE 14

Towards a Definition

  • Secrets are locations.
  • Attacker’s goal: distinguish

location x from x’.

  • The closer two locations are,

the more indistinguishable they should be.

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mildly distinguishable

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SLIDE 15

Towards a Definition

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  • Secrets are locations.
  • Attacker’s goal: distinguish

location x from x’.

  • The closer two locations are,

the more indistinguishable they should be.

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SLIDE 16

Towards a Definition

15

  • Secrets are locations.
  • Attacker’s goal: distinguish

location x from x’.

  • The closer two locations are,

the more indistinguishable they should be.

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SLIDE 17

Towards a Definition

15

  • Secrets are locations.
  • Attacker’s goal: distinguish

location x from x’.

  • The closer two locations are,

the more indistinguishable they should be.

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SLIDE 18

Towards a Definition

15

  • Secrets are locations.
  • Attacker’s goal: distinguish

location x from x’.

  • The closer two locations are,

the more indistinguishable they should be.

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SLIDE 19

Geo-Indistinguishability

  • We can consider the set of possible locations as the set of secrets,

and the Euclidian distance as the metric.

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A location obfuscation mechanism M provides ϵ-geo-indistinguishability if:

DP(M(x), M(x’)) ≤ ϵ d(x,x’) ∀ x, x’ Where d(x,x’) is the Euclidean distance between x and x’.

[ Pierce et al., ICFP 2010 ] [ Chatzikokolakis et al, PETS 2013 ]

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Line of work

[PETS’13] privacy under general metrics [CCS’13] application to location privacy, planar Laplace [CCS’14] mechanisms of optimal utility [PETS’14] protecting location traces [ongoing] privacy metrics adapted to the semantics of the map

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The Planar Laplace Mechanism

A way to achieve geo-indistinguishability is to add noise from a 2- dimensional Laplace distribution. Computationally efficient. Scales very well. Independent from the set of locations and the user. Utility may not be optimal.

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We measure the (inverse of) utility as the “Quality Loss”:

Utility of a mechanism

Utility depends on the user! Utility measure: QL(K) = Expected distance of K (wrt π and dQ) π : user’s prior dQ : quality metric

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Goal

Guarantee geo-indistinguishability.

  • Pre-fixed privacy level ϵ.
  • Independent from the user and adversary’s prior.

Optimize utility.

  • For a given set of locations.
  • Depends on the user’s prior π.
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The dX-optimal mechanism

K is OPTQL wrt ϵ, π, dX and dQ iff: From all mechanisms that provide geo-indistinguishability with level at least ϵ, K is the one with the best utility.

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The dX-optimal mechanism

Choose: K To minimize: QL(K) Subject to: kxz ≤ e kx’z ∀ x,x’,z (dX-privacy)

ϵdX(x,x’)

We get K by solving a linear optimization problem:

|X|3 constraints!

Because we need to consider the privacy constraints for all x, x’.

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Spanners

δ = 3 δ = 1.5 δ = 1.25 δ = 10

Images from “Geometric Spanner Networks”, by G. Narasimhan and M. Smid

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Protecting location traces

◮ Secrets are now tuples

x = (x1, . . . , xn)

◮ Distance between tuples:

d∞(x, x′) = max

i

d(xi, x′

i ) ◮ Use ǫd∞-privacy

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Independent Mechanism

apply noise to each point n ǫN d∞-private

◮ works on any trace

(including random teleporting)

◮ budget is linear on n

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Predictive Mechanism

prediction function

◮ based on public info ◮ obtain point ˜

zi is ˜ zi close to xi?

◮ yes: report ˜

zi

◮ no: add new noise to xi

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Predictive Mechanism

prediction function

◮ based on public info ◮ obtain point ˜

zi is ˜ zi close to xi?

◮ yes: report ˜

zi

◮ no: add new noise to xi

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Predictive Mechanism

prediction function

◮ based on public info ◮ obtain point ˜

zi is ˜ zi close to xi?

◮ yes: report ˜

zi

◮ no: add new noise to xi

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Predictive Mechanism

prediction function

◮ based on public info ◮ obtain point ˜

zi is ˜ zi close to xi?

◮ yes: report ˜

zi

◮ no: add new noise to xi

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Testing the prediction

Deterministic test

breaks privacy

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Testing the prediction

Deterministic test

breaks privacy

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Testing the prediction

Deterministic test

breaks privacy

D-Private test

use a noisy border for the test

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Testing the prediction

Deterministic test

breaks privacy

D-Private test

use a noisy border for the test

Budget used at each step

ǫθ (successful prediction)

  • r ǫθ + ǫN (new noise)
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(In)Distinguishability Metric

What is it that you want to be similar to? ( and how much? )

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Euclidean Metric

◮ space provides privacy ◮ scaled by ǫ

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Euclidean Metric

◮ space provides privacy ◮ scaled by ǫ

but...

◮ space is not equally valuable

everywhere

◮ POI/population/... also provide

privacy

◮ we can achieve better

privacy/utility by adapting the noise to the map

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Building a custom metric

◮ divide the space in cells (eg grid 100m x 100m) ◮ privacy weight of each cell

◮ from POI/population/... (eg by querying OSM) ◮ from the cell’s area

◮ build a metric d satisfying the requirement f :

weight(Bd

r (x)) ≥ f (r)

x, r

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SLIDE 41

Building a custom metric

◮ divide the space in cells (eg grid 100m x 100m) ◮ privacy weight of each cell

◮ from POI/population/... (eg by querying OSM) ◮ from the cell’s area

◮ build a metric d satisfying the requirement f :

weight(Bd

r (x)) ≥ f (r)

x, r

Exponential Mechanism

constructed from any metric d

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SLIDE 42

Privacy weights

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SLIDE 43

Obtained Mechanism

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Location Guard for Chrome and Firefox

https://github.com/chatziko/location-guard 4700+ daily users

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Future work

Privacy guarantees under (un)correlation conditions between the points in the trace. Questions?